University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

November 2017

Changing Changelessness: On the Genesis and
Development of the Doctrine of Divine
Immutability in the Ancient and Hellenic Period
Milton Wilcox
University of South Florida, miltonwilcox@mail.usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Wilcox, Milton, "Changing Changelessness: On the Genesis and Development of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability in the Ancient
and Hellenic Period" (2017). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7108

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Changing Changelessness:
On the Genesis and Development of the
Doctrine of Divine Immutability in the Ancient and Hellenic Period

by

Milton Wilcox

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
with a concentration in Philosophy and Religious Studies
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Joanne Waugh, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor: James Strange, Ph.D.
Roger Ariew, Ph.D.
Michael DeJonge, Ph.D.
Mor Segev, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
November 8, 2017

Keywords: Ancient, Immutability, Divine, Changeless, History, Theology
Copyright © 2017, Milton Wilcox

DEDICATION

To my mothers, Denise and Debbie, who did not live to see this work completed, you are
the source of so much of all that is good in my life.
And to Wynn—because even a blind squirrel finds a nut sometimes.

χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and above all others, Kylie must be praised for her elegance, excellence, and
ceaseless support of not only me and this process, but also of our children. It has been a long row
to hoe, my love, but laboring beside you is all joy—even when I am at my most cranky.
Second, thank you to my children for their precocious joy and inquisitiveness about
everything in the world, but also for the hugs, kisses, late nights, early mornings, laughter, and
tears that we have shared. Without you, my little ones, my life would be the poorer.
Third, thank you to my fathers, both of whom have inspired me to faithfulness to my
projects and the people I share my life with. Your examples have carried me to this point.
Fourth, thank you to my siblings, both of blood and marriage, all of you consistently
challenge me to be my best, but particularly to Sarah for your drive for competition.
Fifth, thank you to my friends and colleagues at USF who have offered a friendly and
critical ear to my rather arcane field of research. In particular I would like to thank Dan Collette
and his family for their steady and deepening friendship over these years (as well as all the
shared turkey).
Sixth, thank you to the members of the Bartow Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church.
Your support through so many struggles in these years has been a buoy to my family through the
celebration of new life and the grief of losing our mothers. I especially thank Rob Patrick for his
tireless ministry to my family and our souls and Zach Simmons because sometimes one just
needs to play a game.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter One: The Transition From Mythological Thinking about Cosmological Deities into
Abstract Thinking About Transcendental Deities In the Greek and Hebrew Contexts .............5
Transitioning to Transcendental Thinking About the Divine in the Archaic Greek
Context ..........................................................................................................................5
Transitioning to Transcendental Thinking About the Divine in the Archaic Hebrew
Context .........................................................................................................................13
Chapter Two: The Genesis of the DDI in the Greek Context ........................................................24
Introduction .......................................................................................................................24
Xenophanes of Colophon ...................................................................................................26
Parmenides of Elea ............................................................................................................36
Pre-Socratic Divine Motion and Its Origin ........................................................................51
Chapter Three: The Genesis of the DDI in the Ancient Hebrew Context .....................................55
Abraham and the Binding and Sacrifice if Isaac: Absurdity and Covenant Constancy ....55
Further Instances of Covenant Constancy in the Face of Absurdity .................................63
Chapter Four: Influential Texts of Plato and Aristotle ..................................................................68
Doctrinal Genus and Differentia ........................................................................................68
Plato and the DDI...............................................................................................................71
Aristotle and Divine Changelessness .................................................................................80
Perfectly Active Substance ....................................................................................86
Perfect Human Psychological Activity ..................................................................91
Chapter Five: Cicero, Philo Judaeus, and the New Testament ......................................................95
Cicero and Middle Platonism.............................................................................................95
Philo Judaeus ...................................................................................................................102
Early Epistles and Immutability.......................................................................................114
Chapter Six: Justin Martyr and the DDI in the Context of the 2nd Century .................................123
Second Century Philosophy and Bibliophilia ..................................................................123
Justin’s Version of the DDI .............................................................................................130
Divine Perfection and Covenant Constancy as a Means to Articulate the Philosophical
Acceptability of the Incarnation and the Godhead .....................................................139
i

Conclusion and Further Work ......................................................................................................150
References ....................................................................................................................................156

ii

ABSTRACT
This project will track and explain the development of the Doctrine of Divine
Immutability from early mythological and scriptural source material that seems to indicate that
divine entities are changeable into metaphysical systems that demand a perfectly consistent
deity. The Doctrine of Divine Immutability is a philosophical and theological postulate that has
long been a staple of systematic metaphysics and theology, but its function in robust and fully
formed systems is different than its function when it is first generated in Ancient Greece and
Judah. Methodologically mostly primary sources are studied and compared with interpretive help
from relevant secondary sources. Once the generation and evolution of this doctrine is
understood, a more holistic understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy
will be evident. Additionally a more robust understanding of Middle Platonism and 1st and 2nd
century Christianity and their relationship to Roman Stoicism will be achieved. Of particular
importance to contemporary scholarship this work will allow us to understand the doctrine in its
context and will shield us from anachronistic readings of the arguments that are bound to cause
fundamental errors in scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of this study we will be considering the Doctrine of Divine Immutability in
its context. The time period under consideration will stretch primarily from the 500’s BCE until
200CE. The purpose of this study is to trace the features of the doctrine in question and provide a
sort of genealogy that will help explicate the content of the doctrine as well as the work that it
does in its context. Each chapter will cover a major section of the development of the doctrine as
it grows and changes over the years in different thinker’s hands. Accordingly, for the most part
the study shall proceed chronologically in two major geographical locations. We will be
considering the confluence between the thought of Post-Exilic Judaism and Post-Dark-Ages
Greece.
The first chapter will outline the state of the mythic traditions of Homer and the Tanakh
out of which our doctrine will grow. It will examine the similarities and differences between
these points of departure and attempt to show how two slightly divergent conceptions of the DDI
develop. Of particular note will be the nature of the religious and cultural traditions and the way
in which they took themselves to carry meaning to the people that live inside these traditions.
The Greek context is moving from a robustly polytheistic and decentralized religio-mythical
tradition that allows for a great deal of variation between city-states. The Jewish context is
different. Rather than having a contiguous and pluralistic culture as regards its deities, it is not
dealing so much with an internal series of critiques, but rather the trauma of the diaspora and the
loss of the central cultic artifacts that were central to the Temple worship of the pre-exilic period.
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Accordingly, these different contexts mean that the questions that are raised as concern the
Divine are different, and will have slightly divergent answers.
The second chapter will focus explicitly on the development in the Greek of those
philosophical and religious antecedents that will later figure in more robust and systematic
articulations of the DDI. Xenophanes of Colophon and Parmenides of Elea are the two preSocratic thinkers that will be most salient to our discussion. While there are a great number of
other poets that we could consider, I wish to focus on seminal thinkers from whom we have
sufficient extant fragments from which to build an account of their thought. While Pythagoras
and the Milesians would be fascinating to study, there simply is not enough data to form a
cohesive understanding of how they would have articulated the DDI. The fragments of
Xenophanes have been the subject of much debate regarding early “Greek Monotheism,” though
reports of his systematic theology, and supposed monotheism, are overblown. Special attention
will be paid to Parmenides’ fragments, particularly his third fragment as an interpretive tool that
will help the modern reader understand how ancient convictions about the link between
epistemology and ontology function. The reason for the significance of this fragment will
become plain over the course of the argument, but essentially it is the epistemic mechanism
which allows for mortal and profane minds to understand the truths of divine existence and
generate the DDI.
The third chapter will cover the Exilic and Post-Exilic transition out of pure cultic
Temple Hebraic religion to what might be called Proto-Synagogue Judaism. Special attention
will be paid to the traditions internal textual resources in the Torah so that the Jewish articulation
of the DDI is not confused or conflated with the developments that are occurring at Greece in the
same century. Much of the argument will turn on a particularly detailed analysis of how the story
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of Abraham and the sacrifice of Isaac will provide the epistemic hook upon which the DDI can
hang.
The fourth chapter will cover the seminal texts in Plato and Aristotle. This study is not an
attempt to perfectly and most accurately understand exactly what Plato and Aristotle believed
about the DDI, but rather to show those texts which most fully contain the resources upon which
other thinkers will build in order to advance a more systematic DDI. Because the project is
concerned with the development of the idea over time, I will of course, try to articulate how
these passages might be read in their context (both temporally and canonically), but these
readings are by no means exclusive. They will, however, identify the systematic language upon
which the next few centuries of debate and development depend.
The fifth chapter will focus on the first century BCE and the first century CE. The three
focus individuals in this chapter will be Marcus Tullius Cicero, Philo Judaeus (also known as
Philo of Alexandria), and the Apostle Paul (Saul of Tarsus). For the most part Cicero’s De Natua
Deorum will be in focus, Philo’s “Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis” and “On the
Unchangeableness of God” will be of peculiar significance, and the Pauline Epistles and the
Epistle to the Hebrews will be the focus of the Christian primary source material. Through all of
these sections special attention must be paid to the influence of Middle Platonism on the general
philosophical landscape in the Roman Empire.
The sixth chapter will focus entirely on St. Justin Martyr as a second century CE Middle
Platonist and as a Christian Apologist. While there are some salient passages from the Apologies,
most of the chapter will attend to the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. This chapter will show a
Hellenic Christian synthesis of the two forms of the DDI (both of which have grown closer and
closer over the centuries and the Hellenization of the Jewish culture—as evidenced by Philo’s
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work). After the argument and explanation has been accomplished, a more complete
understanding and articulation of the nature of the DDI in the ancient world will have been
articulated, and further uses for this work will be suggested in a brief conclusion.

4

CHAPTER ONE:
THE TRANSITION FROM
MYTHOLOGICAL THINKING ABOUT COSMOLOGICAL DEITIES
INTO ABSTRACT THINKING ABOUT TRANSCENDENTAL DEITIES
IN THE GREEK AND HEBREW CONTEXTS

Transitioning to Transcendental Thinking About the Divine in the Archaic Greek Context
The transition from the Homeric period of Greece to the Archaic period occurred in what
some scholars of religion, following Karl Jaspers, have called the Axial Age.1 In this time period
a great many ideas about divine entities, religiosity, and philosophy were first generated and
critiqued. It is in this transitional period that Greek Philosophy is born, and many
transcendentalist critiques of the traditional polytheistic religion of the Greek-speaking peoples
arise. While it is fascinating that this Axial Age transition appears to occur in roughly the same
centuries worldwide (c. 800 BCE-200 BCE) the doctrines and ideas of this period are by no
means identical from culture to culture.2 Of particular interest to this study is that the Doctrine of
Divine Immutability3 is sometimes dated to this period—in particular it seems as though DDI is
a basically Hellenic idea. In the archaic period critiques of traditional Bronze and Iron Age
deities began to emerge, and it appears as though the DDI is first found in these critiques. Bronze
and Iron Age deities are often either theriomorphic or thoroughly anthropomorphic, are most

1

Karl Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by Michael Bullock. London: Yale University Press,
1953. p.1.
2
That is to say, the rise of Daoism and Confucianism and the subsequent Ru Mo debates in ancient China had
remarkably little to do with Greek thought about the Divine. Harappan religiosity and the spread of missionary
Buddhism may have had more influence on Hebrew, Hellenic, and Roman religiosity, but such claims deserve their
own study, a work I leave to others.
3
DDI hereafter.
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often understood and communicated about in familial terms, and serve as a point of contact
between human order and cosmic order. In the Axial Age it is precisely the issue of
anthropomorphism that many religious and philosophical thinkers begin to challenge. It is this
anthropomorphic understanding of deity that is being directly addressed by the Pre-Socratics in
Greece and the Major Prophets in Palestine. One of the first Greek critics of the traditional
conceptions of deity is Xenophanes of Colophon. In order to understand to what Xenophanes—
as well as some other Pre-Socratic philosophers—was committed, some examination of their
cultural context and background is in order. Accordingly we shall first consider the intellectual
background of the Homeric period and then the pre-Socratic thinkers Xenophanes and
Parmenides. This consideration will aid us in understanding the rise of abstract, or
“transcendental,” thinking about the divine, and accordingly the rise of the idea of divine
changelessness.
As with most archaic cultures, the intellectual life of Homeric culture was not divided
from the religious practice of the day. Accordingly, any idea of what is “true” of the divine,
cosmic, and human realities will likewise look different from later ideas concerning truth.
“Truth” in the Homeric period looked rather different from a Hellenic idea of truth, or even a
basic correspondence theory. The arbitration of what was true involved the speech of powerful
individuals who occupied the social roles of poets, seers, and kings as Detienne and Havelock
have both argued. Concerning the topic of the truth of things, Detienne claims, “in archaic
Greece, three figures—the diviner, the bard, and the king of justice—share the privilege of
dispensing truth purely by virtue of their characteristic qualities.”4 In the time of Homer, these
three types of person had special authority to declare truth, and were considered the Experts
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Marcel Detienne. "The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece." Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: Urzone, Inc.,
1996.16. Note: I will refer to these offices as “seer, poet, and king” respectively.
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whom others could trust to impart knowledge. Both the poet and the seer had a direct religious
connection to what Detienne calls “the Beyond,”5 but what we may correctly call the divine
(after all, the claim that everything was full of the gods was not instantly dismissed). Poets and
seers were supposedly able to disclose the past, present, and future by looking into the invisible
world that other people could not see, or by contact with the Muses:
And they once taught Hesiod the art of singing verse,
While he pastured his lambs on holy Helikon’s slopes.
And this was the very first thing they told me,
The Olympian Muses, daughters of Zeus Aegisholder:
“Hillbillies and bellies, poor excuses for shepherds:
We know how to tell many believable lies,
But also, when we want to, how to speak the plain truth.”
So spoke the daughters of great Zeus, mincing their words.
And they gave me a staff, a branch of good sappy laurel,
Plucking it off, spectacular. And they breathed into me
A voice divine, so I might celebrate past and future.6
The roles of the poet and the seer were not identical, however. The seer’s occupation
often seems more “religious” to us because their business was divining the will of the gods for a
new ritual or cultic action (examples include slaughtering a goat and looking at the entrails, or
casting sheep knuckle-bones or teeth to discern whether the gods would favor them in war or
not). Such ritualistic activities seem more religious in nature simply because of their ritualized
embodiment. We should note, however, that not all divination occurred in secret, and it often

5

Detienne, 16.
"Theogony." In Hesiod: Works & Days; Theogony, 61-62. Translated by Stanley Lombardo. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 1993. 22-34.
αἵ νύ ποθ’ Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν, ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ’ Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο. τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ
πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον, Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο· “ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.” ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι
μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι, καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι
αὐδὴν θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, καί μ’ ἐκέλονθ’ ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, σφᾶς
δ’ αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν. M.L. West, Hesiod. Theogony, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966: 111149.
6
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involved the participation of observers who occupied other social roles.7 The seer’s role also
seems to have had a more mystical (perhaps even magical) bent than the other two roles. Oracles
who lived in caves, who flew into trances in order that they might speak their prophecies, were
still part of Ancient Greek society, but they were sometimes removed from it by physical
separation. As often as not, oracles of this sort waited for others to seek them out wherever they
happened to live. Indeed a number of the oracles we have record of seem to be tied to one place,
e.g. the oracle of Delphi or Ammon Zeus. The role of the seer is, in some ways, closer to the role
of a shaman than it is to anything like a priest.8 While by an art or a gift a seer might transport
information between the divine and human realms, the gift is often not under the seer’s direct
control.
The poet’s role, in contrast, was broader. His place was among the people. He traveled
about declaring the great tales of men and gods, stories of gods, heroes, battles, victories, and
defeats. It seems that rather than prophesy in the strong sense, he taught those who listened to
him how to live well and honor the gods. The poet provided examples of great men and women
one ought to live up to. Such examples were not just casually bandied about, but powerfully
spoken into reality through robust description and passionate song. Homer, of course, gave
wonderful examples of such powerful and captivating speech:
Next upon Thestor, son of Enops, he rushed. Crouching he sat in his polished car, for his
wits were distraught with terror, and the reins had slipped from his hands, but Patroclus
drew nigh to him, and smote him upon the right jaw with his spear, and drave it through his
teeth; and he laid hold of the spear and dragged him over the chariot-rim, as when a man
sitting upon a jutting rock draggeth to land a sacred fish from out the sea, with line and
Cornford’s From Religion to Philosophy is an instructive, though somewhat dated, read on this subject, as is
Burkert’s The Orientalizing Revolution.
8
By shaman and priest I here intend to reference a difference in form more than in function, though function is also
somewhat distinct. The primary distinction that I wish to point out is the level of institutional organization between a
ritual specialist in a decentralized space without a rigid set of cultic traditions within peculiar spatial-cultural loci,
and a ritual specialist within such loci. Primarily, then, what I am pointing to is the distinction between rural and
urban activities and to their relative economic and political organization of the ritual space and the persons who
partake in the rituals.
7
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gleaming hook of bronze; even so on the bright spear dragged he him agape from out the
car, and cast him down upon his face; and life left him as he fell. Then as Erylaus rushed
upon him, he smote him full upon the head with a stone, and his head was wholly cloven
asunder within the heavy helmet; and he fell headlong upon the earth, and death, that slayeth
the spirit, was shed about him.9
Here Homer gave an exultation of the glory and horror of warfare in splendid detail. The poet is
not content to simply tell us that Patroclus killed n number of men that day. He tells us the name
of a particular man, how he killed him, the motivations behind it, and the skill with which
Patroclus wields his spear. He spares no gruesome detail of the kill because sharing such details
with the listener serves to draw the listener into the tale, but it also serves to tell a warrior what a
good kill is like. This small section of Homer’s epic serves to show how the poem as a whole
may drive one on to greatness in warfare. These are not the words of a foretelling seer, but the
words of one who showed the way to greatness through vivid examples. Homer’s words are the
words of a teacher or a sage—he casts light upon the path one should follow in order to live a
good life.
Poets also declaimed the stories of the gods and the origin of all things. They were the
people who told the history of their city, the history of the world, and the history of their gods.
They provided the meta-narrative of their culture, and gave their listeners a place within the
cosmos. Hesiod’s Theogony is certainly not the only theogonic work, but like all the others it
gives a meta-narrative structure to the history of the universe. Theogonic myths suffuse Bronze
and Iron Age cultures, and many of them share the fascinating feature of accounting for the
9

Homer. The Iliad with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, Ph.D. in two volumes. Cambridge, MA., Harvard
University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1924.. XVI, 401-414.
ὃ δ’ ἔγχεϊ νύξε παραστὰς γναθμὸν δεξιτερόν, διὰ δ’ αὐτοῦ πεῖρεν ὀδόντων, ἕλκε δὲ δουρὸς ἑλὼν ὑπὲρ ἄντυγος, ὡς
ὅτε τις φὼς πέτρῃ ἔπι προβλῆτι καθήμενος ἱερὸν ἰχθὺν ἐκ πόντοιο θύραζε λίνῳ καὶ ἤνοπι χαλκῷ· ὣς ἕλκ’ ἐκ δίφροιο
κεχηνότα δουρὶ φαεινῷ, κὰδ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπὶ στόμ’ ἔωσε· πεσόντα δέ μιν λίπε θυμός. αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ Ἐρύλαον ἐπεσσύμενον
βάλε πέτρῳ μέσσην κὰκ κεφαλήν· ἣ δ’ ἄνδιχα πᾶσα κεάσθη ἐν κόρυθι βριαρῇ· ὃ δ’ ἄρα πρηνὴς ἐπὶ γαίῃ κάππεσεν,
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν θάνατος χύτο θυμοραϊστής. T.W. Allen, Homeri Ilias, vols. 2-3, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931: 2:1356; 3:1-370.
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genesis of their deities by recourse to human reproductive practice, and legitimizing current
social order by recourse to familial structures accepted and practiced by the cultures that housed
the myth. The Enuma Elish is perhaps the most prevalent and re-used theogonic work in this
vein, in that it appears throughout Bronze Age Mesopotamian culture and all the cultures derived
from it.
The king had a slightly different role to play. His words brought about truth when he cast
judgment over his subjects. The simplest way to understand the king as the master of truth is to
grasp that the king’s word was law. The king was not accorded the power of a god, in that he
could, of course, be gainsaid. It does mean, however, that the king spoke justice into existence
when he passed judgment on a legal matter. Before his pronouncement of judgment, justice
simply did not exist in the particular case. This ability of the king is analogous to Zeus’ nodding
his head in judgment. Until Zeus nods, what is permissible is up for grabs. Once Zeus has
decided and nodded, however, the case is closed. So it is with the king and his judgments.
These three authorities share what Detienne calls “magicoreligious speech.” This type of
speech actually brings truth into being by its utterance. In some sense this magicoreligious
speech is word magic. The seer or poet vaticinates, and in so doing brings into being a new
course of events. Such prophecy was thought to be real and efficacious in much the same way
that the king’s pronouncement of judgment is. By speaking into the world a human with the
power to do so is able to make truth where none existed before. Such power is, perhaps, like unto
divine power itself in that it makes something real in a way that goes beyond the typical profane
existence of every day experience.10

10

Detienne gives an in depth analysis of the Greek understanding of truth as Alethea which is not central to my topic
here, but is a very worthwhile read. In addition a great deal may be gleaned from Yoffee, N. 2005. Myths of the
Archaic State. Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States, and Civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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These traditional offices do not exist in a vacuum, however. Detienne outlines how a
more profane language, i.e. the dialectic use of prose, replaced this magicoreligious speech. His
analysis is that the warrior class of archaic Greece instituted a convention for distributing the
spoils of war and eventually the prizes for athletic competitions. The basic structure of this
convention was that all the warriors (or judges of the athletic event) who were important enough
to count for something (which is to say the aristocrats) would gather together and either sit or
stand in a circle. The spoils or prizes would be placed in the center of the circle of warriors, and
then they would take turns (according to their worth in battle) selecting for themselves some of
the spoils of war or the prizes that they had earned the right to own. This convention was also
how the warrior class prepared their strategy for combat, planned out their movements, and
handled any problems that they needed to solve as a group. The warriors would form a circle and
then the different parties of appropriate rank would discuss items on which the group needed to
decide. When a man came to the middle of the circle he picked up a scepter and made his case,
and then yielded the center so that another could speak. In this way the warriors were seen as
equals—at least in their ability to address one another publicly.
This format of going to the middle of the group to address the group may also be seen as
the birthplace of proto-democratic ideas. Each person who gains access to the circle is (as far as
the convention is concerned) an equal member of the circle with an equal right to have his say.
This equality of speech is not found in the magicoreligious speech of the seer, the poet, or the
king of justice. There is no analog for this dialectic prose in the three traditional “masters of
truth.” The warriors, however, do decide among themselves what they will hold true. They
decide through debate and persuasion how they should act, who gets what share of the booty, etc.

Most particularly salient is his analysis of the decentralized nature of legitimizing power across various coequal
institutions in archaic cities.
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In a way, however, the magic of a speech is not entirely lost. If a warrior fails to speak
persuasively, his speech falls on deaf ears. While at first this convention only includes the
noblemen, it will eventually come to encompass all the soldiers who prove worthy through
bravery in battle to participate in the circle. This convention is eventually expanded to the
assembly in the city, giving rise to an even more widespread dialectic—and eventually even the
Sophist tradition of victory by persuasion.
Detienne contends that once the citizenry at large engage in this sort of dialectic, the
traditional social roles are deeply challenged. While the seers (the oracle at Delphi for instance)
maintain much of their traditional authority, the poet and the king of justice can be replaced with
a more public, less autocratic means of arriving at truth. The assembly can decide what is just in
their midst; they no longer need the king of justice to speak judgments into existence because
they can do so themselves. Likewise the philosopher arises to challenge the poet for supremacy
in the public arena of truth. Where the poet claimed direct inspiration from the gods, the
philosopher gains his knowledge through public dialectic and learning. Detienne sees this shift as
the “secularization” of speech in ancient Greece, and he seeks to show how it changed the Greek
understanding of truth forever. It is certainly the fact that when a king or a poet is no longer the
avatar of divine communication, that the settling of matters of justice and cultural norms changes
from a sacred thing into a profane thing. The practice of the older sacred power of speech by the
common people means either that the sacred is passing out of existence or else that the sacred is
not seen as so distantly removed from the profane. If Detienne is correct, then this secularization
process is gradual, as is shown by the persistence of traditional Greek religion and the interest of
Archaic and Classical thinkers in metaphysics and theological concerns. If, however, this new
use of speech is not a “secularization” but rather a closer tie between sacred and profane space,
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time, and speech—leading to more diverse participation in sacred matters—then religion is not
passing away, simply changing form. What is most important to understand is that there is a
possibility in each of these traditional roles of “masters of truth” to speak the truth into
existence—and that each of these roles may be either directly challenged or annexed by new
social entities or practices. The transition from Homeric period into sixth and fifth century
Greece has set a stage in which magicoreligious speech is powerful, but also more and more
widely available to Greek citizens—especially in Athens.

Transitioning to Transcendental Thinking About the Divine in the Archaic Hebrew
Context
As Loew suggests,11 the Hebrew context for religious speculation and development was quite
distinct, perhaps without parallel in world history. Where most archaic cultures used mythical
thinking based in anthropomorphic imagery, the Hebrews were more interested in building a
Sacred History. Mythical thinking most often begins with a theogony of some sort. Gods and
goddesses come from Chaos, or oppose Chaos in some way so that a primordial family is
instituted. The First Mother either mates with another primordial deity or she spontaneously
gives birth to a deity who then becomes her consort. Typically the divine couple then gives birth
to a host of other mythical entities and the story of myth plays out in familial-tribal imagery until
the whole host of divinities is complete. Such myths are not merely theogonic, however, but also
cosmogonic. The explanations provided by religious μῦθος serves a cosmological type of
thinking. There is little in the way of pure abstraction in such myths. These stories serve to bind
the human reality to all of reality in a contiguous, mirrored whole. All things are explainable by
the diurnal and annual motion of the seasons and stars. Myths serve to explain the world as it is,
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and the place of humans in that world. The paradigm of this sort of cosmogonic-theogonic myth
is, of course, the Enuma Elish, but we cannot spare time here to examine that work in great
detail.12 What is important is that the explanation given in Egyptian, Akkadian, Syrian, Assyrian,
Babylonian, Canaanite, Mycenaean, Minoan, and Homeric-Hesiodic cultures all functioned in
rather the same fashion.13 The Hebrew legend was quite distinct in tone and in cast of characters.
In particular YHWH has no origin story and no familial relationships. His person is removed
from the usual cultural analogs between cosmic order and human order. In fact it is His covenant
with the Hebrews that establishes human order in the world in the same way that He established
the cosmic order in the creation account in Genesis.
According to their own religious tradition the Hebrews struggled greatly with
understanding the cultural unity of the tribes of Israel. A great part of the Tanakh is spent
outlining the difficulties that the Hebrew people had with their lack of singular loyalty to
YHWH. The sacred history of the Hebrews shows their wavering loyalty to YHWH. The call of
YHWH on them is a call to exclusivity in worship: “I am the LORD your God, who brought you
out of the land of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. You shall have no other gods before me.”14
This first and central commandment is perhaps the most distinctive instruction given to the
Hebrew people. While it is possible to read this commandment as a commitment to monotheism
the historical situation, and the accounts of the Hebrews could also indicate an exclusivist
henotheism. The call to a group of tribes to come together in the worship of one (and only one)
deity is starkly different than the contemporary religio-cultural realities in the rest of the Fertile
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Crescent, as well as in Egypt and South-Eastern Europe. The typical model for religious and
mythical explanations of the world was not to claim one particular deity who excluded the
worship of others, but rather that each deity had his or her own domain, character, and rank
among the pantheon of divinities. A sort of pluralism was the default attitude among Archaic
cultures in which any and all deities existed, and even strove among one another. While some
cultures might look on the gods of another culture as silly or backwards (as was the attitude of
certain Romans toward the theriomorphic deities of Egypt),15 the disapprobation of peculiar gods
did not amount to a denial of their existence. Such is the case with the Hebrew people.
The claim that YHWH is the only god of the Hebrew people is, as I indicated, remarkably
exclusivist, but it ought not be interpreted as a denial of the existence of the gods of Egypt or
Canaan. The exclusivist character of YHWH is such that the most formative event in Hebrew
history, the Exodus, actually plays out as war waged between YHWH and the divinities of the
Egyptian empire. Thus, reading Exodus 20:3 as though it denied the existence of deities other
than YHWH would be extremely odd—seeing as YHWH is declaring his victory over just such
deities. What sets YHWH apart from these divinities is His lack of relationship with said deities
(usually war between the gods occurs between family members, only crossing cultural
boundaries when different cultures war with one another) and his jealousy for his people. While
many deities are depicted as desiring particular rites and honors from their worshipers, and even
as fighting against one another, a call to exclusivity is odd in and of itself. A city might be the
province of a particular god or goddess (Athens, for instance, is the domain of Athena), but in no
way are Asclepius, Zeus, Eros, Hera, the Muses, or Apollo denigrated in Athens—these gods are
simply not the city’s matron. Cult activity involving these other deities was not only sanctioned
in Athens, but expected. Pluralism runs even more deeply in most archaic cultures than mere
15
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acceptance of polytheistic cult practice: often pluralism extended to identification of different
parochial deities as the same entity. This practice happens on a local level when Poseidon is
considered the god of the sea by coastal cities, but god of earthquakes by land-locked cities. It
happens, however, even on a more global scale. Helios and Re may well be considered the same
entity known by different names when people from Greece and Egypt engage one another
peacefully. One of the more famous examples of this sort of pluralistic syncretism is recalled by
Plato when he mentions Ammon Zeus as an oracle in North Africa. The identification of two
greatly powerful deities with one another shows the willingness to syncretize as a means of
communication not only between the gods and humans, but also as a means of communication
across cultural and linguistic boarders. Exported and imported deities are common enough
among ancient cultures that we often speak of Zeus and Jupiter interchangeably—this tendency
is perhaps most noticeable in today’s popular culture where we simply speak of Hercules being
the son of Zeus, rather than properly disambiguating the relationship between Zeus and Heracles
from that of Jupiter and Hercules. YHWH, however, has no such familial relationships. He does
not appear as a deity tied to particular temporal or special confines. YHWH meets the tribal
Israelites at a particular mountain, but He does not stay there. He has no clear analogue in most
mythical systems. He comes from no-one-knows-where and calls people out of typical mythical
situations into a new situation outside of the norm. He takes them to a place (Canaan) that He is
not geographically associated with and “gives” it to them in the form of infiltration and conquest.
YHWH breaks all the typical usual conventions of mythical near-eastern deities, to the
point that one of His demands is that he not be represented via images or icons. While there is
cultic iconography in archaic Hebrew worship, it is an iconography of situation, not an
iconography of person. The icons that are used in Hebrew cult activity are the Tabernacle and its
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artifacts. These artifacts serve to invoke the presence of God in the midst of the culture without
confining God to a particular location or a particular item. The closest that the Hebrew cult came
to an icon of their deity was the Ark of the Covenant—itself a container of items of sacred
historical significance. On top of the Ark was the Mercy Seat between two worked Cherubim,
but the seat itself was notoriously empty according to their own tradition. Seasonal festivals
occurred, but there was not the same sort of cosmological identification of YHWH with any part
of the seasonal order, or with any of the items or processes usually associated with a deity.
YHWH may steer the seasons, and hold the store of snow and frost, but he is not the storm god
any more than he is the mountain god or the river god or the vegetation god.
This call to exclusivity is not immediately respected by the Hebrew people. Much of the
Tanakh is spent recording how often Israel “whored after other gods.” The picture laid out in the
Tanakh is one of a people called to exclusively worship one deity, YHWH, but a people
unwilling to do that very thing.16 Their sacred history demands many things from them, but the
most central tenet is one that they entirely fail to follow. “Hear O Israel the Lord your God, the
Lord is one.” “You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.” “You shall
have no other gods before me.” All the other deities that a culture would either absorb or
syncretize were strictly forbidden according to the Hebrew tradition. Any dilution of YHWH’s
singular and peculiar significance resulted in the rise of charismatic persons who called Israel
back to exclusive, “pure” worship. Along with the call to exclusivity in worship the Hebrews
were called to a cultural exclusivity. Much of the Levitical tradition exists to mark them as
different from “the nations.” As a people began as tribal nomads who never attain imperial status
on the scale of their surrounding neighbors, and in fact spend much of their history as a vassal
16
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state to various other empires, their religio-cultural identity is constantly threatened with
dissolution or absorption. As a result they had particular standards of grooming, they could not
round the corners of their beard,17 have tattoos or ritual scars (excepting the singular importance
of male circumcision),18 or wear clothes made of mixed fibers.19 Like many other religions the
Hebrews had extensive dietary laws in order to maintain ritual purity, and specific rituals by
which one would become ritually clean had such purity been lost. These types of commandments
serve to mark Hebrews as distinct from the cultures in Canaan, but they also serve a historical
purpose later in Jewish history during the exile.
As indicated above, Greek πολεῖς were not the only part of the world experiencing Axial
Age upset of their Bronze and Iron Age values. Any unity between the tribes of Israel found in
the Davidic dynasty was incredibly short-lived, and famously did not outlast his son, Solomon.
David’s military success allowed for Solomon’s rule to oversee the construction of the Temple
(constructed by architects loaned to him by Hiram of Tyre, not solely by Hebrew architects20), as
well as other expeditions after wealth and military power. Famously Solomon even succeeded in
bringing back gold from Ophir—a feat of sailing never repeated in Israel’s recorded history,
though Jehoshaphat is said to have attempted to repeat the expedition.21 It is into this period of
disunity between the Northern and Sothern Kingdoms that the prophetic tradition of Israel finds
itself infused with new vigor. While the office of prophet was as old as Hebrew Sacred history, it
is in the divided kingdoms, the period after the diaspora of the Northern Kingdom, and the exile
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of the Southern Kingdom that the prophetic tradition gains a centrality nearer to what it had in
the pre-kingdom period of the Judges. It is precisely this period in which we begin to see the
most transcendental reflection occur in the Tanakh, and because of this tendency in these
prophets we often think of Isaiah and Jerimiah as thoroughly Axial Age figures.
The Hebrew prophets occupy a rough, but distinct, analogy to the Greek “masters of
truth.” Prophets are the revealers of divine truths, but they are singular rather than tripartite.
Where in Israel a king might issue edicts and take political action, real justice was to act in
accordance with those truths that the prophet(s) had revealed. The king (as a king) had no say in
magicoreligious speech, but was as subject to it as were all other Hebrews. While a king might
fulfill the role of prophet as well,22 such a role was usually temporary. The role of seer and poet
seem to be combined into one person in the Hebrew context. Moses is perhaps the best example,
in that he was the recipient of God’s message through direct contact with divine reality, but was
also ruler and judge over the whole people. The message and power given to Moses toppled
foreign political and divine powers, and was the standard by which every political leader of the
Hebrews was to act.23 The prophet was not given individual power to speak truth in the way that
Hesiod claims for himself, or to divine future events through proper ritual practice24 or innate
gift, but is given a particular message at a particular time from the deity. Crucially, this message
(and any miraculous power that comes with it) is not presented as belonging to the prophet, but
22
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always rests with the deity. While there may be some crossover between the role of priest and
prophet (especially considering the Ephod of the High Priest, and his potential use of the Urim
and the Thummim), and the role of prophet and political ruler (as in the case of Moses, the
judges, and when Saul was counted among the prophets), it is the prophetic office, not the
political office, that qualifies one to be the mouthpiece through which divine truth is spoken.
The relegation of the role of the king to a secondary position may be most clearly seen in
the ordination of the role of the king in Deuteronomy 17:18-20:
And when he sits on the throne of his kingdom, he shall write for himself in a book a copy of
this law, approved by the Levitical Priests. And it shall be with him, and he shall read it all the
days of his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his God by keeping all the words of this
law and these statues, and in doing them, that his heart may not be lifted up above his brothers,
and that he may not turn aside from the commandment, either to the right hand or to the left,
so that he may continue long in his kingdom, he and his children, in Israel.25
This passage comes after the Levitical priests are given authority to settle civil matters, and the
injunctions against certain social practices by the kings (should kings be appointed in Israel). The
concept then is that the judgments of kings were to be subject to the message delivered by the
prophets—even in legal matters. Magicoreligious speech was housed in the role of prophet, and
the king’s only ability to vaticinate was when he stepped out of the role as king and into the role
of prophet. This power relationship, of course, assisted in the reconstruction of the post-exilic
power relationships when proper kingship and those appointed to priestly office were not as
obvious as they once would have been. In addition this understanding that the words of the
prophets came directly from the mouth of God allowed for the construction of a civilization
based around the records of the history of the people, rather than requiring the people to reinvent
or redefine their identity as a people because of renewed geographical circumstances. The
requirement that the king both write and read from this same textual history clearly demarcates
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the language of power and legitimation as being accessible only through the ordained religious
form of communication: given by the prophets, legitimized by the priests, enforced by the king.
The standards of right action in the Judaic context were set down as direct revelation from God
to His people, and those directives could continue to function outside the geographic location of
Palestine, or indeed, even without a current prophet or a current king as long as the record and
the priestly function could be fulfilled in some way.
As in Greece, the Hebrew people in Palestine also underwent a radical adjustment of their
cultural cohesion and religious praxis. Whatever may be true of the Sauline, Davidic, and
Solomonic kingdoms, the dissolution of the Hebrew state into smaller kingdoms and the defeat
and diaspora of the Hebraic peoples by the Babylonian and Assyrian empires radically changes
the face of Hebrew religious thought and practice. The diaspora of the kingdom of Judah and the
destruction of the temple complex in Jerusalem is particularly important. The older ritualistic
system of worship of their deity was utterly denied to those Hebrew people who had been
removed from Palestine. Without the sacred space in which to perform the rituals and without the
ability to control their agendas such that their sacred times could coincide with the proper sacred
places, the practice of Hebrew religiosity was denied to some generations of Hebrew people. In
order to adjust for this lack of traditional context that allowed cultural-religious practice to obtain
in the lives of the dispersed peoples, they adjusted their practices to become less dependent on a
physical contextualization and more dependent on abstract thought about the nature of their
religiosity. This shift in attention from prescribed rituals to abstract teaching is aided by the
exposure to the diverse religious traditions practiced in the Babylonian, Medan, and Persian
Empires. Accordingly the Exile into Babylon and Persia is when we begin to observe the rise of
“Synagogue Judaism,” which was a method of preserving their cultural and religious realities in
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a distant and syncretistic environment. While the interaction of Hebrew peoples and practicing
Zoroastrians is of particular interest to many historians of religion, is not our main concern here.
It is sufficient to note that the diaspora and exile began a change in the Hebrew religion that
allowed for much more decentralized and abstract thinking about their cultural and doxastic
praxis.26
While it may be argued that the transition between the old kingdoms and the restored
Jews marks, in itself, a very different religion, I take it that the practitioners of the religion and
the re-constructors of the Palestinian worship center believed themselves to be following
particular mandates given through the ancient prophets. The historical oddity of the persistence
of a Hebraic-Judaic cultural and religious existence that was compelling enough to resist the
erosion of dispersal and return to a more traditional context while at the same time adapting into
something more complex than common geographical cult-practice is remarkable. The Jewish
people made a transition to a transcendental religiosity that preserved their unique cultural and
religious identity in the face of an uprooting that was intended to assimilate the diverse peoples
of different cultural backgrounds into one larger community that bolstered the might of the
Babylonian, and later Persian Empires.
It is, perhaps, the difference in context that is most remarkable between the Jewish and
Greek development of transcendental thought about religious and political matters. The Greek
context is one of a continued growth in and consolidation of power tied to particular locations,
the poleis, which allowed for enough leisure that certain persons were able to contemplate more
abstract matters. Herodotus is able to travel to far-away places and inquire into their differences
because the wealth of his city and his family is able to finance such wanderings. The prosperity
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of Athens was, no doubt, a contributor to the training of Socrates and Plato. But they are the
result of a long term cultural trajectory of civil, economic, military, and cultural growth in
Greece that allowed for poleis to re-establish (in some small way) the sophistication of the
Mycenaean and Minoan civilizations that they recalled in their Homeric μῦθος. The expansion of
Greek poleis is most striking in the confrontation between these advancing city-states and the
Persian Empire. Where the Jews were subjugated and then released by Xerxes in his own time,
the Greeks violently wrested control and power away from the great Persian Machine—most
notably and obviously at Marathon. In both cases (Greek and Jewish) the exposure to a larger
cultural context, as well as advances in trade (Palestine has always been a very fertile land—
indeed a review of Byzantine trade reveals just how profitable this small stretch of land could
be), were invaluable in transforming the sophistication of abstract thinking in both cultures.
Where one culture syncretized their religious and cultural views through colonization and
expansion, the other attempted to hold onto something unique about itself despite its subjugation
and repeated inability to meaningfully defend itself from invaders.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Genesis of the DDI in the Greek Context.

Introduction
While it may be true that the Milesians considered the topic of the gods, especially considering
Thales’ supposed statement that “everything is full of the gods,” there is not enough left of the
Milesians’ work to be able to offer meaningful analysis on their idea of the divine as changeless
or mutable. The issue is even more obscured because of Aristotle’s well known tendency to
create straw men of his interlocutors’ arguments in order to advance his own position. In this
study we shall confine ourselves to thinkers for whom we have extant fragments dealing with the
immutability of the divine. In the archaic period of Greece we see a great variety of religious
institutions that often overlap in some details. Two great resources for understanding this period
and its thinkers are Berkert and Cornford. Of particular interest is Cornford’s analysis of μοῖρα
as central to the thinking of both religious specialists and the early Greek philosophers. I will
specifically engage Cornford’s understanding of μοῖρα and its role in understanding the concept
of immutability in the gods and the ἀρχή. Though I do not wish to belabor our discussion here
with a full analysis of Cornford’s monograph, I do believe that an analysis of his understanding
of μοῖρα will be required to do the topic of immutability due diligence.
Cornford suggests that both archaic Greek religion and ancient philosophy are based upon the
concept of μοῖρα or “fate.” Cornford’s central claim in this regard is that in Greece we must
24

understand the genesis of all abstract ideas regarding φύσις is found in the practice of
sympathetic magic. He contends:
These doctrines of Thales, which are almost all that survives to us of his opinions about the
general nature of the world, contain three conceptions which are the principal subject of the
following pages: the "nature" of things--physis, rerum natura (declared by Thales to be
water); 'God' or 'Spirit'; and 'Soul.' Here at once, in the very first utterance of philosophy, we
encounter conceptions which have a long history as religious representations, before
philosophy begins. Unless we have some grasp of that history we are not likely to understand
the speculation, which however scientific its spirit may be, constantly operates with these
religious ideas and is to a large extent confined in its movement within the limits already
traced by them.27
That the history of Greek thinking was filled with religiosity is beyond doubt, and that the
intellectual soil from which philosophy grew was saturated with μῦθος can hardly be questioned.
What is somewhat dubious is the claim that religious thinking evolved directly from totemic
systems of sympathetic magic. While such evolutions are possible, the evidence for them is
circumstantial at best. In particular, such accounts have a polemical and teleological bent:
specifically they posit systems wherein primitive savages evolve more fully into rational persons
who (of course) look more and more like we “Scientifically-Minded-Western-Europeans.”28 The
particulars of how such an evolution would come about are possible to outline, but much in them
depends on particular analysis of individuals, and such analyses are often theory-laden—either
for or against such evolution. I shall not try to address whether this account is ultimately
sustainable or not—but I will address Cornford’s idea that μοῖρα is based upon an idea of
immutable standards. The most insightful idea that Cornford draws out in his argument is the
spatial nature of μοῖρα in its earliest articulation.
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Xenophanes of Colophon
One of the earliest Greek thinkers for whom we have extant fragments that show the
transition out of traditional mythic thinking is Xenophanes of Colophon. Of particular interest to
this discussion are his advancements of the concept of divinity. Xenophanes was happy to tear
down the anthropomorphic conception of the gods, but he was not willing that the divine should
be dishonored because of his teachings, nor that men should abandon the notion of the divine
altogether. We would do well to remember that Xenophanes’ interests in politics, philosophy,
and science were not separate from his inquiry into god’s nature, though they may have been
distinct. The god that Xenophanes proposed has a number of fascinating attributes. Fragment 23
purports that “One god is greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or in
thought.”29 This statement has been used to claim that Xenophanes was a monotheist, but this
claim cannot be easily sustained in the face of the obvious problem that more than one god is
posited by the fragment. One might claim henotheism, but that would be an anachronistic
formulation that does not take the cultural context of ancient Greek religious practice into
account. For instance, in fragment one Xenophanes admonishes his listeners to honor the gods.
Any claim that he would both admit the existence of the other gods and encourage others to
honor them, but not honor them himself, would be very odd indeed. A claim of henotheism is
also very difficult to make stick, because the difference between monotheism and henotheism in
the ancient world (or in the practice of modern religiosity for that matter) is frustratingly difficult
to discern. The oddity of assigning henotheism to Xenophanes only increases when one recalls
that the worship of specific gods in the Greek pantheon was determined by the patron god of the
city in which one lived. Any person was free to worship what gods they desired, as long as they
29
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made the proper sacrifices and paid proper homage to the city’s patron (or matron as the case
might be) deity.
Xenophanes is not content with the traditional mythical understanding of the Greek
deities that was taught to his generation. He seeks to understand the nature of the divine on its
own terms, while not depending on a Hesiodic possession by the muses to guide his inquiry. As a
poet, Xenophanes occupied a traditional role in Greek society—that of one of the masters of
truth. The extant fragments show that he takes himself and his poetry, his teaching, very
seriously. From fragment 2 we see that he considers his teachings about politics more worthy
than the games dedicated to the gods. His method of enquiring into reality and working to
advance his society through access to truths not understood by the οἱ πόλοι looks very similar to
Hesiod’s claim about his teaching—but it lacks the appeal to external divine authority. Where
Hesiod is a vessel to transmit someone else’s speech, Xenophanes is the origin of his poem.
Accordingly the teaching that Xenophanes gives about the nature of the divine does not depend
upon the traditional Greek theogonic myths. In point of fact it functions as a direct critique of
their rationality and coherence. His attempt to explore the nature of divine existence therefore
takes the tone of a critique of traditional understandings of the gods as anthropomorphic beings.
He does not provide an utterly apophatic theological critique, however, but engages in both
apophasis and cataphasis in an attempt to express those things he thinks would be true of the
divine.
It is vital to remember at this juncture that for the ancient Greeks there was not a hard
division between church and state. The state was very invested in the religion of its people, and
the people were very invested in the religion of the state. They believed that the gods actually
intervened in their cities directly, and if the city displeased the god or goddess that guarded the
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city there would be dire consequences for the citizenry. Piety was not just a private matter in
ancient Greece: it was a serious and very public business (as can be seen in the trial and death of
Socrates). One’s piety and one’s political views had a fully reciprocal influence upon each other
in a sort of socio-religious feedback loop. Xenophanes’ understanding of divine reality could,
therefore, be quite destructive to established social orders. While fragments 1 and 2 definitely
show us that Xenophanes did not think much of established social orders, he nonetheless was
dependent on said orders, and he knew it well.
What was Xenophanes up to in his analysis of divine reality? One attempt to understand
Xenophanes theological passages takes him to have taken the ἀρχή30 proposed by the Milesians
and applied it to divinity. Jaeger claims that Xenophanes took Anaximandrian concepts and
placed god roughly where the boundless belongs.31 Hack is so convinced of this relationship
between the ἀρχή and the divine that he claims:
Xenophanes has taken the supreme god further along the same path which had led to the Air
of Anaximenes and to the One Fire of Pythagoras; the One God of Xenophanes has reached
the point where substance disappears, and it stands revealed as pure causality and pure
unity, unhampered by even the subtlest of physical attributes, except that it “coheres” with
all that it causes.32
The claim that substance disappears is hyperbolic, as it is not clear exactly what concept of
substance was held by the Milesians or by Xenophanes. As we have only fragments of his
thought remaining it is hard to ascertain whether Xenophanes has a concept of substance qua
substance, much less to claim that such a concept could disappear. Indeed in order to understand
the concept of substance qua substance one would need to do a genealogy of ὑπόστασις rather

30

Primary Substance, the One out of which the Many were made.
Werner Jaeger. The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers. Eugene, Ore.: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2003.
49.
32
Roy K. Hack. God in Greek Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 61.
31

28

than of immutability, or even to look more properly at φύσις and the ἀρχή. Cornford’s
etymological work on φύσις is particularly useful in this regard:
It is at once apparent that we have no satisfactory rendering for physis. 'Primary substance' is
charged with Aristotelian and scholastic associations; 'matter' suggests something contrasted
with mind or life, whereas the primary meaning of physis is 'growth,' and its first associations
are of life and motion, not of stillness and death. The mere use of this term already implies the
famous doctrine which has earned for the Milesian school the designation of 'Hylozoist'--the
doctrine that 'the All is alive.' The universe 'has soul in it,' in the same sense (whatever that
may be) that there is a 'soul' in the animal body. We must not forget that the meaning of
physis, at this stage, is nearer to 'life' than to 'matter'; it is quite as much 'moving' as
'material'—self-moving, because alive.33
A thoroughgoing analysis of these terms cannot be our main concern here, but we at least know
that one of the oldest meanings of ὑπόστασις was the sediment that settles at the bottom of a
liquid—either the smooth and undifferentiated grey mud at the bottom of a river-bed, or even of
sediment in the urine34—and the oldest meaning of φύσις is demonstrably distinct from the
notion of substance qua substance. In later thinkers, the difference between ὑπόστασις and
substance is still important. The distinction between the meanings of these terms is of great
significance to the development of philosophical Christian thought to this day. In particular the
division between the Orthodox churches and the Western churches rests, in part, on the
ambiguity of the proper use and meaning of ὑπόστασις and how it is properly applied to God.
Simple etymology also shows that identifying ὑπόστασις and substance as identical concepts at
this point in history is pure anachronism. Xenophanes simply could not have been conversant
with the Latin thinkers from whom we receive definitions and doctrines concerning substantia.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Xenophanes does care a great deal for understanding the sensible
world in physical terms. Indeed Xenophanes takes great care (and great boldness) to claim that
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Iris is merely a cloud.35 His other fragments dealing with ordinary sensible reality are more than
sufficient to show that he was interested in physical questions, much like the Milesians.
Suggestions about the nature of the ἀρχή are attempts to understand the causal relationships
between natural objects. They are attempts to understand mutations in the observable world
according to a set of simple principles. The Milesians wish to understand and explain the world
around them. Their concerns are far more directly about grasping what makes a thing or entity
that particular thing or entity, or what makes one thing different from another. The motion of the
stars and seasons, the borders between sea and shore—these things seem to occupy the concern
of the Milesians. A distinction between the subjects of physics and metaphysics is hard to sustain
at this point in the history of philosophy.
The question of the ἀρχή is not so much about substance qua substance, but about understanding
the relationships between all that exists. Indeed it seems likely that the question of the ἀρχή
evolves into Plato’s question of the one and the many. The difficulty with collapsing these
questions together, however, is that neither Plato nor Xenophanes require that the ontology of the
many derive from the ontology of the one (or the Greatest God). As I will discuss later in this
work, Plotinus’ doctrine of emanation clearly works to show a derivation of ontology, but Plato
is less clear when considering the forms and ontological relationships. Xenophanes seems to be
denying the possibility that such an ontological derivation could obtain. By restricting his
considerations in the passages about the divine Xenophanes is engaging in philosophicaltheological concerns.36 Again, Cornford expresses a particular idea regarding traditional Greek
“theology.” He claims that,
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If we are to dwell on the freedom of Greek thought from dogmatic prejudice, we cannot be
too grateful for the absence of this particular belief in a divine creator. No hypothesis is more
facile and supine; nothing is so likely to stupefy and lull to slumber that wonder which is the
parent of philosophy, than an explanation which will account with equal readiness for every
feature of the world, whether good or bad, ascribing what is good to the transparent
benevolence, and what is bad to the inscrutable wisdom, of omnipotence.37
This claim is not without its problems,38 but it does identify one central fact about the Greek idea
of the gods: their gods were based in myth, not in sacred history. There is no “Creator” deity
wholly responsible for the existence of the world. The created order functions in the same way
that a dynastic family does. On the mythical account of the gods, we see immortals who are
driven by particular needs—namely the needs to procreate, and the fear of the end of their reign.
Xenophanes shares this background, and does not conceive of his non-anthropomorphic deity as
a “Creator,” and in fact, we see nothing in what remains of his account concerning cosmogenesis
whatsoever.
This background of concepts concerning divinity and the nature of the cosmos leaves a
particular question to those thinkers who consider the problem. The Greek thinkers, in particular,
are concerned with cosmology in the sense that they are concerned with the study of φύσις. The
study of cosmology has many distinct subfields, but the two most applicable in terms of the
interaction of the cosmos with the divine are the questions of cosmogony and cosmography.
While the theogonic myths of Hesiodic lineage certainly show that questions of cosmogony were
not alien to the ancient Greeks, it is not Theogony nor cosmogony which occupies the Milesians,
nor Aristotle. While Plato may have engaged in some amount of cosmogonic speculation in the
37
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Timaeus, he does not attempt to give a particular order to the development and work of the
Demiurge—we must wait for Plotinus for a fully-fledged “Platonic” cosmogony. Since the
Greek context is one in which the question of cosmogony is not of primary importance, we may
legitimately consider cosmography to be of more significance to the contemplation of the
presocratics—and perhaps to Ancient Greek thinkers in general. Cornford shows how this
cosmographic bent can be seen even in how the concept of μοῖραwas spatial and legal, rather
than genetic or causal, in its original use:
Moira simply means ‘part,’ ‘allotted portion’; from that primary meaning it is agreed that the
meaning ‘destiny’ is derived. Poseidon’s protestation [15th Iliad l.189] shows how it is that
the Gods, as well as men, have moirai. Each God has his own allotted portion or province—a
certain department of nature or field of activity. This may also be regarded as his status
(τιμή); it gives him a determined position in a social system. Sometimes it is called his
‘privilege’ (γέρας). Within his own domain his supremacy is not to be challenged; but he
must not transgress its frontiers, and he will feel resentment (nemesis) at any encroachment
by another. [. . .] The original conception of Moira thus turns out to be spatial rather than
temporal. We are to think of a system of provinces, coexisting side by side, with clearly
marked boundaries.39
The spatial organization of μοῖρα leads into the cosmology of thinkers like Anaximander, but it
further influences ideas concerning deity in later thinkers. Of particular importance in this regard
is the primacy that Greeks place on Geometry as a sign of great intelligence and wisdom. The
understanding of geometrical principles and applications, indeed, is the source of the admiration
the Greeks had for the Egyptians, as well as the myth that Thales learned the art from them. The
limits and descriptions of the triangle were sacred to the Pythagoreans, and it makes sense that
this spatial aspect of μοῖρα would hold such power and fascination for later thinkers, and even
manifests itself in the Timaeus as Platonic Solids. When we understand the spatial nature of the
provinces of the Olympian triumvirate, it becomes easier to understand the level of concern that
Xenophanes and Parmenides place on the geometric descriptions of the sort of deity they each
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consider to be more real than the traditional anthropomorphic deities, and indeed why that deity
would be like a well-rounded sphere.
Whether or not Xenophanes intended to apply the category of ἀρχή to god or not, it is certainly
true that he pushed the concept of deity far beyond what was represented in the anthropomorphic
gods of Olympus. He wishes to preserve the dignity of both profane existence and divine
existence, and not make one directly derivative of the other, while still allowing for some kind of
causal relationship to obtain—at least for the divine reality to cause changes in profane reality.
The god that Xenophanes proposes is the greatest of all beings, and cannot to be compared to
mortals in body or in thought—a claim both troubling and fascinating. Taken in its strongest
light, this claim seems to indicate that there is no body to this god at all, as any body at all could
be compared to the body of a mortal in that both bodies are in fact bodies, and the same standard
holds true of thoughts. If we take the description as positing a complete equivocation between
the two types of beings, then it seems that Xenophanes must have been doing one of two highly
unlikely things. The first is that he is committing himself to the existence of a non-material
entity. This commitment is problematic because there is no evidence known to me that the
Greeks had the concept of a non-material substance at this point in Greek history. In fact at this
point in Greek thought it is hard to make a distinction between physics and metaphysics at all, so
the question of substance, much less the idea of multiple sorts of substance, is not historically
applicable. Lacking a Cartesian substance dualism, it is therefore very difficult to suppose that
such an equivocation can make sense. The other possibility is that he was committed to the nonexistence of the god he proposed, which is absurd. At this point in intellectual history there
would be no reason for Xenophanes to be a reductive atheist. The rejection of peculiar or
parochial local deities was possible, but a thorough discounting of divine reality is highly
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unlikely. Even Epicurus would not entirely discount divinities, merely their significance to
mortals. Because of this difficulty, it seems likely that what Xenophanes was trying to show was
the mistake of speaking of the god’s attributes in univocal manner with the way that we speak of
humans. Another way that “body” could be translated is “shape.” The concept of shape seems
far more likely to capture Xenophanes’ meaning. Consider a being that is not at all like us in
shape: we can think of many such beings, oceanic invertebrates (octopods, cuttlefish, jellyfish,
etc.), plants, and insects spring readily to mind as examples of entities with which we do not
share a common shape. It is easy to suppose something so different in body is also different in
mind, thus fulfilling the second attribute that Xenophanes posits. The better way of
understanding his point is that the one god is sufficiently different from human beings that it
would be a grave mistake to assign it any anthropomorphic characteristics. Xenophanes does not
seem to think that the one god is unknowable, however, though it must be able to be spoken of
via some form of analogical language.
Fragment 24 proposes “ . . . Whole he sees, whole he thinks, whole he hears,” though it
could also be translated “. . . he sees all over, he thinks all over, he hears all over,”40 which
captures more of the ambiguity present in the Greek. The ambiguity in this fragment may mean
that this god is omniscient—in that senses all things, or it may mean that this god has a
qualitative set of experiences unlike to our own, as the whole of it thinks, sees, and hears without
distinction between the senses and the thoughts. Then fragment 25 states “. . . but completely
without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.”41 Fragment 25 is an attempt to
show how the divine is able to cause changes in the profane world without recourse to standard
means of causation. The function of causation without the standard means available to standard
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bodies is another dividing line between mortals and the immortal. Both of these attributes are
complimented by fragment 26, “. . . Always he abides in the same place, not moving at all, nor is
it seemly for him to travel to different places at different times.”42 In what is perhaps the most
interesting part of Xenophanes speculation concerning divine reality, we are given to understand
that causing changes in the world causes no changes in the divine itself. Xenophanes god could
not be god if it was capable of motion—of change.
This claim, however, ought not to be taken to mean that the divine is utterly static. The
claim about the lack of change in the divine is indeed ontological, but Xenophanes gives a reason
for its lack of motion. Consider that it abides in the same place, not moving at all because it is
not seemly, or fit, for it to move about. The lack of change in the divine has more to do with its
dignity and status than it does with a desire for lack of motion or for divine simplicity.
Xenophanes finds the anthropomorphic Olympian deities wanting because they require objects
or persons outside themselves. For Xenophanes, for god to be god it must be utterly selfsufficient. If the one god could have needs outside of itself, it would be was obligated toward the
object of its need or desire. I shall have more to say on this point in a discussion of Greek
psychology of motivation in the following chapters. This level of detail in Xenophanes thought
shows great originality in his philosophical considerations of theology. There is one rather
striking question that Xenophanes does not engage in the extant fragments; we have no record of
his understanding of place. Aristotle’s treatment of place is fascinating and may give us insight
into his concept of the Unmoved Mover, but we have no such information concerning
Xenophanes’ concepts. This lack of information makes his one god even harder to understand,
especially given the spatial background of the Olympian triumvirate.
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If, as I have claimed, Xenophanes is not asking about or motivated by the question of the
ἀρχή in his analysis of the divine, but is seeking the fundamental cause of motion in profane
reality, or the fundamental principle, perhaps we can understand the relationship at which Hack
is pushing. The question of substance did not disappear in Xenophanes; it simply was not a
question in the first place. At this point, what God or anything else is made of was not an
important question. What counted as divine and what counted as profane mattered a great deal,
however. For Xenophanes a god had to be complete and utterly without needs. Only perfect and
total self-sufficiency could allow a being to be truly divine. The one principle that approaches
what Hack suggests is that in Xenophanes we begin to see a division between divine and profane
reality. While it may be the case that for Xenophanes that everything is full of the gods, not all
items in nature are thereby rendered as particular, powerful deities. These items are not
possessed of their own god, but rather they can be shaken by the one god, greatest among gods
and men. Xenophanes seeks an understanding of the divine that is more expansive and
transcendental than the folk religion of his day. In the end, we should see Xenophanes pushing
not for divine stasis, but pushing very hard for something more akin to divine aseity.

Parmenides of Elea
The second Pre-Socratic thinker for whom we have extant fragments concerning the
nature of the divine is Parmenides of Elea.43 Parmenides is most widely known not for his own
writings, but rather for his student Zeno’s defense of his doctrine that multiplicity (and thus
change) were absurd. There is, however, much more to Parmenides than a simple denial of the
many and change. Parmenides, much like Xenophanes, wrote poems as a way to reflect upon
Heraclitus of Ephesus may have had quite a bit to say about the nature of the divine in his discussion about λόγος,
but that topic deserves its own lengthy treatment, and would not meaningfully add to our understanding of the nature
of divine immutability at this juncture.
43
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abstract ideas. Compared to Xenophanes he seems to have had more interest in what we in the
21st century might call “religious experience.” He certainly places great emphasis on his talk
with the goddess and his nearly shamanistic visit beyond the doors of Night and Day. While
Parmenides’ poem addresses multiple philosophical concerns, among them the nature of
existence qua existence, epistemology, negative predication, and the nature of change, it also
points to the power of the human intellect, and the union of mind and world. For Parmenides
there is no subject – object divide from which to exercise intense skeptical doubt. This implicit
trust in the continuity between knower and known allows him to posit robustly cataphatic ideas
about the nature of the divine than we have in Xenophanes’s extant fragments. I will maintain
that reason and reality are one and the same for Parmenides, and so his ability to think like the
divine, and understand the divine, is central to his commitments regarding the what-is.
As we have already seen from our consideration of Greek thought to this point, we cannot
be sure of a separation between divine and profane realms, much less a difference between
physics and metaphysics. Parmenides and the peoples of the Axial Age lived in a world
enchanted by nymphs and gods, where the mountains breathe and the ocean is a cranky old
man—and one might meet any of them while walking between towns. The reality of wandering
or parochial deities was a part of the reason for the practice of ξενία, a practice that the goddess
he meets in the proem takes pains to extend to him. Unlike the situation we see in Isaiah, or the
account of the Israelites at Sinai, neither Homer, Hesiod, nor Parmenides fears dissolution
through coming into the presence of a deity. As far as they understand, the divine is all around
them. Many Greeks feared that a particular deity would harm, curse, or kill them if they
displeased the deity, but the idea that the gods were exalted and unavailable was not a part of the
cultural reality. The earth in which they plant their crops may be known as a patch of dirt, or it
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may be γαΐα herself, and this dual identity is not seen as problematic. In the same fashion there is
no worry about one’s capability to seek out and uncover nature, even though nature hides itself.44
There are surely some bits of gold that no human could dig to, if we may borrow Heraclitus’s
analogy,45 but it is not because they are unable to dig, but because a human is a fragile, mortal,
ephemeral, partial entity who will not live long enough to complete the search. In other words, it
is not that there is some great ontological or epistemological divide between knower and
known—it is simply that some things are too far away, or too well hidden, or too heavy to lift for
a mortal to grasp alone because of the brevity of human lifespans.
The key to understanding Parmenides’ claims about the nature of What-is comes from the
principle found in fragment 3, “. . . τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι.”46 which Gallop renders
as “. . . because the same thing is there for thinking and for being.”47 While the interpretation of
this passage is difficult, I maintain that this fragment expresses Parmenides’ commitment to the
inseparability of epistemology and ontology. Gallop notes that there are divergent ways in which
we may understand how Parmenides uses “is” in this sentence. As he states “The ‘veridical,’
‘copulative,’ and ‘combined’ interpretation of ‘is’” are all possible ways of reading Parmenides,
as is the “existential.”48 There has been no little debate about which meaning of “is” Parmenides
intends in his poem. While I concede that it is possible that Parmenides could intend that only
one of these uses is “correct,” I believe that looking for the “one” meaning intended (or most
appropriate) to Parmenides is a mistake based upon reductive thinking.
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This non-reductive use of terms makes more sense of Parmenides claims, but also seats
him more firmly in his time period when compared to the polysemic use of terms in both
Xenophanes and Heraclitus of Ephesus. Parmenides lived in a time when it was not necessary
that a word would have only one meaning, in the same way that a particular object in the world
could be more than one thing all at once. Famously, it is not until Aristotle that the sentence
becomes the basic unit of meaning. Part of the difficulty with understanding the Pre-Socratics, as
is particularly acknowledged in Heraclitus, was that they did not share this basic assumption
regarding language. Ambiguity and polysemy in terms could be both appropriate and expected.
While Parmenides is not making the kind of wordplay that Heraclitus is so fond of,49 I believe
that he makes use of polysemy in his use of “is” in these passages. To assume that he would use
a particular word in a highly technical sense assumes that Parmenides would think in a literary
fashion rather than a verbal fashion. When we refer to the “writing” of Parmenides’ poem, we
really ought to think more of an intentional and embodied composition—as a song. Parmenides
uses the word “is” in just such a polysemic and verbal fashion. He is using the existential ‘is,’ the
veridical ‘is,’ and the copulative ‘is’ simultaneously. The polysemic use leads to a holistic
understanding of the “What –is” as not reducible to a technical term, or a particular explanatory
factor in an argument. The “What-is” encompasses these meanings, and would be indescribable
if Parmenides actually used the word in a reductive, or restricted sense. He is thus uniting all of
these senses in a single use, and if we are to understand his thinking, we must hold them all
equally and without tension. This robust polysemy has both epistemological and ontological bite,
and serves to unite the realm of thought and being in one simple phrase. I shall refer to this
principle of the unity of thought and being found in fragment three as “the F3P” hereafter.

A perfect example of this use of polysemy and the strangeness of homophones can be found in F.48 “τῷ οὖν τόξῷ
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In order to show that his commitment to the F3P is not isolated I shall reproduce other
lines in which Parmenides uses and expands upon this central principle. The expansion of the
F3P is found in 2.1-8, 6.1, and 8.34-41. The lines in question are as follows:
Come, I shall tell you, and do you listen and convey the story,
What routes of inquiry alone there are for thinking:
one—that [it] is, and that [it] cannot not be,
Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon truth);
The other—that [it] is not, and that [it] needs must not be,
that I point out to you to be a path wholly unlearnable,
For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible),
Nor could you point it out. 50
It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking of is; for [it] is there to be,51
The same thing is for thinking and [is] that there is thought;
For not without what-is, on which [it] depends, having been declared,
Will you find thinking; for nothing else <either> is or will be
Besides what-is, since it was just this that Fate did shackle
To be whole and changeless; wherefore it has been named all things
That mortals have established, trusting them to be true,
To come-to-be and to perish, to be and not to be,
And to shift place and to exchange bright colour.52
These fragments are found in the fragments we dub The Way of Truth, and I believe that they are
sufficient to show the tight bond between epistemology and ontology in Parmenides’ thought.
Despite this bond, I do not mean that Parmenides is a naïve realist. Parmenides and his
contemporaries were aware that their senses could be fooled. Homer’s poems were evidence
enough of that phenomenon.53 Indeed if humans were never fooled, then Parmenides’ poem
would be at once redundant and insane. In addition to the mythical histories, both Xenophanes
Parmenides, 2.1-8. εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι· ἡ
μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ), ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ
ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ
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and Heraclitus pointed out the importance of perspective and the difference between opinion and
knowledge.54 This awareness of human fallibility did not, in the presocratics at least, result in
despair towards the possibility of knowledge that one sees in skeptics (be they classical or postmodern). On the contrary, though many people are deceived by appearances,55 the individual
person is capable of coming to knowledge if they search hard for the truth. For example while he
managed to fool the suitors, Odysseus is still given away by an old scar when one looks closely
enough. Heraclitus is capable of investigating himself56 and coming to understand that “Soul
possesses a λόγος (measure, proportion) which increases itself.”57 Even thinkers who were
deeply convinced of the foolishness of their contemporaries, as Heraclitus surely was, allowed
that mortals were capable of discovering truth if they strove after it.58
The difference between the Pre-Socratic philosophers and those who adhere entirely to
Homeric or Hesiodic μῦθος is that the Pre-Socratics are trying to understand a fundamental
principle behind the existence they are a part of without reference to anthropomorphism. Where
pure mythical thinking gives particular human (or quasi-human) identities to individual entities
and objects in the world that offers a personality and intention that matches some part of
anthropocentric concept that is meaningful to the cultural and intellectual background of the
assigner, a non-anthropomorphic understanding of those same items seeks to understand them on
their own terms. Parmenides method of understanding the world is not to attempt to give
anthropomorphic identities to parts of the world, but to attempt to see the human as a contiguous
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part of a greater whole. That whole encapsulates human experience in addition to all other kinds
of existence—because existence is common to all:
Welcome; for it is no ill fortune that sent you forth to travel
This route (for it lies far indeed from the beaten track of men),
But right and justice. And it is right that you should learn all things,
Both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth,
And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust.
But nevertheless you shall learn these things as well, how the things which seem
Had to have genuine existence, permeating all things completely.59
Thus the human experience is not the basis for understanding; rather the fact of contiguous
existence with the whole forms the basis for all human perspectival experience, and thus the
basis of Parmenides’ claims. Humans exist, thought exists, objects exist, reason exists, the
cosmos exists, and so there is always common ground on which to stand when considering
anything. In addition, because existence is common to all, there must always be some amount of
shared experience predicated upon the most basic fact: existence. For Parmenides then, there can
be no perspective that exists that is impossible to contemplate—or more simply one can always
walk in another’s shoes, even if one could never fill those shoes. This method of thinking
preserves the lack of a subject-object gap while still allowing for more abstract critical thinking
than pure mythical thinking provides. It also delineates a boundary—perhaps even a μοῖρα—
over which certain things may not even be thought, thus raising the thorn of negative predication
which so rankles him.
To further show Parmenides’ commitment to this epistemological-ontological unity we
must recognize that Parmenides is not like Homer who pleads for the goddess herself to sing, or
Parmenides, 1.26-32. χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι τήνδ’ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς
πάτου ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ
βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ
παντὸς πάντα περῶντα. Gallop 52-53. This text is quite difficult, particularly lines 31 and 32. I do not mean to make
light of the difficulty in translating them, but I think that Gallop provides a good preliminary analysis of how this
line fits into the overall poem on pp 21-23 of his translation. What Gallop does not address in his account, however,
is why he translates μοῖρα as “fortune” rather than “fate” or “doom” in line 26.
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like Hesiod who invokes the muses to sing through him—Parmenides is the student of the
goddess. She speaks to him, not through him when she calls out “Come, I shall tell you, and do
you listen and convey the story,”60 This is a subtle but astoundingly important shift in how
learning from the gods is understood. Parmenides is no mere vessel, but is a mortal who can hold
his own in conversation with divine persons and divine truths. Parmenides’ mental faculties are
sufficient to engage with and understand divine truths and his body is able to endure their
presence. It is true that Parmenides claims that mortals require instruction regarding divine truths
in order to understand them, but once exposed to these truths he is able to ponder their depths
through use of his own faculties. Once he has heard her speech and learned her lessons, he is
then able to go out and spread the message. In addition human nature was not necessarily closed
in many ancient cultures. Euhemerism and apotheosis were serious possibilities in the ancient
world (at least for some subset of human beings), and there were myths about humans becoming
immortal through action of the gods. Well known examples from Greek culture are Pythagoras
and Empedocles.61 It is sloth, recalcitrance, and vice that stand in the path to knowledge for
Parmenides and his contemporaries, not epistemological and ontological restrictions.
To explicate the way this divine to human continuum functioned in Ancient Greece I shall
compare two interpretations of Plato’s allegory of the cave as a sort of case study.62 The first

Parmenides, 2.1. εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας Gallop, 54-55.
Usually this happened to a hero of some sort. Heracles is a decent example, though he was a son of Zeus he
became something more than mortal in some legends. Egyptian pharos also had this sort of distinction, as did
Imhotep. In the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires the king would recapitulate the actions of Enlil or Marduk in
annual festivals that were meant to renew the earth, and so they too took on a divine dimension.
62
While I maintain that reading Parmenides as though he was in conversation with Plato is a mistake, I believe we
may legitimately read Plato as influenced by Parmenides (and Zeno)—indeed the very existence of Plato’s
Parmenides seems to indicate both a familiarity with Parmenides’ work, and a desire to address the old sage’s ideas.
The method of the final sections of the Parmenides shows that Plato is working with something like the F3P, as
well. From Parmenides 137.c to the end of the dialogue the character of Parmenides works out the nature of the One
and the Many through investigation of the thought process available to himself and the young Aristotle. The
rationalistic investigation of the nature of the One and the Many proceeds along grounds quite similar to the actual
Parmenides’ methodology—seeing thought and reality linked in such a way that a contradiction in thought is a
problem for the reality it is supposed to describe. For my purposes it does not matter whether the arguments in this
60
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interpretation is that the prisoners in the cave may be chained there by their natural abilities,
unable to come to real knowledge of how things are because of their mortal, derivative, partial,
limited nature. In this interpretation it would take an act of a god to take them beyond their limits
and usher them into the light of true knowledge via some sort of transformation of the person or
divine intervention. Even then the now freed prisoners could only bear such knowledge by being
sustained by divine power. This understanding of the allegory of the cave is analogous to a
Kantian gulf between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Even if one somehow made the
prisoner aware of her lack (i.e. her inability to reach the noumenal through conventional means),
there is nothing he or she could do to overcome the lack and know the noumenal. While a god
might implant a “noumenal truth” into the minds of a mortal, that truth would not be knowledge
in the same way “phenomenal knowledge” is knowledge. One would be hard pressed to justify
that noumenal truth, or to use it in a process of reasoning concerning phenomenal matters. In this
system humans are utterly helpless in the face of their own finite nature, never able to grow past
a certain point. Under this interpretation we cannot have a contiguous existence between
phenomenal realms, merely phenomenal realms that exist in the same unavailable noumenal
world. In this interpretation, knowledge of other phenomenal worlds, to say nothing of the divine
realms, cannot be truly known. At best they might merely introduced into the world by means of
inspiration and μίμησις of divine inspiration. Reason then, is not common to all parts of
existence, and the gap between knower and known is so vast that Phyrro himself was hardly
skeptic enough. As we have seen, this interpretation is clearly not Parmenidean, but is rather the
way in which a post-Kantian thinker would address the allegory.

section of Plato’s dialogue are sound or not, what matters is that there is implicit in them a principle like
Parmenides’ F3P.
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The second interpretation depends on a specific understanding of ancient Greek
psychology, and Plato’s view of poetry. I shall elaborate further when we come to Plato, but the
ownership of one’s own words was deeply important in Greek psychology. Reading and writing
were thought to be activities for slaves and women while speeches were “real men’s work.” In
the Theatetus we see this principle in action when a slave is called in to read the account of the
conversation between Socrates and Theatetus. The use of scribes in ancient Greece is well
known—an author would not take the time to learn to write when they could simply dictate to a
professional writer. Likewise a man would not want to read another person’s words (for instance
a playwright would not read another’s words—that was what actors were for) because that would
mean that someone else’s ψυχή was in control of their body—essentially it would mean that
someone else was using their voice in the way the Muses used Hesiod, the goddess used Homer,
or Apollo used the Oracle at Delphi.63 While these offices might have been traditionally honored
in the Greek poleis they were also tied to the use of magico-religious speech of which Dettienne
writes. While it may be appropriate for such inspiration or communion to occur with a poet, a
seer, or a king, such a possession was certainly not desired by those who wished to make no
claim to such an office. In particular as more authority was vested outside of the βασιλῆες and
democratic ideals flourished among the nobility and the citizenry in general, desire for such
power to overthrow the individual’s voice fell further out of favor. If power and authority in the
πόλις is vested in oneself, why would one wish to become a passive vessel? As Havelock points
out much of Plato’s work—particularly in The Republic—deals with critiquing μίμησις, and the
allegory of the cave is no different. When read as a part of his critique of the effect of μίμησις on
the soul, the allegory has a vastly different meaning than the first interpretation.

Such a use of one’s body made the used person the passive person—and if we know anything from Aristotle it is
that activity is better than passivity.
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Under this second reading of the allegory, the prisoners are held captive not by their
native abilities, but because they have never received any real education.64 The process of setting
them free does not seek to push them past the limits of their finite nature or to provide them
some new “ascended human” status, but to free them from the spell of the poets that keeps them
in darkness. Once they have been freed they are capable of exercising their intellects aright, and
will naturally come to full knowledge as long as they are not led astray by some vice. The
problem that the dwellers in the cave have in this second interpretation is not that their
constitution lacks something, but that they are not free. Like a slave they are bound to serve the
will of another—only able to see those things which others show them.65 They are chained with
heavy chains in a mimetic feedback loop and no one has yet come to free them from the spell
under which they suffer. This second interpretation is far closer to Parmenides’ perspective,
honors the F3P and avoids anachronism.
Parmenides tells his listener the same story as this second reading of the cave with his
proem and poem. Mortals are wrong about the way of truth and the way of seeming for many
reasons, but the biggest reason is that they have not properly learned, or that they are not
properly observant. They are content to stick with the way of seeming, and do not exercise their
natural rational capacities in such a way that they can meditate on the way of truth. As stated
above, when Parmenides meets the goddess he learns from her but he does not request that she
speak through him. To be sure she gives him a commission, and she restrains him from the way
of seeming, but she does so because of his reason, not her power or inspiration. Indeed after the
proem we see his arguments for the What-is come forth along with a very sudden change in
style. The proem reads much as one would expect of a myth, but the poem itself is more like
64

In other words the restriction is not essential, but accidental.
We must remember that though Aristotle suggests that some people may be born into a “slave status” from which
they cannot ascend, we see nothing of this doctrine in Plato or Parmenides.
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Heraclitus’ or Xenophanes’ argumentation. Parmenides is able to communicate his knowledge
precisely because it is his. Rather than a mimetic repetition of the goddess’s words, we see him
transition from the proem into the body of his work in which he proceeds to reason from
principles to a conclusion about the true nature of reality. He is committed to the idea that
humans are intimately connected with the intelligible (and intelligent) world around them. The
union with the whole is what drives his ability to make such claims even while recognizing the
existence of perspectives.
While Parmenides makes a few interesting moves that seem dubious to 21st century
readers, his arguments make sense if one understands the tight relationship of epistemology and
ontology in his thought. We have already considered the basis for the unity of epistemology and
ontology in Parmenides, so now we shall apply his standard to his discussion of the way of truth.
Parmenides’ claims engage the questions of the nature of What-is, its timelessness,
ungenerablity, and incorruptibility.
Parmenides sums up the way of truth in fragment 8. This fragment speaks in both
cataphatic and apophatic ways about the nature of thought, speech, and what-is.
. . . A single story of route still
is left: that [it] is: on this [route] there are signs
very numerous: that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable;
whole, single-limbed, steadfast, and complete;
Nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since [it] is, now, all together,
One, continuous; for what coming-to-be of it will you seek?
In what way, whence, did [it] grow? Neither from what-is-not shall I allow
You to say or think; for it is not to be said or thought
That [it] is not. And what need could have impelled it to grow
Later or sooner, if it began from nothing?
Thus [it] must either be completely or not at all.
Nor will the strength of trust ever allow anything to come-to-be from what-is
Besides it; therefore neither [its] coming-to-be
nor [its] perishing has Justice allowed, relaxing her shackles,
But she holds [it] fast; the decision about these matters depends on this:
Is [it] or is [it] not? But it has been decided, as is necessary,
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To let go the one as unthinkable, unnamable (for it is no true
Route), but to allow the other, so that it is, and is true.
For if [it] came-to-be, [it] is not, nor [is it] if at some time [it] is going to be.
Thus, coming-to-be is extinguished and perishing not heard of. 66
His claims here are both epistemological and ontological. The routes in question concern what it
is legitimate to think—what 21st century thinkers might conceive of as justified inferences—but
they also concern What-is, and what is speakable. Parmenides seems to have something like the
principle of the excluded middle in mind when he raises the horns of this epistemic-ontological
dilemma in that he will not allow the real existence of a third path. If there are only two routes
that one may use to think, then the options for maneuvering are severely reduced and
Parmenides’ arguments are powerful. His commitment to the F3P gives him a situation in which
any contradiction in language is a contradiction in thought, as he explicitly states in 6.1. Such a
contradiction is also a contradiction in ontology, and is therefore rendered self-contradictory.
Years later Plato still conceives of thinking as “A talk which the soul has with itself about the
objects under its consideration.” a statement that shows us that Plato believed in this self-same
rational capacity for thought to touch both itself and the reality of the object considered.67 The
capacity for speech, thinking, and reality are tightly woven together in the ancient world, and so
the story that the goddess gives to Parmenides attains to the same level of reality as the objects it
discusses.68
Parmenides 8.1-21. . . . μόνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι πολλὰ μάλ’, ὡς
ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ’ ἀτέλεστον· οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ
νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ; πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω
φάσθαι σ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ’ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν ὕστερον ἢ
πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί. οὐδέ ποτ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει
πίστιος ἰσχύς γίγνεσθαί τι παρ’ αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτ’ ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν,
ἀλλ’ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ’ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν
ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ’ ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι. πῶς δ’ ἂν ἔπειτ’ ἀπόλοιτο
ἐόν; πῶς δ’ ἄν κε γένοιτο; εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ’, οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ
ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος. Gallop 64-67.
67
Plato, The Theatetus of Plato. trans. M J. Levett. Revised by Myles Burnyeat. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, inc., 1990. 189.e.1-2
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These are no “language games,” but rather the νόος and the λόγος entail and support one another and φύσις.
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Parmenides demonstrates his commitment to the F3P again when he bids us “Look upon
things which, though far off, are yet firmly present to the mind; | For you shall not cut off what-is
from holding fast to what-is, | For it neither disperses itself in every way everywhere in order, |
Nor gathers itself together.”69 The far off things are present to the mind, which is part of the
reality it touches—indeed it is part of What-is in such a way that we could not divide the mind
from What-is even if we desired to do so. Thought and reality remain elided. Under these
circumstances Parmenides’ claims are indeed a type of argumentation. He gives his audience a
poem that drives their thoughts to consider the nature of the reality they are a part of, and can in
no way be separate from. The result he comes to is that What-is is immutable—at least as far as
generation and perishing are concerned. He has to go farther than the initial principle to attain
true immutability, however. After all there are ways to conceive of a cosmos that is ungenerated
and imperishable that is still capable of change, as Aristotle clearly does.70
Parmenides offers the argument for the changelessness of What-is in 8.22-49,
Nor is [it] divisible, since [it] all alike is;
Nor is [it] somewhat more here, which would keep it from holding together,
Nor is [it] somewhat less, but [it] is all full of what-is.
Therefore [it] is all continuous; for what-is is in contact with what-is.
Moreover, changeless in the limits of great chains
[It] is un-beginning and unceasing since coming-to-be and perishing
Have been driven far off, and the true trust has thrust them out.
Remaining the same and in the same, [it] lies by itself
And remains thus firmly in place; for strong Necessity
Holds [it] fast in the chains of a limit, which fences it about.
Wherefore it is not right for what-is to be incomplete;
For [it] is not lacking; but if [it] were, [it] would lack everything.
The same thing is for thinking and [is] that there is thought;
For not without what-is, on which [it] depends, having been declared,
Will you find thinking’ for nothing else <either> is or will be
Besides what-is, since it was just this that Fate did shackle
To be whole and changeless; wherefore it has been named all things
Gallop, 57. Parmenides 4.1-4. “λεῦσσε δ’ ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως· οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ
ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντηι πάντως κατὰ κόσμον οὔτε συνιστάμενον.”
70
See Physics VIII and Metaphysics Lambda.
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That mortals have established, trusting them to be true,
To come-to-be and to perish, to be and not to be,
And to shift place and to exchange bright colour.
Since, then, there is a furthest limit, [it] is completed,
From every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,
Everywhere from the centre equally matched; for [it] must not be any larger
Or any smaller here or there;
For neither is there what-is-not, which could stop it from reaching
[Its] like; nor is there a way in which what-is could be
More here and less there, since [it] all inviolably is;
For equal to itself from every direction, [it] lies uniformly within limits.71
Here Parmenides gives us a series of arguments about the kinds of change that What-is
can undergo. From the concept of being ungenerable and imperishable he expands to the idea of
changelessness in general. The attribution of chains that limit its change is difficult—he might
mean that it is capable of movement within certain limits or descriptions, or he might mean that
the chains of fate and necessity keep it from any motion at all. In the end he comes down to
absolute changelessness. The most powerful move he makes towards immutability comes from
8.40-41in which he claims that coming-to-be and perishing are equitable to shifting place and
changing color. If changes such as shifting place and the exchange of visual qualities are a type
of generation or destruction (or perhaps require a type of generation or destruction) it follows

διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον· οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν
εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι, οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ’ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος. τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν·
ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον,
ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος τῆλε μάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε
μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν
δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει, οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ
ἐπιδευές· ἐὸν δ’ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο. ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ
τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστιν, εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἄλλο
πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ’ ὄνομασται,
ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, καὶ
τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί,
πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι. οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι
εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ’ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ’ ἧσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον· οἷ
γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει. Gallop, 69-73.
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that any sort of change would cause What-is to not be as What-is must be.72 I believe that it is a
tremendous mark of how deeply he, and his near contemporaries, held to the F3P that his terrible
logic (and the immutability it led to) was seen as a truly difficult problem, despite the evidence
of change in their everyday experience.73

Pre-Socratic Divine Motion and Its Origin
Once the basic commitment to the unity of thought and What-is is understood,
Parmenides’ lines of poetry can be seen as arguments for immutability, but why would either he
or Xenophanes be so concerned with changelessness in the divine or the “What-is,” when sense
data clearly reveals that the cosmos (or at least the items in it) do in fact change? I suggest that
this concern was present in both Xenophanes and Parmenides because they believed that
alteration in place or quality is seen as a motion of some sort, and motions require that the item
or entity in question lack something into which they could change. Privation is the source of
motion or alteration in the mind of Xenophanes and Parmenides, and both of these thinkers are
not willing to allow for any privations in the divine. Xenophanes shows this conviction when he
claims that the divine cannot be anthropomorphic:
Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods
all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among men:
theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.74
. . . as they sang of numerous illicit divine deeds:
While it may be that Parmenides’ notions in these lines also depend on a concept of What-is as simple, and indeed
his arguments against its divisibility do tend strongly in the direction of a doctrine of simplicity, I am not sure how
one would support the idea of simplicity of the world. If the way of seeming is not a path one can walk, but that all
that is cannot be cut off from What-is, and what-is-not cannot even be thought, then whence the path of seeming and
all our perceptions of change? Would not the illusion be one with What-is? I am not convinced that Parmenides had
answers to these sorts of questions—but I am also not convinced that he would consider them to be real problems,
because of the weight of his conviction about the union of epistemology and ontology.
73
Zeno’s paradoxes remain with us even ~25 centuries later.
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Xenophanes: Fragment 11. πάντα θεοῖσ’ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε, ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ
ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν. Lesher, 22-23.
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theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.75
But mortals suppose that gods are born,
wear their own clothes and have a voice and body.76
As well as when he speaks about the motionlessness of the divine in Fragment 26, but perhaps
most interestingly the disjunction between the changelessness between the greatest god and his
physics:
. . . for all things are from the earth and to the earth all things come in the end.77
All things which come into being and grow are earth and water.78
The sea is the source of water and of wind,
for without the great sea there would be no wind
nor streams of rivers nor rainwater from on high;
but the great sea is the begetter of clouds, winds,
and rivers.79
For we all come into being from earth and water.80
From the juxtaposition of these fragments we can see that Xenophanes clearly thinks of the
divine as necessarily distinct from the profane in at least one way—their capacity for and means
of alteration. The greatest god cannot come into or pass out of existence, nor can it move because
of any lack within itself. Xenophanes’ standard is the same as the one revealed in Parmenides’
fragments 2 and 8. The constancy of existence and the lack of any generation or corruption is
necessary for the divine to be truly divine. There is no capacity for lack in the greatest god, or in
the “What-is.” The reality of this item is ensured by strong necessity because of the union

Xenophanes, Fragment 12. ὡς πλεῖστ’ ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους
ἀπατεύειν. Lesher, 22-23.
76
Xenophanes, Fragment 14. ἀλλ’ οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς, τὴν σφετέρην ἐσθῆτα <τ’> ἔχειν φωνήν τε
δέμας τε. Lesher, 24-25.
77
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between thought and reality inherent in the F3P. Where a 21st-century thinker might be hard
pressed to take the F3P seriously (in the same way that Final Causation is not seen as real
causation), this principle is at the core of Pre-Socratic contemplation. The concept that thought
and reality are elided is explicitly stated, even if not explicitly argued for. It is this principle that
allows Parmenides to draw the conclusions he does concerning the nature of What-is and
Xenophanes concerning the greatest god.
The fact is that these thinkers are concerned that any privation in divine existence makes
the divine not truly divine. Any entity or object that is not entirely self-sufficient is dependent on
those things that it lacks in order to maintain its existence. Humans require earth, water, air, and
fire in order to subsist. We require drink, grain, and flesh (be it of fruit, fowl, fish, or beast) to
flourish. All things are compelled to move toward that which they lack—and are therefore in
some way controlled by their privations. If an entity or object that had no privations were to
exist, such an entity would be greatest among gods and men. It would be a being that was
invincible and altogether unmasterable. The dignity and power of such an entity would be
capable of self-existence, and capable of making all things to quake and shake by the power of
his thought, while exerting no toil. All actions would be categorically different from those items
that exist in the profane world. Such a being would not require a body or mind like ours in shape
or thought. It would not be more here or less there, but would be whole, complete, perfect, One.
Like the simplest three dimensional shape—the sphere—a shape with only One edge, so would
such a Being-Be-One. This sort of Existence does not require utter stasis, however. It merely
requires that the One be only self-motivated. All the quaking that It causes affects It not, because
It cannot be affected. Its divine actions may affect other things and bring about effects, but never
its actions nor the effects of its actions serve to change the One—for any change would make it
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no longer One. These thinkers have taken the first, tiniest step into what we would think of as
metaphysics—only they do not think in terms of physics and metaphysics. These ideas have
immediate and radical ontological importance. Anthropomorphic gods are revealed as petty lords
of small fiefs. True divinity is beyond any such limits, and is therefore unlike mortals in shape
and thought—like a well-rounded sphere; perfect, whole, complete, pure, One.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE GENESIS OF THE DDI IN THE ANCIENT HEBREW CONTEXT

As was discussed in the introduction, the ancient Hebrew context was distinct from the
situation of its geopolitical neighbors. In this chapter I wish to discuss not the geopolitical
situation, parts of the Tanakh that I think offer the Hebrew tradition its own type of push towards
divine changelessness. This consideration will center on the birth and binding of Isaac as a
paradigm for a specific kind of DDI, and then show how other sections of the Tanakh expand on
and reinforce this conception of the Divine. Both of these texts have great theological import for
the understanding of the nature and character of YHWH. Understanding the push towards a
changeless YHWH happens in these passages because of a contemplation on YHWH’s
interaction with mortals, and the covenant(s) that YHWH makes with them. I shall begin with an
analysis of the story of God’s promises and covenant to Abraham and the subsequent demand for
the sacrifice of Isaac.

Abraham and the Binding and Sacrifice of Isaac: Absurdity and Covenant Constancy
A consideration of the binding of Isaac that does not take the entire context of Abraham’s
life previous to that demand is doomed to mischaracterize the nature of the tale. This particular
story has often been the subject of debate over the moral character of God. Many thinkers have
attempted to offer a theodicy for how God could ask for such an apparently immoral sacrifice. It
is not my intention in this dissertation to engage with questions of theodicy or morality directly,
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though perhaps some of my claims will be useful in articulating one or both of those ideas. My
focus is rather to deal with how a divine entity could be seen to be changeless in the face of
apparently contradictory situations. Accordingly, in this consideration of the binding of Isaac I
shall consider how a reader of this passage could see YHWH as a changeless being.
The story of Abram’s exodus out of Ur of the Chaldeans is, in some ways, the story of the
genesis of the Hebrew people. It is through Abraham that the Hebrew people identify themselves
as a unit, despite their tribal differences. The call of Abram is, at first, a call without context. A
voice comes to him and instructs him to leave his society behind and go to a land that would be
shown to him at some later time. There is at this point in the tale, no established relationship
between YHWH and Abram, merely a call and a response. Abram leaves his lands, his family,
his native gods, and takes an amount of wealth from a prosperous land and sets out for
destinations unknown based upon the promises of an unknown deity. The first promises that
Abram receives are,
Get out of your country,
From your family
And from your father’s house,
To a land that I will show you.
I will make you a great nation;
I will bless you
And make your name great;
And you shall be a blessing.
I will bless those who bless you,
And I will curse him who curses you;
And in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed.81
and “To your descendants I will give this land. [Canaan]”82 These promises form the foundation
of the relationship between God and Abram. After his trek to Egypt, return to Canaan, and
separation from Lot, God again gives Abram a promise,
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Lift your eyes now and look form the place where you are—northward, southward, eastward,
and westward; for all the land which you see I give to you and your descendants forever. And
I will make your descendants as the dust of the earth; so that if a man could number the dust
of the earth, then your descendants could also be numbered. Arise, walk in the land through
its length and its width for I give it to you.83
The gift of land is of particular importance in understanding the type and power of deity with
which Abram is interacting. There is a claim to power and ownership concerning a land to which
said deity seems to be alien. The importance of the commitments of this deity ought not to be
missed: This deity commits to give a. Land on which to raise herds and crops, and b. human
progeny of vast numbers. The promises are not complete, however. God again comes to Abram
and converses with him in a vision, and a further expansion and detail is given to the call and
promise of God,
“Fear not, Abram, I am your shield; your reward shall be very great.” But Abram said,
“O Lord GOD, what will you give me, for I continue childless, and the heir of my house is
Eliezer of Damascus?” And Abram said, “Behold, you have given me no offspring, and a
member of my household will be my heir.” And behold, the word of the LORD came to him:
“This man shall not be your heir; your very own son shall be your heir.” And he brought
him outside and said, “Look toward heaven, and number the stars, if you are able to number
them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be.” And he believed the LORD, and he
counted it to him as righteousness.
And he said to him, “I am the LORD who brought you out from Ur of the Chaldeans to
give you this land to possess.” But he said, “O Lord GOD, how am I to know that I shall
possess it?” He said to him, “Bring me a heifer three years old, a female goat three years
old, a ram three years old, a turtledove, and a young pigeon.” And he brought him all these,
cut them in half, and laid each half over against the other. But he did not cut the birds in
half. And when birds of prey came down on the carcasses, Abram drove them away.
As the sun was going down, a deep sleep fell on Abram. And behold, dreadful and great
darkness fell upon him. Then the LORD said to Abram, “Know for certain that your
offspring will be sojourners in a land that is not theirs and will be servants there, and they
will be afflicted for four hundred years. But I will bring judgment on the nation that they
serve, and afterward they shall come out with great possessions. As for you, you shall go to
your fathers in peace; you shall be buried in a good old age. And they shall come back here
in the fourth generation, for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet complete.”
When the sun had gone down and it was dark, behold, a smoking fire pot and a flaming
torch passed between these pieces. On that day the LORD made a covenant with Abram,
saying, “To your offspring I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the

83

Gen. 13:14-17. ESV

57

river Euphrates, the land of the Kenites, the Kenizzites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the
Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites and the Jebusites.”84
In this passage God gives a very peculiar set of promises. First, God answers a complaint from
Abram that the promise goes as yet unfulfilled. Abram has no children of his own, and his house
will pass to a slave born within his house. God’s response is to directly say that Eliezer of
Damascus will not be the heir, but rather a son of Abram’s own body. After this promise, God
reaffirms that the descendants of Abram will be of an indeterminately large number—or that they
would at least be beyond Abram’s capacity to count. Thus God reaffirms the second promise
(that God would make Abram a great nation). Then the first promise is also revisited, and the
land is once again promised to Abram, and again Abram questions God’s promise. At this point a
rather remarkable thing occurs. God’s response is to cut a formal covenant with Abram. Animals
are ritually sacrificed and laid apart over against one another so that a bloody pathway is formed.
Once the sun goes down a theophany of God passes between the pieces and so formalizes the
peculiar relationship between God and Abram (and therefore Abram’s descendants) in which
God reaffirms both promises at once. The offspring will receive the land. Fascinatingly only the
theophany passes through the pieces, meaning that the punishments for any failure of this
covenant will fall on God, and not on Abram or Abram’s descendants.
Immediately85 following this incident the scripture turns to an attempt of Abram and
Sarai to make good on the covenant by means of Sarai’s slave girl Hagar. Hagar indeed becomes
pregnant and gives birth to Ishmael when Abram was eighty-six. Thirteen years later God
appears again to Abram, reaffirms the covenant, this time complete with a renaming of Abram to
Abraham and an insistence that all male human members of the covenant be circumcised in the

84

Genesis 15:1-21, ESV
While the change in subject is immediate in the text, the text also informs us that an undetermined amount of time
has passed, as this next tale takes place after Abram has been in the land for 10 years.
85

58

flesh of their foreskins at eight days old. God then renames Sarai to Sarah, and specifically
promises that “I will bless her, and moreover, I will give you a son by her. I will bless her and
she shall become nations; kings of peoples shall come from her.”86 Abram does not believe that
Sarah and he will be able to conceive, and so requests that Ishmael would be the son of
promise—a request that God denies. God then specifically states “No, but Sarah your wife shall
bear you a son, and you shall call his name Isaac. I will establish my covenant with him as an
everlasting covenant for his offspring after him. [. . .] but I will establish my covenant with Isaac,
whom Sarah shall bear to you at this time next year.”87 Abraham obeys and circumcises the
males of his household. In chapter 18 there is the story of the theophany with two angels who eat
with Abraham at his tent, and the rebuke of Sarah for laughing at the promise of God. In Chapter
21 the promised Isaac is born, the tension with Hagar and Ishmael rises, and God reaffirms that it
is “through Isaac shall your offspring be named.”88
To recount, Abraham received a call and promise from God at 75 years of age. A few
years later God reaffirms the promise by making a formal covenant with Abraham—God
specifically promises that a child of Abraham’s own body will be the child of promise. When
Abraham is c.85 years old he and Sarah try to get an heir by Hagar. Thirteen years later Isaac is
promised, and is born a year after that. Thus, from the first call of Abraham until the birth of the
child 25 years have passed, the child has been promised at least six times, twice by name. After a
quarter of his life waiting on one promise to be fulfilled, we then see that Isaac is weaned, and
sometime after that (when Isaac is fully able to form cogent sentences) but before his marriage
(sometime after his 37th birthday) is when the story of the binding of Isaac occurs. We may
safely assume that there have been between 30 to 40 years of consistent promise have occurred
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concerning the promised child, and six to eleven years of knowing that Isaac is specifically the
child of promise. Once this context has been accounted for and understood we finally reach a
position where the content of this particular tale may be evaluated for what it is; a part of the
story of the God’s covenant with Abraham.
After this extended period of waiting on a peculiar promise based on one child God
makes a seemingly irrational and absurd demand of Abraham: “Take your son, your only son
Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on
one of the mountains of which I shall tell you.”89 While this passage is the center of many
different debates, I wish to emphasize is the apparent ability of this deity to undergo radical
change—seemingly at a whim. By simple argumentation we seem to reach the conclusion that
the God of Abraham is mutable.
1. If the deity is immutable, then the deity cannot alter its purposes.
2. The deity does alter its purposes.
3. Therefore the deity is mutable.
Simple Modus Tollens seems to give us all the information we require in order to understand the
fickle nature of God in this passage. Let us examine how this argument applies to the God of
Abraham.
First we must consider that there have been the two covenants cut with Abraham. The
first was cut into the flesh of the sacrificial animals—through which God alone passed as a
theophany. The second was cut into the flesh of the foreskin of Abraham and all the males of his
household—including Isaac when the boy was 8 days old. As far as Abraham was concerned he
had kept the covenant of circumcision. He had gone where God told him to go, and he had
served God faithfully for his part. Abraham had fulfilled his end of the covenant responsibility
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and God had delivered the child of promise. Isaac, however, was still young and unmarried.
Because Isaac lacked children God’s promise to Abraham and to Sarah was not yet fulfilled.
There was no great nation of descendants from Abraham’s body. It is into this situation that the
call to sacrifice Isaac is made. What God has asked Abraham to do is kill Isaac—thereby
making it impossible for God to bring about the promise He had covenanted with Abraham. Here
we add layers to our analysis of the nature of Abraham’s God:
1. A perfect deity cannot act on false pretenses.
2. An omnibenevolent deity cannot make false promises.
3. An omnipotent deity cannot fail to bring about its purposes.
4. An immutable deity cannot alter its purposes.
5. Abraham’s God reneges on at least one of his purposes.
6. Therefore, Abraham’s God is either not perfect, not good, not omnipotent, or is
mutable.
In order to understand the stakes at this juncture we might modify any or all of these premises to
be more subtle, but the two easiest and most direct ways to deal with the problem at hand is to
address 5, and to modify it to 5A “Abraham’s God seems to renege on at least one of his
purposes.” We shall now analyze the story and show how the use of 5A will not only salvage, but
indeed will establish, a Hebrew version of the DDI.
From Abraham’s perspective, God has demanded that the child of promise—the only
child through whom God could fulfill his promises—and now that child is to be killed before the
promise can be fulfilled. If Isaac dies childless then God’s promise is broken. There are a few
options to what has gone awry here. First, God has acted in such a way as to deceive Abraham,
violating 1 and 2, showing that this God is not worthy of worship for his character. Second, God
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has been found unable to bring about his purposes for Isaac based on some constraint that he
cannot overcome, meaning that God fails to 3 because God is unable to bring about this one
promise and is not worthy of the lifelong devotion that Abraham has lived out. Indeed if God
cannot establish the line of Abraham’s descendants through Isaac, then the whole covenant
relationship is void. The central fact about this story is not the actions of God, nor the actions of
Abraham, but rather the standards of the covenant relationship between these two persons.
Because the covenant between YHWH and Abraham is modeled on the suzerain-vassal form of
covenant, we have occasion here to ask what sort of test is occurring.
While this story has often been read as a test of Abraham’s faith in a deity that demands
difficult, perhaps even immoral things, I contend that we ought also to read this passage as a test
of YHWH. Read in this fashion the tale will establish not Abraham’s faithfulness, but rather
YHWH’s faithfulness to the covenant. YHWH made Abraham promises that could only be
fulfilled through Isaac because the promises depended on Isaac’s existence. When God calls for
Isaac’s death then, Abraham is offered the chance to test YHWH in a way that other humans in
the Tanakh may never test YHWH.90 When Isaac is bound and Abraham commits to killing him,
we see the ultimate failure of YHWH’s promise in the making. If Isaac dies without children,
then YHWH is bound by the covenant with Abraham to die and suffer disintegration in the same
way that the heifer, the goat, the ram, and the two birds that sealed the covenant in blood had
died and been torn apart. In short, this sacrifice is the test of YHWH’s faithfulness to the
covenant despite seemingly absurd circumstances. This formula of YHWH’s faithfulness to the
covenant with Abraham and his children is the foundation of the Hebrew idea of the DDI. Rather
than being a critique of anthropomorphism, or intended to justify a claim regarding divine
motivation, the claim made in this passage is that YHWH is immutable in behaving in a manner
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consistent with his covenant. Indeed we may term this sort of immutability “Covenant
Constancy.”

Further Instances of Covenant Constancy in the Face of Absurdity
Covenant Constancy is not isolated to the binding of Isaac, however, but is a major feature
of the Tankah. Time and again the story of YHWH’s relationship with the children of Israel is
about a seeming failure of the covenant, or a failure to fulfill a promise, or perhaps most
prevalently how a seemingly absurd circumstance that seems to show that the covenant has failed
is in fact a way in which YHWH is carrying out the covenant in unexpected ways. In many ways
the binding of Isaac is the prototype of all these other stories, and each of them is confirmed in
the same manner. There is always a seeming failure or tension to a breaking point before YHWH
steps in and makes good on the covenant. Isaac has two sons, and again the covenant is
confirmed to the younger son. When Jacob seems to have been driven out of the land of promise
by Esau, the conflict is resolved by means of a change of heart in the violent older brother. When
the sons of Jacob seem to have doomed themselves through the abuse of Joseph, YHWH makes
a way for the children of Israel to survive the famine without abuse. When their descendants
suffer abuse at the hands of a new king in Egypt, YHWH reveals himself to Moses and calls
them out of the house of slavery by means of plagues and miracles. YHWH renews and
strengthens covenant in the wilderness of Sinai, and when the children of Israel reject the tenants
of the covenant he makes with them, rather than destroying them and starting anew, he keeps
covenant by weeding out the faithless generation. After they enter the Canaan and Joshua dies,
YHWH sends Judges to call his people to repentance for violation of the commandments
regarding the worship of other deities, and subsequently to free them from oppression by
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conquering powers. After the period of the Judges we see that through the period of the kings the
same ideas are present in the text. Saul’s election and subsequent fall gives rise to David’s reign
and the new covenant that promise that one of David’s progeny will rule his kingdom eternally,
Now, therefore, thus you [the prophet Nathan] shall say to my servant David, ‘Thus says the
LORD of hosts, I took you from the pasture, from following the sheep, that you should be
prince over my people Israel. And I have been with you wherever you went and have cut off
all your enemies from before you. And I will make for you a great name, like the name of
the great ones of the earth. And I will appoint a place for my people Israel and will plant
them, so that they may dwell in their own place and be disturbed no more. And violent men
shall afflict them no more, as formerly, from the time that I appointed the judges over my
people Israel. And I will give you rest from all your enemies. Moreover the LORD declares
to you that the LORD will make you a house. When your days are fulfilled and you lie
down with your fathers, I will raise up your offspring after you, who shall come from your
body, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house for my name, and I will
establish the throne of his kingdom forever. I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a
son. When he commits iniquity I will discipline him with the rod of men, with the stripes of
the sons of men, but my steadfast love will not depart from him, as I took it from Saul,
whom I put away from before you. And your house and your kingdom shall be made sure
forever before me. Your throne shall be established forever.91
This promise, combined with the promise made to Abraham that his offspring would possess the
land of Canaan eternally92 leads to the paradigmatic absurd situation: the Exile and Diaspora.
Both of these promises seem to show the greatest failure of the promises of YHWH, and they are
the core commitments outside of the very existence of the Israelite people. This apparent failure
of YHWH to deliver on these two prominent promises is an exact parallel to the story of the
binding of Isaac. The failure of the kingdom and the failure of the possession of the land would
show that YHWH was unable or unwilling to keep the commitments of the covenant.
To be sure some amount of leeway can be granted because of the penalties and curses
that came with the Deuteronomic renewal of the covenant. While the curses are most exactly
contained in chapter 28, the curse that is most significant to this study is contained in chapter 4,

91
92

2 Samuel 7:8-16 ESV
Genesis 17:8 ESV

64

When you father children and children’s children, and have grown old in the land, if you act
corruptly by making a carved image in the form of anything, and by doing what is evil in the
sight of the LORD your God, so as to provoke him to anger, I call heaven and earth to
witness against you today, that you will soon utterly perish from the land that you are going
over the Jordan to possess. You will not live long in it, but will be utterly destroyed. And the
LORD will scatter you among the peoples, and you will be left few in number among the
nations where the LORD will drive you. And there you will serve gods of wood and stone,
the work of human hands, that neither se, nor hear, nor eat, nor smell. But form there you
will seek the LORD your God and you will find him if you search after him with all your
heart and with all your soul. When you are in tribulation, and all these things come upon
you in the latter days, you will return to the LORD your God and obey his voice. For the
LORD your God is a merciful God. He will not leave you or destroy you or forget the
covenant with your fathers that he swore to them.93
This curse describes the situation that the Israelites go on to suffer in the exile of the Northern
and Southern kingdoms. The loss of the ownership of the land and the fact that the Davidic line
lost control of the kingdoms would appear to show the failure of the promises, and thus either the
lack of power or the rather severe mutability of YHWH as regards his covenant commitments.
Part of the account that must be considered, however, are these very curses. From the perspective
of the people the promises may have failed, but part of the point of the Tanakh is that YHWH
does not—in fact cannot—fail to keep covenant with his people.
While covenant constancy despite appearances is present at the outset in the test of
YHWH’s faithfulness in the binding of Isaac, we see a reaffirmation of this principle for people
who feel the seeming lack of faithfulness in YHWH’s conversation with Elijah,
And behold, the word of the LORD came to [Elijah], and he said to him, “What are you
doing here, Elijah?” He said, “I have been very jealous for the LORD, the God of hosts. For
the people of Israel have forsaken your covenant, thrown down your altars, and killed your
prophets with the sword, and I, even I only, am left, and they seek my life to take it away.”
And he said, “Go out and stand on the mount before the LORD.” And behold, the LORD
passed by, and a great strong wind tore the mountains and broke in pieces the rocks before
the LORD, but the LORD was not in the wind. And after the wind an earthquake, but the
LORD was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake a fire, but the LORD was not in
the fire. And after the fire the sound of a low whisper. And when Elijah heard it, he wrapped
his face in his cloak and went out and stood at the entrance of the cave. And behold, there
came a voice to him and said, “What are you doing here Elijah?” He said, “I have been very
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jealous for the LORD, the God of hosts, for the people of Israel have forsaken your
covenant, thrown down your altars, and killed your prophets with the sword, and I, even I
only, am left, and they seek my life to take it away.” And the LORD said to him, “Go, return
on your way to the wilderness of Damascus. And when you arrive, you shall anoint Hazael
to be king over Syria. And Jehu the son of Nimshi you shall anoint to be king over Israel,
and Elisha the son of Shaphat of Abel-meholah you shall anoint to be the prophet in your
place. And the one who escapes from the sword of Hazael shall Jehu put to death, and the
one who escapes from the sword of Jehu shall Elisha put to death. Yet I will leave seven
thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth that has not
kissed him.94
This passage shows that the difficulty in perceiving the covenant constancy of YHWH can be as
difficult as perceiving YHWH himself. Elijah shows how in the midst of a terribly depressing
situation, when the covenant people seem to have abandoned not only YHWH, but Elijah as
well, it seems that YHWH has been unable to maintain the relationship that he had committed
himself to with the Abrahamic covenant. YHWH’s response is perhaps as counter-intuitive as it
could be. He reveals his power over the created order, and finally reaches out to Elijah in an
intimate moment of prophetic revelation—a revelation that things will get even worse! Elijah is
to go and anoint the enemy of Israel to be king in Syria, and to anoint a new king of Israel, and
then to anoint a new prophet—indicating that either Elijah will die or that his prophetic office
will be removed from him and given to another. Then these anointed ones will commit a great
slaughter in the land. This word is harsher than the idea that Elijah alone would die. In the midst
of all this depressing news, however, YHWH offers an insight to Elijah as to the true nature of
the situation. Despite all the appearances and all of Elijah’s despair a perfect remnant will be
preserved—seven thousand persons who remain uncorrupted. The preservation of the remnant of
YHWH’s people is consistent with the promise given in Deuteronomy, and shows how YHWH
does in fact maintain covenant constancy despite appearances. It is this conception of YHWH as
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constant that aids the displaced persons from Judah in developing an account of their religion
that survives the lack of native and cultic context during the Exile.
The difference between the way YHWH seems to be is powerfully distinguished from the
way YHWH is in fact—a distinction that is both subtle and powerfully reinforced by the
prohibition from making icons or depictions of YHWH. Thus we can see that the cult items and
practice both reinforce this awareness of the fundamental distinction between how a situation
seems and how YHWH is in fact, is central to understanding both the theological facts of
YHWH’s existence, but also what may be known of him. The contrast becomes clear when we
consider what Hebrew scripture makes so very clear through two different prophets; Moses and
Balaam, “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one.”95 and “God is not a man, that
he should lie, or a son of man, that he should change his mind. Has he said, and will he not do it?
Or has he spoken, and will not fulfill it?”96 By these means we are able to support that 5A as a
means to maintain divine status uncorrupted by inconsistency or failure. Thus, in the same way
that the presocratics were attempting to describe One Deity that could not be affected, distracted,
or gainsaid, we see a God that cannot be overcome by human actions or cosmic circumstances.
Here again, we see an argument for a DDI that emphasizes self-motivation, power to shape all
things, invincibility, and aseity rather than stasis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INFLUENTIAL TEXTS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The importance and influence of Plato and Aristotle on philosophical theology cannot be
overstated, and because of this fact there has been much ink spilled over how to best interpret the
writings of these singularly significant thinkers. Interpreting these two philosophers is
notoriously difficult, and much of the study done on them attempts to understand and articulate
exactly what each of them believed and what they did not believe. While an accurate
philosophical understanding of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle is, of course, a worthy and
important goal it is not the aim of this work. The contributions of any given historical figure to a
field of study need not hang on what the person actually believes, but rather by studying the
impact of those beliefs on their devotees. Accordingly we shall consider the various passages of
these seminal philosophers that help to shape the conversation over the next four centuries.
Needless to say, any discussion of these philosophers must involve some manner of
interpretation on my part. However, the emphasis here is on ways Middle Platonists may have
used these passages in advancing their own ideas.

Doctrinal Genus and Differentia
While the logical worth of any given argument may be evaluated apart from the context
in which that argument is made, understanding the preconditions, assumptions, and purpose
behind any piece of argumentation requires an examination of that context. When we consider
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Plato and Aristotle, then we must consider them as being in conversation with those who
influence them. We have already considered the work of some of the seminal Pre-Socratic
philosophers in chapter two, and while that consideration is not exhaustive, it is illustrative of the
concerns to which Plato and Aristotle are reacting. With the conversation set between the
religious and cultural practices of the fourth century combined with the critical work of the early
philosophers, we gain a metric to understand which passages, and accordingly which “doctrines”
should be considered relevant to the progressing conversation about the nature of the Divine.
Some of these passages are far less obvious to the 21st century thinker simply because we are
more removed from the context of the original conversation.
Much of Plato’s work was designed to show the importance of philosophical education as
compared to the mimetic recitation of the Homeric and Hesiodic literature as the primary means
of transmitting culturally significant information. While this polemic against Homer and Hesiod
is hardly unique to Plato, the success of his particular polemic is singular. While Aristotle’s work
is aimed at a different agenda, he is no less polemic in his analysis of the history of philosophy.
Both Plato and Aristotle are working at carving out a space for philosophical contemplation of
the peculiar subjects that interest them at any given time or in any given work. These
polemicized types of contemplation did not abandon holistic thinking, however, and allowed for
the application of Socrates’s definitional queries to be preserved in Plato’s writings.97 Any topic
is open for thought or discussion, and these thinkers turn their attention to these subjects with
gusto. The use of genus and differentia as a means to accurately define terms and subjects gives
rise to a sort of taxonomic means of explaining the cosmos gives us a basic framework in which
to evaluate the ideas contained in the passages we will consider.
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I am not attempting to claim access to the historical Socrates here, but merely express the concern with accurate
definitions of terms that amount to knowledge claims.
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Both Plato and Aristotle make use of this technique as a way to philosophically engage
the topics they encounter. It is not the only tool in their arsenal,98 but it is a particularly powerful
one, and in many ways the use of genus and differentia mirrors the by-now infamous problem of
negative predication in Parmenides as well as anticipating the difficulties between apophatic and
cataphatic thought in metaphysics which becomes so significant and entrenched in the Medieval
period. This explanatory method appears in Greece’s Axial Age, and is used to critique the
traditional cosmological and anthropomorphic folk religions of the day, and while it has already
been used for over a century to attack such these ideas, myths, dogmas, and cultic practices,
Plato in particular turns this method on a new target: μίμησις.99 If we take this methodological
procedure seriously it gives us a means to evaluate the various passages which will be useful in
our consideration of the DDI, both in these thinkers, and in the Hellenic period thinkers who
follow them.
In particular we should be aware that the use of genus and differentia are of particular
significance to the study of the Divine, and particularly of Divine Nature. While a claim of
methodological monism or dualism with regards to ὑπόστασις would, for reasons already
established in the previous analysis of Xenophanes, be overblown, we can see in Plato and
Aristotle a use of this explanatory method that cuts across subject matter. Plato has Socrates use
this method with virtually every subject with which he engages and for every term for which he
seeks a definition. Aristotle, likewise, uses this method in categorical & taxonomic investigation
of reality in general. When turned to studying φύσις we see the same methods applied, but an
oddity appears when one begins to consider the nature of the Divine. First Philosophy itself
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seems to push against the limits of continuity of explanation for Plato and Aristotle in the same
way that it did for Xenophanes and Parmenides. When one begins to consider the nature of the
Divine, and particularly of Divine action and motivation, the usual store of categories seems to
fall short. Thus, while the study of φύσις and First Philosophy are not separable, they do become
rather distinct. Especially in Aristotle we see a push to maintaining unification of explanation,
but explanations of the transcendent Unmoved Mover cannot be wholly univocal with how we
speak of things in the sublunary physics. This distinction of explanatory factors can help explain
the nature of the DDI in Plato and Aristotle, as well as the work it does.
Plato and the DDI
Before considering Plato’s texts, the interpretive standpoint from which this argument
proceeds must be acknowledged. These passages should be considered in at least two ways
before any claims to a “Platonic Doctrine” is made, and quite apart from conducting an analysis
of the pure logical structure of the argument. First we must consider it in its place in intellectual
history, and then we must consider it in its literary context in the flow of the document. Once
these standards are met, we will be in a more established place to understand what Plato may or
may not be claiming the passages we will consider.
The place of definition and genus and differentia has already been broached, but it is
worth rehashing here. Plato’s concern with definitions makes a few assumptions. Perhaps the
most significant is that he maintains a fundamental trust that the human mind is capable of
Knowing both Reality and Truth. In many ways, despite his profound challenge of the wisdom
and knowledge of the day, despite many of the dialogues ending in ἀπορία, despite the Academy
eventually promoting skepticism, Plato maintains hope that Philosophy can deliver powerful
answers to the questions we ask. Unlike Pyrrho, there is content towards which Plato is driving
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his students. While that content may not be made explicit in writing—and may even be
ineffable—the focus and force of Plato’s program yields a very specific sort of fruit in the lives
of his disciples. The very fact of the extent of his written works indicates that there is intent to
preserve the method of seeking that content.100 There is continuity between Plato’s estimation of
human epistemic potential and Parmenides’s F3P. This argument sees Plato as involved in
conversation with various themes and philosophical discussions that were already existent in the
pre-Socratics. While Plato’s thought should not be conflated with theirs, the continuities that do
exist should not be ignored. Plato is likely closer to their way of thinking than he is to Augustine,
much less Descartes. Accordingly, we should read Plato as a philosopher of his time, and attempt
to understand his writings as having philosophical force that is first and foremost addressing the
students to whom he first bequeathed these dialogues.
The most explicit passage used to understand Plato’s version of the DDI comes from
Republic II, from 380d-383c.101 While this passage is an easy one to cite in order to claim that
Plato argues for a sort of transcendental stasis of the divine that allows no changes whatsoever,
such an interpretation is not necessitated from the text. In addition, as we have already seen in
our consideration of Xenophanes, Divine actions may not be tied to Divine mutation. For its part,
this passage makes a few rather bold claims, but to exactly what do those claims amount?
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Excerpted from the text the argument appears to argue for the most strident kind of immutability
imaginable. The argument is fairly simple, and proceeds from the idea of divine perfections.
1. Whatever is in good condition, whether by nature or craft or both is least likely to be
changed by anything else.
2. A god and what belongs to him are in every way in the “most-good” condition.
3. Therefore, a god and what belongs to him is perfectly unlikely to be changed by anything
else.102
So far, so good. This line of thinking is in line with what we have seen before. Here we have a
non-anthropomorphic conception of Divine constancy based in Divine invincibility. We easily
see a continuity between this argument and the argument of Xenophanes. Plato is not finished
with the argument, however. The dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus continues with a
discussion of questions about divine motivation,
S. Then does he change or alter himself?
A. Clearly he does, if indeed he is altered at all.
S. Would he change himself into something better and more beautiful than himself or
something worse and uglier?
A. It would have to be into something worse, if he’s changed at all, for surely we won’t say
that a god is deficient in either beauty or virtue.
S. Absolutely right. And do you think, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether god or human
would deliberately make himself worse in any way?
A. No, that’s impossible.
S. It is impossible, then, for gods to want to alter themselves? Since they are the most
beautiful and best possible, since it seems that each always and unconditionally retains
his own shape.
A. That seems entirely necessary to me.103
Thus, in the discussion here a god must not be forced to alter by things or forces outside of itself
and no internal motivation could cause a god to change because its perfection would not allow
for any better state to be the motivation for any change. There is one final way in which Plato
suggest that divine change might occur—that a deity might seem to change for some reason,

Paraphrased from 381b. Plato’s concluding line here is “Then a god would be least likely to have many shapes."
Plato, Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
INC., 1992. 381b-381c
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without actually undergoing real changes in itself. But this illusion of change would amount to a
falsehood, and this kind of falsehood would be particularly egregious. Any such illusion would
misrepresent the very essence of Divine perfection. If a god could engage in such deception it
would lower the quality of Divine perfection. Therefore a god is immune from all external
controlling or even contributing factors, would be unable to alter in ways that would make it
worse than its already perfect nature, and could not ever seem to be less than it is. Thus extracted
we seem to have outlined an utterly invariant argument for a sort of “simple immutability” in
every way possible.
It is, however, worth considering the context in which Plato sets this description of a
god’s capacity for change. While The Republic is often read as Plato’s dialogue on political
theory, the reader is aware that the only reason that the nature of the καλλίπολις is so that by
analogy the nature of the individual human soul may be investigated. While the insights that
Plato offers in this work are certainly valuable when considering political theory, it is necessary
to remember that the main focus of this inquiry is how the individual human soul is improved.
This particular passage is solidly couched in this allegory, and in particular this argument is part
of the articulation of how to properly train the soul to think correctly about deities. Most
especially, this section is not intended to be a robust articulation of Platonic Theology, but is
rather a critique of what kinds of poets and songs are to be allowed to be part of the education of
the youth and the entertainment of the citizen of the καλλίπολις. In short, this section is one of
the first attacks in The Republic on the practice of mimetic recitation of poetry that so clearly
corrupts the soul. When read in this context we may legitimately ask whether or not this
articulation concerning the nature of Divine is to be taken as a doctrinal standard of Platonic
Theology, or whether it is part of the method of attack on μίμησις.
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In particular we should notice that Plato is very concerned here with the idea of divine
entities changing their shape, and he ties this change to the work of a γόης. The comparison to a
sorcerer and the work of such cheats and illusion makers is a particular type of polemic that Plato
explicitly ties into his critique of the mimetic poet. This particular section is ordered to the end of
passing a particular law about what types of stories may be told in the καλλίπολις, and the
conclusion is as follows;
Then let no poet tell us about Proteus or Thetis, or say that
The gods, in the likeness of strangers from foreign lands,
Adopt every sort of shape and visit our cities.
Nor must they present Hera, in their tragedies or other poems, as a priestess collecting alms
for
The life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus,
or tell us other stories of that sort. Nor must mothers, believing bad stories about the gods
wandering at night in the shapes of strangers from foreign lands, terrify their children with
them. Such stories blaspheme the gods and, at the same time, make children more
cowardly.104
While it is true that Plato’s Socrates does claim that the gods are not able to undergo changes
because of their perfections, that discussion is couched in and ordered toward the criticism of
wrongfully educating children and causing them to become vicious adults. Book 2 concludes
even more strongly where Socrates concludes with, “Whenever anyone says such things about a
god, we’ll be angry with him, refuse him a chorus, and not allow his poetry to be used in the
education of the young, so that our guardians will be as god-fearing and godlike as humans can
be.”105 Plato’s emphasis here could not be clearer. While he seems to hold some standard of
Divine perfection and immutability important, the exact nature of Plato’s own theology may be
obscured by the fact that this section is couched in allegory. In point of fact, the doctrinal
accuracy of these claims is like the Myth of Er in book 10. Just as Plato may or may not believe
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in a robust metempsychosis whose quality is due to the perfection of a soul in the life last lived,
he may or may not believe in this claim about the nature of the Divine.
Whatever the truth of Plato’s personal convictions about the DDI, this argument is not
necessarily the definitive statement of those beliefs, simply based upon its location in the corpus.
Again, it is not the point of this work to declare with certainty what Plato does or does not
believe, but to point out that this particular document leaves open a possibility that Divine action
is possible, even if a robust version of the DDI is true. In particular, the reader must take careful
notice that Plato restricts himself to a discussion of a peculiar kind of change in Republic 2—
change in shape or change in appearance. Plato does not concern himself here with changes of
extrinsic qualities (such as the ability to become related to new things or states of affairs),
changes of location (either spatial or temporal), nor does he mention the ability of gods to affect
changes in the world of φύσις. The exact nature of the DDI here articulated is underdetermined
both by the language in the argument as well as by its place in the overall dialogue. The
importance of the passage is unquestionable, but the exact nature of Plato’s version of the DDI
argued for here is quite open for further debate.
The debate over what Plato really believes about the nature of the divine is given even
sharper teeth when we consider the goal towards which he aims this kind of description of the
gods. Plato explicitly tells his students that the reason that they tell only a very particular type of
story in the education of the children of the καλλίπολις is “so that our guardians will be as godfearing and godlike as human beings can be.”106 The rest of the Republic also stresses the
importance of having a perfected and virtuous soul, and Plato never fully abandons this goal.
Plato may even see the human soul not only as capable of Knowledge of Reality and Truth, but
as capable of a kind of Divine Perfection. He is certainly optimistic about the ability of the
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Athenians to attain Philosophy as a good for the soul that can reach a level of perfection that
Socrates drove them towards with his teaching and questioning. Indeed, Plato seems to have
something of a nascent doctrine of human beings as capable of a kind of apotheosis that is
achieved by the proper practice of Philosophy. Nowhere is this more evident than the way that
Plato narrates the death of Socrates. This idea of the divinity of the soul of the philosopher is not
unique to that passage, however. We also find this idea of the perfecting power of Philosophy in
the dramatic setting of the Theatetus, wherein Theatetus (already like Socrates in shape) becomes
like him also in soul because of his Philosophical education. This motion towards divinity is
similar to the kind of God argued for in Republic 2, in that their character becomes immune to
adversity, but still able to change those around them through questioning and Philosophic
consideration of Reality and Truth.
In addition to these passages about character that reforms others, we also see that Plato
engages with the topic of theology in the Timaeus. Once again the dramatic setting of this
dialogue should not be missed. It is set the very day after the discussions of in The Republic, and
its continuity with that discussion features prominently at the opening of the dialogue. This
juxtaposition is even more important when we consider that much of Timaeus’s articulation of
the existence of the world consists of a mythic telling of the cosmogonic history of the cosmos
and the gods and living things that people the cosmos. Like previous thinkers, Plato here
articulates a rather robust continuity between the study of φύσις and theology. In particular,
Timeaus references the ideas of previous thinkers quite thoroughly in his articulation of the
philosophical cosmogony.
The theogonic myth that Timaeus gives starts with an appeal to the gods, as is proper at
the outset of any affair—mirroring the sort of invocation with which both Homer and Hesiod
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begin their mimetic epics. After the brief introduction, Timeaus immediately turns to a
Parmenidean articulation of existence itself.107 The nature of existence itself by itself is not much
considered at first, but we do get a more complete articulation of what this metaphysical reality
is like when the first and signature work of the Demiurge is described. The first thing that he
creates is the cosmological animal made after the shape of the best of all things. This description
is of a perfectly spherical, and that the sphere itself must be ordered according to the ratio of
numerical harmony present in a well-made and fine-tuned lyre. The cosmological animal must
have both intellect and soul as well as perfect body, and must be self-contained so as to not have
any needs beyond itself. This construction of the cosmic animal that contains all other life and
intellect within itself is made after the image of the most pure being, and becomes the source of
time once it is completed.108 This elaborate cosmogony takes the place of the familial generation
of anthropomorphic deities in Hesiod’s Theogony, and makes the nature of the divine a more
robustly developed version of the speculation given by Xenophanes and Parmenides. This
cosmogonic and theogonic myth gives a sort of structure to divinity that allows for the Divine to
act upon the cosmological order, and even to cause other—albeit lesser—divinities to exist in a
supra-temporal fashion.
While the exact nature of the divine indicated here in the Timaeus is, again, rather
opaque because of Plato’s caginess in having Timaeus give us this myth that is clearly uses the
material of the Pythagoreans and other pre-Socratics, not to mention Homer and Hesiod, the core
feature that interests us here is that the Divine has causal power while itself being immune from
change. The nature of the Divine reality to which the Demiurge looks for inspiration in
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construction of the cosmic animal is perfectly self-sufficient and invincible, and for all the world
seems to be beyond any description beyond “is”. However, this “Divine is-ness,” though not
described in itself by Timaeus, exerts a fundamental causal power—creative and philosophical
imitation. In some way, the work of the Demiurge is nearly mimetic in nature. It perceives the
perfection of the Divine, and overcome with inspiration and perhaps even a sort of awe
constructs the cosmic animal to be as perfect a model as could be constructed. This model
contains all the rationality, soul, and substrata in which such things can inhere. Again, regardless
of Plato’s actual intentions in the Timaeus, we easily begin to see how this line of thinking
becomes important to the overall history of philosophical theology. This use of Divine perfection
to be the source of divine action proceeds in at least two ways in the Greek context. One can
hardly read the Timaeus and not be struck by the similarities between this account of the
spherical, self-containing, sempiternal cosmos and the cosmography provided by Aristotle in the
Physics and Metaphysics.109 The chief difference110 between these accounts is that Plato’s
Demiurge constructs the cosmic order, where as in Aristotle no such construction is entertained.
The other way that this myth becomes famous is through the interpretations of Plotinus, where
the One gains a positive activity. For Plotinus, the story is similar, but the One (or the Divine)
necessarily emanates all of formal reality and the Demiurge. This activity is not chosen, but
innate and unstoppable, but is nevertheless a form of pure activity in being—where being is a
verb rather than a mere noun.

109

The relationship between the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is fraught with much scholarship and tension. It is
not my intention here to make a statement about what either philosopher actually believed, and whether or not the
agreed or disagreed on the subjects of physics and first philosophy.
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Timaeus can be identified with the cosmography in Aristotle’s Physics. I am merely pointing out that the
macroscopic features of these accounts bear enough similarity to one another that a person in the Hellenic period can
see a continuity between them.
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Which tradition more accurately describes Plato’s own views on the nature of the DDI is
not really the most important part of his contribution to the discussion. Rather, what Plato gives
us is not a solid doctrine that answers all the questions, but is rather a codification of the
conversation up to that point. This codification serves as the point of departure for later thinkers
who are interested in both the nature of change and the nature of the Divine. This continuity of
conversation serves to codify the logical structure of the argument that has come before in the
pre-Socratics. In its context, it also serves to show the continuity of concern. Ancient thinkers are
not interested in describing divine action, but rather in showing that there must be a discontinuity
between the types of non-divine change that occurs in the sublunary realm and the type of action
that occurs in the Divine reality.
Aristotle and Divine Changelessness
While Aristotle is famous for not being particularly concerned with religious matters, he
does spend significant energy on First Philosophy. The theological speculation that is part of
doing First Philosophy is itself rather robust, what it lacks is a concept of personal religious rites
and rituals tied to the speculation—in other words there is in Aristotle no prescribed religious
service to the deity. While the Academics and the Stoics may have had a more directly “quasireligious” overtone to their philosophical discipline, there is very little to suggest that Aristotle
and his disciples cared a great deal for personal religiosity beyond its expediency in political
matters. The nature of this speculation does have a rather odd religious feature, however. In
something like the way that the Divine functions in the Timaeus, Aristotle’s doctrine of the
Divine does make the Divine uniquely active, and that activity is the source of all motion in the
cosmos proper. This singular feature, and Aristotle’s peculiar way of articulating the nature of
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final causation does leave one kind of religious attitude open for expression: pure adoration and
rapture in contemplation.
The nature of the unmoved mover and the nature of active νοῦς are both subjects that
have been debated for millennia now. For reasons that are rather different than Plato’s caginess
about his personal beliefs, there is still very good reason to question what Aristotle’s doctrines
actually are. There is some question about how exactly the works we have were recorded. There
is an amount of variation in quality of the work which has led some thinkers to suppose that there
were multiple scribes who recorded Aristotle’s words on different subjects. A good example of
this kind of variation within a single topic is book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. While the
subject matter concerning Justice is contiguous with the other parts of NE, this particular book
seems to be less refined than some of the others. Whether this is because Justice is particularly
difficult as a subject, or whether the scribe was less skilled is opaque. In addition to this textual
problem, we are also aware that Aristotle did not oversee the way in which his philosophy was
compiled and organized.
Once again, the texts in which Aristotle considers the nature of the divine are fairly
obvious. Most specifically Aristotle considers the nature of change and the relationship of
change to the divine in the Physics and the Metaphysics—especially in Physics VII and
Metaphysics Λ. The operative point here is that Aristotle makes a distinction between activity
and change (or motion). The nature of change or motion is a function of imperfection and
deprivation. Activity on the other hand, in its truest sense, is existing in perfect accord with the
final cause of the existent in question. The importance of this distinction is what allows for the
Unmoved Mover to be both removed from the profane order of things (in the sense that it is not
subject to the necessary deprivations of said order) and yet of singular significance to that order.
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Of particular significance to our study is Aristotle’s notion of change and motion, and why it
does not apply to divine entities, specifically the Unmoved Mover, in particular.
Φύσις, according to Aristotle “has been defined as a ‘princple of motion and change’”.111
This idea is key to understanding how we begin to address the nature of the Divine. It is the
nature of definitions that they are limits upon a term or topic that removes non-essential or nonattributive attributes to the subject of the definition. We shall see that just as Xenophanes
claimed that “One god is greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or in
thought.”112 so too does Aristotle confirm that the Divine must be fundamentally different from
the profane order in both shape and soul. Nowhere is this more evident than the difference
between moved movers and the unmoved mover. Aristotle describes the nature of motion in the
profane order as follows,
Everything that is in motion must be moved by something. For if it has not the source of its
motion in itself it is evident that it is moved by something other than itself, for there must be
something else that moves it. If on the other hand it has the source of its motion in itself, let
AB be taken to represent that which is in motion essentially of itself and not in virtue of the
fact that something belonging to it is in motion. Now in the first place assume that AB,
because it is in motion as a whole and is not moved by anything external to itself, is
therefore moved by itself—this is just as if, supposing that JK is moving KL and is also
itself is in motion, we were to deny that JL is moved by anything on the ground that it is not
evident which is the part that is moving it and which is the part that is moved. In the second
place that which is in motion without being moved by anything does not necessarily case
from its motion because something else is at rest, but a thing must be moved by something if
the fact of something else at rest, but a thing must be moved by something if the fact of
something else having ceased from its motion causes it to be at rest. Thus, if this is accepted,
everything that is in motion must be moved by something.113
Aristotle’s claim is that all motions are continuous with causal connections. No motion could be
sui generis but must be connected to prior causes. Specifically he insists that in infinite
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regression of causation is irrational and impossible at 242a16-243a3.114 Having established, at
least to his own satisfaction, the impossibility of sui generis individual and self-caused motion,
Aristotle then considers what kinds of changes can be caused by these profane processes.
That which is the first movement of a thing—in the sense that it supplies not ‘that for the
sake of which’ but the source of the motion—is always together with that which is moved
by it (by ‘together’ I mean that there is nothing intermediate between them). This is
universally true wherever one thing is moved by another. And since there are three kinds of
motion, local, qualitative, and quantitative, there must also be three kinds of movement, that
which causes locomotion, that which causes alteration, and that which causes increase or
decrease.115
Here Aristotle speaks directly of efficient causation and the kinds of changes that efficient
causation can accomplish. He also expressly exempts final causation from proximity to the sorts
of change or motion that things in the profane order can undergo. This distinction between
efficient causation and final causation allows for a mode of influence or causation that works “at
a distance” rather than immediately, but we shall return to this point below.
At this point Aristotle explicitly attempts to prove his point about types of motion. He
applies the idea of efficient and immediate causation to all classes of things in profane order.
Locomotion, alteration, and quantitative change all can happen to both animate and inanimate
entities. All of these kinds of motion require a full account of the thing moved and the causal
account of its movement, but any such motions also require a kind of privation of something that
is a quality of potentiality that allows for the new state of the entity or item in question to
undergo such a change or motion. There is a kind of activity, however, that does not undergo
these standard motions—namely he identifies that the soul, or at least some parts of the soul,
remain unmoved in specific ways. Locomotion, though the primary kind of change and motion,
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is not the sort of thing that makes sense to talk of when we consider the nature of the soul.116
Aristotle argues that generation cannot be a kind of alteration, properly speaking, at 246a1246a9.
Since, therefore, having regard to the figure or shape of a thing we no longer call that which
has become of a certain figure by the name of the material that exhibits the figure, whereas
having regard to a thing’s affections or alterations we still call it by the name of its material,
it is evident that becomings of the former kind cannot be alterations.
Moreover it would seem absurd even to speak in this way, to speak, that is to say, of a
man or house or anything else that has come into existence as having been altered. Though
it may be true that every such becoming is necessarily the result of something’s being
altered, the result, e.g. of the material’s being condensed or rarefied or heated or cooled,
nevertheless it is not the things that are coming into existence that are altered, and their
becoming is not an alteration.117
The idea here seems to be that as long as a thing is not altering in its fundamental nature, but
rather is becoming more or less fully itself, there is no alteration of the thing itself as regards its
formal nature.
Even if the generation of the soul is not a form of change, it would seem to be able to
undergo alteration of states because of its ability to receive sensible forms. However, Aristotle
insists that this is not the case. First he insists that actualizations of perfections in and of
themselves are cases of alteration;
Again, acquired states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. For some are
excellences and others are defects, and neither excellence nor defect is an alteration:
excellence is a perfection (for when anything acquires its proper excellence we call it
perfect, since it is then if ever that we have a thing in its natural state: e.g. we have a perfect
circle when we have one as good as possible), while defect is a perishing or departure from
this condition. So just as when speaking of a house we do not call its arrival at perfection an
alteration (for it would be absurd to suppose that the coping or the tiling is an alteration or
that in receiving tis coping or tiling a house is altered and not perfected), the same also holds
good in the case of excellences and defects and of the persons or things that possess or
It strikes me that the oddity of a soul suffering locomotion would be analogous to the oddities of Aristotle’s
understanding of the doctrine of place and motion when considering a ship in a river. Though the container may be
in motion, the contents themselves are left unmoved in a certain kind of way, or if the container is stationary, the
contents may move internally. A soul could not suffer independent locomotion because it must indwell the body.
The soul, then, does not properly undergo locomotion in and of itself, rather the body undergoes locomotion
properly speaking. See 212a10-20.
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acquire them: for excellences are perfections of a thing’s nature and defects are departures
from it: consequentially they are not alterations.118
So a thing need not undergo locomotion, nor alteration to be able to reach a state of internal
perfection, and indeed Aristotle puts this even more strongly when he discusses the nature of the
intellectual part of the soul.
Again, the states of the intellectual part of the soul are not alterations, nor is there any
becoming of them. In the first place it is much more true of the possession of knowledge
that it depends upon a particular relation. And further, it is evident that there is no becoming
of these states. For that which is potentially possessed of knowledge becomes actually
possessed of it not by being set in motion at all itself but by reason of the presence of
something else: i.e. It is when it meets with the particular object that it knows in a manner
the particular through its knowledge of the universal. (Again, there is no becoming of the
actual use and activity of these states, unless it is thought that there is a becoming of vision
and touching and that the activity in question is similar to these.) And the original
acquisition of knowledge is not a becoming or an alteration: for the terms ‘knowing’ and
‘understanding’ imply that the intellect has reached a state of rest and come to a standstill,
and there is no becoming that leads to a state of rest, since, as we have said above, no
change at all can have a becoming. Moreover, just as to say, when any one has passed from
a state of intoxication or sleep or disease to the contrary state, that he has become possessed
of knowledge again is incorrect in spite of the fact that he was previously incapable of using
his knowledge, so, too, when any one originally acquires the state, it is incorrect to say that
he becomes possessed of knowledge: for the possession of understanding and knowledge is
produced by the soul’s settling down out of the restlessness natural to it. Hence, too, in
learning and in forming judgements on matters relating to their sense-perceptions children
are inferior to adults owing to the great amount of restlessness in their souls. Nature itself
causes the soul to settle down and come to a state of rest for the performance of some of its
functions, while for the performance of some of its functions, while for the performance of
other things do so: but in either case the result is brought about through the alteration of
something in the body, as we see in the case of the use and activity of the intellect arising
from a man’s becoming sober or being awakened. It is evident, then, from the preceding
argument that alteration and being altered occur in sensible things and in the sensitive part
of the soul and, except accidentally, in nothing else.119
Clearly we have here an articulation that even the learning of the soul is not an alteration of the
soul properly speaking, but is rather an alteration that happens in the body of the individual who
now has the “new” knowledge. No case of learning is a change of the nature of the soul, and
cannot count as a case of alteration. So Aristotle has dispensed with two of the three primary
118
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types of motion as regards the nature of the intellective part of the soul. So the activities of the
soul are not a form of motion or change, properly speaking. This idea is fundamental to
understanding both the nature and the usefulness of Aristotle’s Deity.
After establishing that soul is capable of activity that does not involve any of the kinds of
motion, he then gives a lengthy argument for the existence of the sempiternal infinite motion of
the heavens—the circular rotation of the spheres. This type of motion must have an ultimate
cause, and Aristotle famously identifies this cause at the end of the Physics,
The only continuous motion, then, is that which is caused by the unmoved movement: and
this motion is continuous because the movement remains always invariable, so that its
relation to that which it moves remains also invariable and continuous.
Now that these points are settled, it is clear that the first unmoved movement cannot have
any magnitude. For if it has magnitude, this must be either a finite or an infinite magnitude.
Now we have already proved in our course on Physics that there cannot be an infinite
magnitude: and we have now proved that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to have an
infinite force, and also that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by a finite magnitude
during an infinite time. But the first movement causes a motion that is eternal and does
cause it during an infinite time. It is clear, therefore that the first movement is indivisible
and is without parts and without magnitude.120
At this point Aristotle has established that the Divine must be investigated in a different way
from the rest of Physics. The study thus far has led him to realize that the Final Cause of all
change and motion must have different explanatory factors than the rest of existence. We have
here a distinction between the profane and the divine order, but not a separation. The explanation
is different, and the study must proceed along different lines, but there are clear lines of
continuity between the studies. Accordingly, we shall now turn to Metaphysics Λ.
Perfectly Active Substance
Metaphysics is much clearer about the nature of the Divine because it expands upon the
ideas generated in the physics. In particular we see that Aristotle takes up the idea of the first
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cause much more seriously. His claims in Lambda in particular are particularly important for
further developments in the DDI.
Aristotle opens the discussion of the exact nature of Divine Substance and the actions
proper to it, as well as the implications for those actions on motion at 1071b11. Here he claims
the following,
But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them,, but is not
actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need
not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the
believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause
change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for
if it is not to act, there will be no movement. Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough,
if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is
potentially may possibly not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence
is actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal,
if anything is eternal. Therefore they must be actuality.121
Having explained the necessity of a perfectly active causal substance he uses his explanation to
oppose to the Hesiodic account of the world being generated out of chaos and night. He assigns
the first heaven an eternal existence and a ceaseless circular motion at 1072a23.
It is then that Aristotle makes a most interesting claim about the nature of the First Cause,
And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something which moves
without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and
object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of
desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the
real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather
than opinion on desire; for thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object
of thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in
this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple exists actually.122
Here Aristotle affirms that thought is a fundamental kind of causation. The kind of causation in
question is, of course, final causation, which he outlines in the following paragraphs.
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He is very explicit about the nature of final causation and its relationship to unchangeable
entities, and how these factors contribute to the proper understanding of the divine. He also
continues his work from the Physics in an attempt to show how the existence of motion in the
profane realm grounds the reality,
That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of
its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b)
something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable
entities though the former does not. The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved,
but all other things move by being moved.
Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore if its
actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in
this respect it is capable of being otherwise—in place, even if not in substance. But since
there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way
be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change and motion
in a circle is the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first
mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is
good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses—that
which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which
the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single
way.123
Having laid the groundwork for the necessity of the existence of the Divine, Aristotle tells
explains its fundamental attributes:
On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life
such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state,
which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking,
perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.)
And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the
fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought things on itself because
it shares the nature of the object and the thought; for it becomes an object of thought in
coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are
the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is
thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than
the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of
contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state
which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder’ and if in a better this compels it yet
more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought
is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent actuality is life most good and
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most eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and
duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God. [. . .]
It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and
unmovable and separate from the sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance
cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement
throughout infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and while every magnitude is
either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot
have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it also has been
shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all other changes are posterior to change of
place.124
Herein is Aristotle’s explicit version of the DDI, but he does not leave us with this argument
alone. While the study of physics leads directly to the necessity of the existence and perfection of
the Divine, there is another reason to suppose that the Divine is immutable: the motivation of
such a perfect entity. He explains divine motivation from 1074b26-34
Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change;
for change would be change for the worse, and this would already be a movement. First,
then, if ‘thought’ is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose
that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be
something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking
and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the wort thing in the world, so
that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better
not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be
of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of all things), and its
thinking is a thinking on thinking.
It is thus that Aristotle articulates the notion of a God that does not, and cannot, change.
However, this perfect substance is not static or inactive—rather it is perfectly identified with its
activity—thought thinking itself.
There is, of course, an objection that Aristotle anticipates; that a thought cannot be both
an activity and the object of an activity. However, here Aristotle recapitulates an old conceptual
friend—the F3P. Like Parmenides before him, he believes that in the case of the Divine that
there is one thing that exists for thinking as for being. We see this older principle given new life
at 1075a1-11.
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We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences it is
the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the
definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought
are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object
will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.
This idea has a similar implication for the nature of the Divine as well. The Divine’s existence
and perfection are ensured by necessity, and it is causally insulated from influence by any other
existent entity or object, whether abstract or concrete. The Unmoved Mover causes motion by
the pure perfection of its own thought; only where Xenophanes gave thought the power to make
all things quake and shake Aristotle gives thought the power of rotating the entire universe. Its
thoughts are so much more perfect than the thoughts of all others that it is unlike us in νοῦς, but
it is also unlike us in shape insofar as it does not have a share in material cause. He claims “that
everything which has not matter is indivisible—as human thought, or rather the thought of
composite beings, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment
or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of
time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.”125 The result here is
that we have a more fully developed idea of the nature of Divine motivation and activity, while
being more taxonomically correct in our understanding of what makes the Divine different from
the profane order. Namely, the motivation of Divine action is exactly the same as the motivation
of the universe—perfect contemplation of perfection. The changelessness of the Divine is not the
result of different goals, but results from the fact that the Divine has no privations which could
be actualized.
Here, however, we do run into a strange problem. How could humans have access to
something so dissimilar to everything that we experience through the senses? The answer is that
as far as Aristotle and is concerned, theology is not the study of something “wholly other” or
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“unknowable”. Rather the ability of the philosopher extends into being able to understand the
fundamental principles of existence. To explain the epistemic powers of human persons that
allow for such knowledge, we shall turn to Nicomachean Ethics and De Anima next.
Perfect Human Psychological Activity
In any question about the truth of a matter, and perhaps especially in metaphysical and
theological questions, the problem of epistemic access and power must-needs rear its head.
Aristotle is not, perhaps, as concerned with radical skepticism as we might be, nevertheless he
does address how a human might come to know divine things—he claims that human mind and
divine mind connected. This answer further strengthens Aristotle’s ties to something akin to the
F3P of Parmenides, as we shall see.
Book 10 of Nicomachean Ethics puzzles a great many readers because much of the text
focuses on the ethical virtues rather than the intellectual virtues. In fact, it sometimes seems as
though the ethical and intellectual virtues are in competition with one another. Regardless of the
cohesion of the text overall, book 10 is instructive for understanding the nature of intellection
and the ties of the human mind to the divine mind. There are two passages that are concern the
nature of human epistemic access to the nature of the Divine, which also help to reinforce
Aristotle’s version of the DDI. Aristotle is rather precise about the epistemic unity of reason at
1177b25-1178a8.
But such a life [a life of constant philosophical contemplation] would be too high for a man;
for it is not in so far as he is a man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is
present in him, and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity
superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in
comparison with man the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But
we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being
mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain
every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk,
much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. This would seem too, to be each
man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if
91

he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else. And what we said before
will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for
each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is the best and pleasantest, since
reason more than anything else is man.126
This passage simply and directly aligns with Aristotle’s conception of thinking being an activity
that involves no potentiality or change. Thus, the human capacity for reason and contemplation is
perfectly in accordance with the Divine. Human epistemic capacity is thus capable of grasping
Divine truths in a Divine way, but lacks the constancy and purity of the Divine. It is the material
cause that keeps humans from fully realizing their Divine part, in the same way that the heavens
cannot fully realize their own Divine perfection.
The second passage more directly concerns the reason that the Divine is changeless, and
is found 1178b7-23,
But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following
consideration as well. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy;
but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem
absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then
confronting dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or liberal acts? To
whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or anything of the
kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have
no bad appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be
found trivial and unworthy of the gods. Still every one supposes that they live and therefore
that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away
from a living being action, and still more production. What is left but contemplation?
Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be
contemplative; and human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most
of the nature of happiness.
Once again we see shades of Xenophanes and Parmenides. The Divine must be both knowable
by us through our experiences of reasoning, but must also be immune from profane motivations
or affections. These passages serve to augment and unify Aristotle’s standard of Divine
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immutability as being identical with Divine activity and provide the sketch of how a human mind
fits into the overall scheme.
The final passages significant for understanding Aristotle’s understanding of the DDI and
our ability to know it is found in De Anima 3.4 and 3.5. At 430a2 Aristotle is explicit once again
about an idea that powerfully echoes Parmenides’ F3P,
Mind is itself thinkable in exactly in the same way as its objects are. For (a) in the case of
objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical; for
speculative knowledge and its objects are identical. (Why mind is not always thinking we
must consider later.) (b) In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of
thought is only potentially present. It follows that while they will not have in mind them (for
mind is a potentiality of them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from
matter) mind may be thinkable.127
And finally Aristotle gives the obscure and difficult paragraphs of 3.5 which are as follows;
And in fact mind as we have descried it is what is by virtue of becoming all things, while
there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: This is a sort of positive
state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours.
Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature
activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the
matter which it forms).
Actual knowledge is identical to its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in
time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time.
Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present
conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal
(we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind is in this sense
impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks.
While this passage is famously difficult, it is clear that Aristotle can be read as being committed
to the idea of an active Divine mind that cannot be corrupted by potentiality.
This idea of the divine and human mind being distinct but not wholly other weds the
concepts of divine invincibility, power, and constancy of Xenophanes with the mental capacities
inherent in Parmenides and Heraclitus. These principles create a means by which the Divine is
unique, but also imminently knowable. In many ways these passages, taken together serve to
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show the paradigm of ancient thinking on this matter. The DDI of the ancient world is not a
matter of abstracted logical principles, but of a contiguous rationality that is a part of all reality—
be it divine or profane. Ultimately, regardless of the final truth about Aristotle’s personal
convictions regarding the divine, these passages in their context give us a picture of how the DDI
can function in a pre-modern systematic understanding of the cosmos.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CICERO, PHILO JUDAEUS, AND THE NEW TESTAMENT
The influence of Plato and Aristotle on the Hellenic period cannot be overstated, and
many lifetimes’ work could be devoted to the study of the various extant figures we have from
this time period. I have here selected three thinkers that I believe exemplify the prevailing
philosophical-theological concerns of the period from 100BCE to 100CE, and we shall examine
what each of these three individuals has to say about the nature of God or the gods as
unchanging. Cicero will give us a good touchpoint for how the idea of changelessness has
advanced into the popular culture of Latin rhetoricians, as well as its public acceptance in the
early days of the Roman Empire. Philo Judaeus will show us how a Jewish thinker will use the
resources in his own tradition to insist on God’s changelessness (despite apparent biblical
passages that indicate otherwise). Paul of Tarsus will show us the emerging synthesis between
Hellenic philosophical ideas and apocalyptic Judaism that gives rise to Christianity. Specifically
Paul’s concern with Christology and the incarnation (both major themes in early Christian
writing) will pose drastic challenges to a doctrine of simple divine changelessness. An
examination of these three thinkers will hardly provide up with an exhaustive understanding of
the nature and use of DDI in this period, but it will enable us to understand where this doctrine is
situated at the time, and what work it does in philosophical-religious dialogue.
Cicero and Middle Platonism
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We have extant much of Cicero’s De natura deorum though not all of it. What remains,
however, gives us a picture of the common views concerning the nature of the gods in Hellenic
Rome. While the discussion that Cicero records comes to no explicit conclusions regarding the
nature of the gods, he does provide us a history of ideas regarding the nature of the gods (albeit a
polemic one). While it might seem that the content of the positions and criticisms regarding the
Epicurean and Stoic ideas about the gods and nature should be the most significant section of this
work, there is little new about Cicero’s criticisms. Rather, the most telling and compelling facts
about De natura deorum are small things that are easily overlooked. The first, and perhaps most
significant, piece of information that Cicero gives us about this topic is that this study is the
purview of natural philosophers rather than some other group of individuals. The second tidbit is
that there is still an ongoing tension between the established state religion that worships
anthropomorphic gods and a more abstract philosophical consideration of Deity that does not
succumb to or depend upon anthropomorphism. The third and final piece of information that
Cicero gives us is that there is a close identity between the physical (and because of point 1,
theological) doctrines of the Stoic and Peripatetic schools in the minds of most Romans at this
time period.
Much ink has been spilled in an attempt to understand what Cicero’s personal convictions
were concerning the nature of the gods, especially because of closing lines of the monograph:
“Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Vellius thinking Cotta’s discourse to be the truer,
while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.”128 While
the desire to know Cicero’s personal convictions is understandable, it is hardly important in
comparison to the information he communicates to us about the state of the question regarding
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the nature of the gods in his time period. Indeed, it may be foolhardy to even seek for an
Academic’s “true beliefs” in the first place. The reader should remember that the account that he
sends to Brutus is not a public exercise; rather it is a way to open discussion with his peers
concerning matters that are of personal interest to him. Cicero’s examination of this topic
functions as an exploration of the matter at hand so that he and Brutus (and any other peers they
wish to bring to the discussion) can have meaningful correspondence about this matter in the
future. If we keep these things in mind it becomes easier to understand why the work reads like a
cross between an epistle and an encyclopedia article—and one that ends in aporia at that.
Any lasting power from Cicero’s argumentation in De natura deorum comes not from the
novelty of the reasoning, but rather from the strength of Cicero’s command of rhetorical skill in
his native tongue—a skill that makes these arguments available, and indeed enjoyable, to a Latin
speaking audience. Any student of archaic and ancient philosophy will find little new in all of
this work, but that makes it no less significant for the Roman citizens who read it over the
coming centuries. Accurate and erudite communication of these ideas and arguments is of great
use to the student of philosophy, especially in the Latin speaking world of the coming centuries.
In particular, the rehearsal of these arguments will be of great use to Christian theologians and
apologists, as they provide an easy access to what have become very standard arguments against
anthropomorphic paganisms. As Maccormack remarks,
What mattered about Cicero was not so much his thinking about law, or—as in the Tusculan
Disputations—his thinking about pain and death, but the discontinuities and discrepancies in
Roman notions of the gods that he had written about in De natura deorum. For generations
Christian writers, the vantage points there portrayed, that is the philosophical theodicies of
two of the interlocutors, the Epicurean Velleius and the Stoic Balbus, as critiqued by the
adherent of the Academy and pontifex Gaius Cotta, provided arguments both to attack
Roman and in general pagan religion, and simultaneously to affirm the truth of Christian
monotheism. In the dialogue Octavius, the very form of which was inspired by Cicero,
Tertullian’s near contemporary Minucius Felix thus adapted and incorporated statements by
Cicero’s Balbus about the order and harmony of the cosmos as proofs of the existence of
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god into his defence [sic] of Christianity, while statements by Velleius and Cotta were
recycled to demonstrate that the religion of ancient Rome and pagan religion in general were
erroneous.129
This use of Cicero’s monographs shows us that his influence on theological inquiry does not
diminish, but is rather disseminated throughout the next centuries, even fueling certain
movements in decidedly Christian thinkers. Neither the obviousness of Cicero’s influence, nor
the strength of the arguments he records need be evaluated here, rather let us turn to the deep
significance of the three themes I outlined above.
The first point shows us that in the Hellenic Period, and even the philosophy happening
in the transition from the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire, we are still dealing with
systems of thought that hold to the continuity of explanations of the cosmos with explanations of
the divine. Cicero repeatedly locates the debate on the nature of the gods in the realm of natural
philosophy. Velleius introduces Cicero’s discussion on the nature of the gods thusly,
I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination,
such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato’s Timeaeus, or that old hag of a
fortuneteller, the Pronoia (which we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world
endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotary god of burning fire; these are
the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. [. . .] Can you
suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything
that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution?
What thing is there that has a beginning that has not an end?130
The standard of needing to apply the standards of natural philosophy when examining the nature
of the gods is further illustrated by Velleius’s recitation of the varying ideas about divine nature
from Thales to Chrysippus and declares them all to be “more like the dreams of madmen than the
considered opinion of philosophers.”131 This ad homenim attack by Vellius is, perhaps, ironic as
his school’s doctrines and its founder are rather exquisitely abused by Cotta for much of the
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work. Vellius’s recitation is followed by a rather simplistic understanding of the gods as sedate,
dispassionate, and disinterested entities engaged in no activity whatsoever. Vellius claims that
belief in the gods “has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the
unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference,
since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by
nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist.”132
Vellius’s standard for epistemic justification is hardly a convincing argument for the existence of
the gods, and his argument for their nature is similarly lackluster. It is safe to assess that Cicero
had little interest in, or patience with, Epicurean conceptions of the divine. Cicero’s apparent
desire to recount the history of Greek ideas about the nature of the gods is far more compelling
an exercise than the argumentation of Vellius in this introductory passage.
The history of the subject is engaged in by natural philosophers, and even the Cotta, for
all his Academic skepticism, affirms the appropriateness of this approach even as he denies that
the Epicurean doctrine is foolishness, “In all this I speak for the time being only as the
mouthpiece of our oracles of natural philosophy; whether their utterances are true or false I do
not know, but at all events they are more probable than those of your school.”133 Cotta’s account
is critical and apophatic, and as such only shows the problems involved in considering whether
the nature of the gods can be grasped according to the programs laid out by previous
philosophers (as summarized by Vellius and Balbus). Cicero’s own positive assessment of the
nature of the gods is, therefore doomed to remain unarticulated—as it should be for one in the
Academic tradition. Cicero himself tells us as much in his opening address to Brutus when he
says, “Those however, who seek to learn my personal opinions on the various questions show an

132
133

Cicero, I.44b-h
Cicero, I.66b-c

99

unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of
argument that should be demanded.”134 As a prominent Roman citizen during the first century of
the Empire, his public affirmation of devotion to the gods is part of his patriotism. Philosophical
inquiry is part of his personal passion. While we may not have a firm answer on Cicero’s
personal beliefs regarding the nature of the gods, we may rely on his conviction that enquiry into
the nature of the gods is a part of the business of natural philosophers.
The second detail given to us in small asides in the text is that the tension between
philosophical accounts of the nature of deity and the popular religion of the day is simply
assumed in the characters who we find populating the dialogue. In particular we find that Cotta is
a pontifex, and despite any skepticism he may have for the business of augury and soothsaying,
he is an active and willing participant in the religious order of the day.
The third piece of information is the briefest and easily overlooked, but is of deep
significance to understanding how members of the Roman intelligentsia, especially exponents of
Middle Platonism, understood the philosophical schools to be related. In the dramatized
beginning of the dialogue, before the accounts of the different schools are given, Cicero writes
this brief passage recording the conversation with which his companions welcome him into the
discussion,
“Well, I too,” I replied, “think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are
you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want
Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented.”
“Oh,” rejoined Cotta, “if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately
dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your
friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in
form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know
your opinion of the book, Balbus.”
“My opinion?” said Balbus, “Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like
Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish
expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who
134
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class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or
degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy, but a fundamental
difference of doctrine. However we can discuss this some other time. For the moment we
will, if you please, continue the topic which we had begun.”135
This brief aside shows us that as far as Cicero and others like him in Middle Platonism are
concerned, the Stoics and Peripatetics are understood to be fundamentally similar in doctrine,
with only minor disputes over proper technical syntax. It is true that Balbus here objects to this
comparison, but notice the substance of his disagreement—Balbus is concerned that his
interlocutors not confuse Stoic and Peripatetic ethics, he voices no objection as to the similarities
of the physical doctrines of these schools. This point may seem minor and accidental, but in a
dialogue that takes itself to be concerned with the proper practice of natural philosophy applied
as a means to consider the very nature of divinity, we have a statement by Cicero showing that
the idea of pronoia is perfectly analogous to the Unmoved Mover of the Peripatetics. While this
detail might seem insignificant at first glance, we shall be reminded of it when we consider Philo
Judaeus’s physical doctrine and how it relates to his understanding of the nature of God as
distinct from the fundamental truths of physics in the sub-lunar world.
Altogether Cicero’s examination of the nature of the gods adds nothing new to the pure
question of what are the gods like, but it gives us a wonderful window into the state of the debate
in Roman society. The articulation of the argumentation is a subject for classicists, and the
strength of the argumentation for metaphysicians and theologians to asses, but for the purpose of
understanding the state of the DDI, Cicero adds nothing new, other than these small details
which will help us to more accurately evaluate the writings of Paul of Tarsus and Philo Judaeus.
Accordingly, let us turn to Philo next.
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Philo Judaeus
Philo Judaeus is rather atypical of a Jewish thinker of his day, and his methodology of
interpretation and training marks something of a bold synthesis that would be only tenuously
accepted long after he died. In some ways he prefigures the opinions of the much more widely
accepted Moses bin Maimon, but Philo’s thought concerning the Torah and philosophy remains
fully his own—not least because he lives and works solidly within the Middle-Platonic period,
rather than the Post-Plotinain philosophical landscape. Philo’s commitment to Judaism and to the
Law is deep, but his interpretation of the Torah is particularly unconventional for the first
centuries BCE and CE. His method of allegorical interpretation is not unheard of, but is also not
popular. This interpretation is not well received by other Jewish scholars, nor by Christians—
with the possible exception of Origen.136 While some Christians did engage interpretive methods
that included allegory Philo’s methodology was much more pointedly, and singularly,
allegorical. This method of interpreting the Tanakh allegorically allowed for novelties in
theological and philosophical understandings of the importance of sections of the Law. This
study will focus on sections of Philo’s Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis that deal specifically
with the idea that God must be unable to change—specifically with regard to intentions, but also
in regards to God’s uniqueness when considered as part of the study of φύσις.
First, we must again recognize that at this point in philosophical discourse, the study of
First Philosophy (Metaphysics) and Physics is still not rigidly distinguished, and so to enquire
into God’s nature, one is also be engaged in a study of physics. So far, despite Aristotle’s
distinctions, the two fields remain linked, and the study of one must needs affect the study of the
other. Accordingly, Philo’s theological enquiries are directed at Genesis—a book that deals with
the establishment of all φύσις. While it is tempting for us to provide a marked distinction
136
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between theological and physical study, Philo—like others in the pre-medieval periods—has no
such qualms. Philo’s doctrine of φύσις will need to be outlined in brief in order for this study to
proceed.
Philo’s physical ideas mirror that of Stoic doctrine that is somewhat conflated with a
more Peripatetic division of the soul in that he describes living beings under a four-fold physical
division. Philo introduces this division in his discussion of the creation of Adam and Eve when
he makes the following claims;
Having said this, we must go on to remark that the mind when as yet unclothed and confined
by the body (and it is of the mind when not so confined that he is speaking) has many
powers. It has the power of holding together, of growing, of conscious life, of thought, and
countless other powers, varying both in species and genus. Lifeless things, like stones and
blocks of wood, share with all others the power of holding together, of which the bones in
us, which are not unlike stones partake. “Growth” extends to plants, and there are parts in
us, such as our nails and hair, resembling plants; growth is coherence capable of moving
itself. Conscious life is the power to grow, with the additional power of receiving
impressions and by being the subject of impulses. This is shared also by creatures without
reason. Indeed our mind contains a part that is analogous to the conscious life of a creature
without reason. Once more, the power of thinking is peculiar to the mind, and while shared,
it may well be, by beings more akin to God, is, so far as mortal beings are concerned,
peculiar to man. This power or faculty is twofold. We are rational beings on the one hands
as being partakers of mind, and on the other as being capable of discourse. Well, there is
also another power or faculty in the soul, closely akin to these, namely that of receiving
sense-impressions, and it is of this that the prophet is speaking.137
This division mirrors Stoic division of physics, though it also imports some use of Platonic and,
more significantly, Peripatetic terminology. Specifically, Philo seems to have a robust idea that
there are important divisions between the mind and the body in which it is clothed. This sort of
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dualistic thinking is, of course, not held by the more monistic Stoics, but is available to both
Middle Platonists and Peripatetics.138 The use basic list of physical terms that Philo posits is
ἑκτικὴν φυτικὴν ψυχικὴν διανοητικήν,139 a list to which we shall return momentarily. While
Philo is not here interested in a robust cosmology, he is using the physical descriptions of the
cosmos as applied to living things. This stratification of the parts of the soul is also a division in
φύσις. This historical link to Stoic accounts of physics helps to reinforce Philo’s position in the
history of philosophy, but also serve in a roundabout way to showcase Cicero’s claim that the
doctrines of Stoic and Peripatetic thinkers of this period differ in form of expression but agree in
substance. Philo maintains a physical doctrine that accounts for human capacity to receive new
information, act and change upon receipt of such information, and even accounts for interaction
between God and human beings. His familiarity with this series of doctrines is central to his
account of God’s creation of the world, as well as what he sees as the necessary distinctions
between Divine reality and the profane reality of human existence. This necessary distinction
allows him to use Stoic terminology for the division of the parts of the soul, while maintaining a
Peripatetic distance between God and φύσις that would not be available to Stoic thinkers.
Philo’s understanding of the physics of the soul and the bodies of living beings is deeply
indebted to a both Stoic and Peripatetic conceptions of the parts of the soul, but may also mirror
some of the ideas set forth in the Timaeus. It is not my purpose here to show a direct lineage of
the earlier thinkers to Philo, but rather to establish that his conceptions regarding the soul are
locatable in the general ebb and flow of philosophical discourse available in first century
138
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Alexandria—the sort of information that Cicero would have us believe is readily available to
students of various schools of philosophy. In the expanded consideration that he gives in The
Unchageableness of God (Deus. hereafter) Philo again lists these four parts of the created order
of living beings as ἕξει, φύσει, ψυχῇ, and λογικῇ ψυχῇ.140 Philo engages in a detailed
explanation of each of these various parts of the created order, but it final part is clearly the most
significant.
The first property to be considered is ἕξις. This property of body can be found in such
unimpressive things as stones, sticks,141 and parts of severed body. He likens this part of
existence to a breath that holds a thing to itself—from the innermost part to the outermost edge
and back again. He even likens this property to a competitive race where the runner must
complete a run from a beginning point to a second point and then return again whence he
started.142 This property seems to be a simple description of the necessary condition of any
particular existent, and so Philo does not give it a lengthy treatment.
After the brief description of ἕξις, he quickly turns to φύσις. It is at this point that Philo
most clearly shows some familiarity with a Peripatetic conception of parts of the soul. He
discusses how growth is specifically available to plants. In a passage very reminiscent of
Aristotle’s similar discussion in De Anima II, where Aristotle assigns the nutritive part of soul to
plants. Philo’s account of this power is similar to Aristotle’s own. Philo accounts for this
property of living entities thus, “Growth God assigned to plants. It is a compound of many
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capacities, that of taking nourishment, of undergoing change, and that of increasing.”143
Aristotle’s account runs as follows,
But the word living is used in many senses, and we say that a thing lives if any one of the
following is present in it—mind, sensation, movement or rest in space, besides the
movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth. Consequently all plants are considered
to live, for they evidently have in themselves a capacity and first principle by means of
which they exhibit both growth and decay in opposite directions; for they do not grow up
and not down, but equally in both directions, and in every direction, and they are nourished
and continue to live, as long as they are able to absorb food.144
While it is likely too grand to claim that there is real textual transmission from Aristotle to Philo,
we can see similar themes, and a few words used in similar fashion. The nutritive part of the soul
is clearly important to Philo, and he commits himself to an easy and readily available set of
Peripatetic descriptions of how nourishment feeds growth. He also aligns this capacity for
growth and nourishment with the ancient idea that φύσις still carries the biological sense of
growth for which Cornford argued. Where Philo differs from the Stoics and Peripatetics is his
insistence that this biological unity is given by God and is not sui generis. Philo is clearly
indebted to Aristotle’s basic articulation of how nutrition functions in plant-life at this point,
even if that influence is not perfectly direct.
Philo then turns his attention to the difference between the type of life had by plants and
animals, namely ψυχή. Once again, he follows a Peripatetic division in assigning sensation to
Animals as the distinguishing factor, but also as an explanation of their movement. Philo’s
explanation at this point is rudimentary in comparison to Aristotle’s treatment of the same issue,
but the brevity and imprecision are hardly surprising. Philo’s concern is not an accurate
psychology of creatures (animal or human) but rather to provide just enough explanation to make
Philo, The Unchangeableness of God, 37a-c Τὴν δὲ φύσιν ἀπένειμε τοῖς φυτοῖς κερασάμενος αὐτὴν ἐκ πλείστων
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an allegorical connection between the soul of a sage and the sort of existence possessed by God
and God alone. Accordingly the explanation of the senses in animals takes only five sentences.
What significance, if any, can be attributed to the difference between the use of
διανοητικήν in the Allegorical Commentary and the use of λογικῇ ψυχῇ in the Deus. is unclear,
but the list is otherwise semantically consistent. While this difference in terms could be
significant, it seems unnecessary to posit an inconsistency in Philo’s thinking here. Plato and
Aristotle use διανοητικήν in a similar manner, and it is reasonable to think that this term could be
seen by Philo as simply synonymous with λογικῇ ψυχῇ. Philo’s technical usage may not be as
exacting as it could have been, but he does preserve the requisite distinctions inherent in these
various semantic artifacts.
At the very least we are aware that Plato uses διανοητικός in the Timeaeus to compare the
proper motions of the “rational soul” that moves the body of the individual human person to the
proper motions of “the all.” This use of διανοητικός us notably used to contrast the self-caused
motions of the soul with the less excellent motions of pure body. Aristotle uses διανοητικός as a
contrast between intellectual and moral ἠθικῆς virtues, again preserving the hierarchy of
excellence proper to various parts of the soul. As for λογικῇ ψυχῇ, we find a term that is not used
much by Platonists nor Peripatetics, but rather by Stoics. Though it is some time later, we see
Marcus Aurelius allude to this very physical doctrine in Meditaitons 6.14.145 The physical
doctrines of Aristotle and the Stoics were distinct, but to a person not deeply entrenched in one
school or the other these peculiarities of technical discourse are less than obvious. Philo, in this
case, shows a use of slightly divergent terms in physics and first philosophy as synonymous, and,
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following Cicero, can be seen as surveying the philosophical landscape and conflating some
ideas of the Middle Platonists, Stoics, and Peripatetics.
While Philo’s conception of the soul as based in a φύσις that is a created order, rather
than a sempiternal existent, this conception of the soul forms the basis for comparison to the
nature and ψυχή of the Divine. The first important distinction that Philo makes in Deus. is that
God cannot be overcome by change or by passion. This appeal to invincibility and impassibility
as the cause of and reason for DDI is, by this point in history, rather to be expected. In no ways
can Philo accept that causation flows from creation to the Divine, not even as a form of response
to the created order in particular temporal states. Since Philo has been dealing thus far with an
interpretation of Genesis, he must now deal with a passage that forms a direct challenge to his
physical doctrines, his psychology of the Divine, and his conceptions of causation;
The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of
the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the LORD regretted that he had made
man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart. So the LORD said, “I will blot out man
whom I have created from the face of the land, man and animals and creeping things and
birds of the heavens, for I am sorry that I have made them.146
Much like the Abraham, Philo is faced with a seeming absurdity. He is convinced that God is not
able to be affected by things lesser than Godself. His philosophical leanings will not allow that
the Divine can suffer changes at the hands of any lesser entity, or even any substantive change at
all. Yet here in the Torah he is confronted with a dual problem, God is grieved, and God
commits to a change of action because of the grief He experiences.
Philo is exceedingly clear that we must not attribute change to God because of
interactions with created entities. He quotes the passage from the LXX available to him, and
responds in a fashion that makes abundantly clear his objection;
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Let us extend our discussion to embrace the words that follow. “The Lord God,” says Moses,
“seeing that the wickedness of men were multiplied upon the earth and that every man
intended evil in his heart diligently all his days, God had it in His mind that He had made
man upon the earth, and He bethought Him. And God said, I will boot out man, whom I
made, from the face of the earth.”
Perhaps some of those who are careless inquirers will suppose that the Lawgiver is hinting
that the Creator repented of the creation of men when He beheld their impiety, and that this
was the reason why He wished to destroy the whole race. Those who think thus may be sure
that they make the sins of these men of old time seem light and trivial through the vastness of
their own godlessness. For what greater impiety could there be than to suppose that the
Unchangeable changes? Indeed some maintain that even among men vacillation of mind and
judgement is not universal; for those who study philosophy in guilelessness and purity, it is
held, gain from their knowledge this as their chief reward, that they do not change with
changing circumstances, but with unbending steadfastness and firm constancy take in hand
all that it behooves them to do.147
While Philo does not at the outset of this objection explain why God ought to be changeless, he
does engage in a curious sort of reasoning. Having discussed the virtues in the first section of the
Deus., he now turns to a sort of reverse allegory in order to make his point about the immutable
nature of God. He examines the soul of the philosopher as a means to understand the soul of
God. Once again we see the link between physics and theology, and Philo uses an Aristotelian
method (i.e. using physics to study the Divine) to make cataphatic inferences concerning God’s
unchanging nature.
This analogy with the soul of a sage or a fully formed philosopher has a venerable
history. We have seen this same conception of the soul of the philosopher as constant and
unflappable, even changeless in Plato’s use of the character of Theaetetus, in the purity of the
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One in the Timaeus, and in the closing books of the Republic. We have also seen this innate
striving for pure constancy in Aristotle’s De Anima, book 10 of Nicomachean Ethics, and the
activity of all of nature as oriented toward the Final Cause that is the Unmoved Mover in Physics
and Metaphysics. In addition, we see this same sort of striving for immobility in the Stoic
doctrine of the Sage, who has become invincible to the changing fortunes of the world. While a
detailed analysis of Stoic doctrine is beyond our purpose here, Cicero points out that this same
orientation toward the unchanging constancy of Pronoia in the Stoics has continued to organize
their ethical principles until this point, and this same motivation continues in Seneca, Epictetus,
and Marcus Aurelius. This conception of the philosophical Sage as approaching the divine is
most easily and closely seen in the death of Socrates as Plato records it in the Phaedo. It should
come as no surprise, then, that Philo constructs this passage about his understanding of the DDI
with analogy to his own preferred Sage, Abraham. The virtues of Abraham are just such as are
required to explain God’s immutability in Philo’s system, and will be, so he thinks, sufficient to
establish that God is in fact constant and invincible in a way that is quite in line with how the
DDI has thus far been utilized.
Abraham’s (whom he titles Ἀβραὰμ τοῦ τελείου) chief virtue, as Philo sees it, is that
Abraham is able to act in constancy of perfect character, without any reticence or back-turning.
He brings to God the dearly loved, the only trueborn offspring of the soul, that clearest image
of self-learned wisdom, named Isaac, and without a murmur renders, as in duty bound, that
fitting thank-offering. But first he bound, as the law tells us, the feet of the new strange
victim, either because having once received God’s inspiration he judged it right to tread no
more aught that was mortal, or it may be that he was taught to see how changeable and
inconstant was creation, through his knowledge of the unwavering steadfastness that belongs
to the Existent; for in this we are told that he had put his trust.148
Philo, The Unchangeableness of God. I.4. ὃς τὸ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς ἔγγονον γνήσιον, τῆς
αὐτομαθοῦς σοφίας εἰκόνα ἐναργεστάτην, ἐπίκλησιν Ἰσαάκ, ἀνάγει θεῷ καὶ ἀποδίδωσι μετὰ πάσης εὐθυμίας
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἁρμόττον χαριστήριον συμποδίσας, ὥς φησιν ὁ νόμος, τὸ καινουργηθὲν ἱερεῖον, ἤτοι παρόσον ἐπ᾿
οὐδενὸς θνητοῦ βαίνειν ἅπαξ ἐπιθειάσας ἠξίου, ἢ παρόσον ἀνίδρυτον καὶ ἄστατον κατεῖδε τὴν γένεσιν, ὅτε τὴν περὶ
τὸ ὂν ἀνενδοίαστον ἔγνω βεβαίοτητα, ᾗ λέγεται πεπιστευκέναι.
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Here we see Abraham acting not out of mere capitulation to greater powers, of the whim of
divine caprice, but out of a perfection of character that would allow him to be no less steady than
God Godself. Philo insists that the giving up of the firstborn son is an analogy to acting with
perfect virtue. Hannah gives up Samuel in just such a way. Rather than be obsessed with keeping
her firstborn son, her greatest virtue, she freely consigns to God because God gave such a virtue
in the first place. It is this constancy of character that Philo assigns to the virtuous person when
he compares the soul of the Sage to a well-made and tuned lyre149 that must be perfectly
balanced and exist in perfect internal harmony in order to function correctly. The Lyre’s virtue
comes not from outside itself, but from the perfect proportions that exist inside its own being. If
it lacks any internal perfection, it becomes unworthy to play any great music. The sage’s soul is
similarly perfect, and by analogy Philo reasons that God must therefore be even more
changeless.
Oh! if the soul of man, when it feels the soft breeze of wisdom and knowledge can dismiss
the stormy surge which the fierce burst of the gale of wickedness has suddenly stirred, and
levelling the billowy swell can rest in unruffled calm under a bright clear sky, can you doubt
that He, the Imperishable Blessed One, who has taken as His own the sovereignty of the
virtues, of perfection itself and beatitude, knows no change of will, but ever holds fast to
what He proposed from the first without any alteration?150
He goes on to insist that humans must needs always be subject to change, but that this quality of
humanity is not a strength, but a weakness peculiar to our imperfect existence. “God,” he says,
“has no such fickleness.”151
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Philo, The Unchangeableness of God, 24-25.
Philo, The Unchangeableness of God, 26. ὅπου γοῦν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴ τὸν πολὺν κλύδωνα καὶ σάλον, ὃν
καταρραγὲν σφοδρὸν πνεῦμα τὸ κακίας αἰφνίδιον ἤγειρεν, ἐπιστήμης καὶ σοφίας αὔραις ἀποτίθεται καὶ τὸ κυμαῖνον
καὶ παρῳδηκὸς ὑφεῖσα νηνέμῳ εὐδίᾳ χρωμένη γαληνιάζει, εἶτ᾿ ἐνδοιάζεις, ὅτι ὁ ἄφθαρτος καὶ μακάριος καὶ τῶν
ἀρετῶν καὶ αὐτῆς τελειότητος καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνημμένος τὸ κράτος οὐ χρῆται γνώμης μεταβολῇ, μένει δὲ ἐφ᾿ ὧν
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐβουλεύσατο οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μετατιθείς;
151
Philo, The Unchangeableness of God, 28c. ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ ἁψίκορος.
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Philo takes a brief aside to argue for the necessary atemporality of God (which is by no
means trivial), but the substance of his argumentation for DDI is found in the definition of his
physical terms—God’s atemporality is merely a feature of his peculiar mode of existing as
Creator of the cosmos. In this regard Philo is clearly attempting to articulate the primacy of God
as Creator of the universe, and therefore of time. He actually borrows familial analogies in order
to explain the derivative nature of time and justify God’s omniscience of future events.
[God] employs the forethought and foreknowledge which are virtues peculiarly His own, and
suffers nothing to escape His control or pass outside His comprehension. For not even about
the future can uncertainty be found with Him, since nothing is uncertain or future to God. No
one doubts that the parents must have knowledge of his offspring, the craftsman of his
handiwork, the steward of things entrusted to his stewardship. But God is very truth the
father and craftsman and steward of the heavens and the universe and all that is therein.
Future events lie shrouded in the darkness of some time that is yet to be at different distances,
some near, some far.But God is the maker of time also, for He is the father of time’s father,
that is of the universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the
generation of the other. Thus time stands to God in the relation of a grandson. For this
universe, since we perceive by our senses is the younger son of God. To the elder son, I mean
the intelligible universe, He assigned the place of firstborn, and purposed that it should
remain in His own keeping. So this younger son, the world of our senses when set in motion,
brought that entity we call time to the brightness of it’s rising. And thus with God there is no
future, since He has made the boundaries of the ages subject to Himself. For God’s life is not
a time, but eternity, which is the archetype and pater of time; and in eternity there is no past
nor future, but only present existence.152
For comparison, in On the Creation he explains God’s eternality as follows,
Then he says that “in the beginning God made the heaven and the earth,” taking “beginning”
not, as some think, in a chronological sense, for time was not before there was a world. Time
began either simultaneously with the world or after it. For since time is a measured space
Philo, The Unchangeableness of God, 29g-32h. καὶ προμηθείᾳ καὶ προνοίᾳ χρώμενος, οἰκείαις ἀρεταῖς, οὐδὲν
ἀπελευθεριάζειν καὶ ἔξω τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καταλήψεως βαίνειν ἐᾷ· ἐπειδήπερ οὐδ᾿ ἡ τῶν μελλόντων ἀδηλότης αὐτῷ
συμβατή· οὔτε γὰρ ἄδηλον οὔτε μέλλον οὐδὲν θεῷ. δῆλον μὲν οὖν, ὅτι καὶ τῶν γεννηθέντων τὸν φυτεύσαντα καὶ
τῶν δημιουργηθέντων τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ τὸν ἐπίτροπον τῶν ἐπιτροπευομένων ἐπιστήμονα [ἀναγκαῖον] εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ δὲ
θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ τεχνίτης καὶ ἐπίτροπος τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ τε καὶ κόσμῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειάν ἐστι. καὶ μὴν τά γε μέλλοντα
συσκίαζεται ὑπὸ τοῦ αὖθις χρόνου, τοτὲ μὲν βραχεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ μακρῷ διαστήματι. δημιουργὸς δὲ καὶ χρόνου θεός· καὶ
γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ πατὴρ—πατὴρ δὲ χρόνου κόσμος—τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν ἀποφήνας ἐκείνου· ὥστε
υἱωνοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν πρὸς θεὸν τὸν χρόνον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὗτος νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰσθητὸς ὤν· τὸν γὰρ
πρεσβύτερον [οὐδένα εἶπε]—νοητὸς δ᾿ ἐκεῖνος—πρεσβείων ἀξιώσας παρ᾿ ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διενοήθη. οὗτος οὖν ὁ
νεώτερος υἱὸς ὁ αἰσθητὸς κινηθεὶς τὴν χρόνου φύσιν ἀναλάμψαι καὶ ἀνασχεῖν ἐποίησεν. ὥστε οὐδὲν παρὰ θεῷ
μέλλον τῷ καὶ τὰ τῶν χρόνων ὑπηγμένῳ πέρατα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ παράδειγμα
αἰὼν ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ· ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὔτε παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὑφέστηκεν.
152
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determined by the world’s movement, and since movement could not be prior to the object
moving, but must of necessity arise either after it or simultaneously with it, it follows of
necessity that time also is either coeval with or later born than the world. To venture to affirm
that it is elder born would be to do violence to philosophic sense.153
Philo’s conception of God at this point is a hybridization of a Middle Platonic and Peripatetic
conceptions of deity. The language of the Demiurge follows Plato, but his particular attribution
of atemporality is more similar to Aristotle’s conception of the Unmoved Mover as being
necessarily outside of time for essentially physical reasons. Accordingly, we can understand that
his articulation of God’s immutability incorporates atemporality not as a primary cause of
immutability, but as a consequence of it. The atemporality of God is used to justify the flow of
causation in a way that will become standard in Christian theological use in the coming
centuries—particularly the articulation of foreknowledge and creative actions not as events in a
chronological series but as a logical series.154
There are, of course, other passages the Tanakh that affirm God’s immutability,155 but
Philo does not focus on these passages. Nevertheless, Philo’s contributions to philosophical
theology in general, and both Judaism and Christianity can hardly be overstated, and his
commitment to the DDI as a doctrine that explains God’s causal relationship to the created order
is the key to his influence. His commitment to a fully transcendent deity who is independent,
invincible, and self-existent, but one that also orders the cosmos in a conscious and intentional
way without undergoing any internal change. While it is a consequence of his argument rather
than the main thrust, the distinction between God’s intentional actions qua the actions of

Philo, On the Creation. 26a-27a. Φησὶ δ᾿ ὡς “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν,” τὴν ἀρχὴν
παραλαμβάνων, | οὐχ ὡς οἴονταί τινες, τὴν κατὰ χρόνον· χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν
ἢ μετ᾿ αὐτόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεώς ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, προτέρα δὲ τοῦ κινουμένου κίνησις οὐκ
ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν ἢ ὕστερον ἢ ἅμα συνίστασθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἰσήλικα κόσμου
γεγονέναι ἢ νεώτερον ἐκείνου· πρεσβύτερον δ᾿ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμᾶν ἀφιλόσοφον.
154
See Philo, On the Creation 27a-h.
155
Passages include Genesis 18:25; Numbers 23:19; 1 Samuel 15:29; 2 Samuel 22:31; 1 Kings 8:56; Job 23:13;
Psalm 33:11, 102:26, 103:17; Proverbs 19:21; Ecclesiastes 3:14; Isaiah 14:24, 31:2, 46:9; and Malachi 3:6.
153
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creation, but not as caused by the creation paves the way for further concepts of divine
omnipotence, innocence, and beneficence. Whether Philo succeeds perfectly in dissolving any
tension between immutability and intercessory action is up to the reader of his arguments, but his
foray into this topic is seminal for how later thinkers establish divine attributes. While his
method is mostly apophatic, he makes powerful use of analogy to make cataphatic claims as to
God’s mode of existence and motivational structure that allow God to exist in meaningful
covenant with both Israel and the world in general.

Early Epistles and Immutability
The text of the New Testament is not a philosophical treatise on any topic, nevertheless
there are some important passages from the Early and Pauline epistles that merit consideration.
While Philo’s articulation of various parts of the Torah are clear attempts to show a continuity
between Jewish scripture and history with Hellenic ideas, the New Testament and other early
Christian writings are attempts to articulate a fundamentally similar synthesis, but with a peculiar
τέλος. The synthesis that occurs in these documents are fundamentally functions to explicitly
control the doxastic practices of the nascent sect.
The narrative books are not as useful for finding explicitly robust philosophical theology,
but are rather like source material to be incorporated into systematic thought that comments on
them. That is not to say that there is no content to seek in the Gospels and Acts, but that these
books deal primarily with the person, work, and character of Jesus of Nazareth. The focus on
Jesus means that the books are not written in a critical or speculative fashion, but rather serve to
express the ideals and virtues embodied in the person who is the subject matter of the books.
Particularly, as Jesus is human, the language used of him in these texts is thoroughly
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anthropomorphic, and does not focus on philosophical speculation about divine nature, and does
not admit of robust philosophical discourse on the non-anthropomorphic attributes of Deity. In
these narrative texts the closest we come to finding explicit claims about the nature of Deity are
those polemic texts that attempt to show the continuity between the covenant(s) made with the
patriarchal and monarchical characters of the Tanakh (most explicitly Abraham and David) and
the new covenant cut in Jesus of Nazareth and communicated through the apostles. These claims
are diverse and manifold and include the genealogical accounts found in Matthew 1:1-17 (in
which Jesus is tied to both Abraham and David) and Luke 3:23-38 (which also ties Jesus to these
patriarchs, but extends back to the creation account by naming Adam), as well as the use of
Tanakh passages interpreted to apply specifically to the life and work of Jesus. The repeated use
of Isaiah 52:13-53:12 as direct prophecy of the Passion is most widely publicized and easily
recognized text of this kind, but other texts are also clear. The Sermon on the Mount is polemic
in this fashion when Jesus quotes sections of Mosaic Law with the formulaic “you have heard it
said [. . .] but I say to you”156 are clear references to the continuity of divine authority of the
Torah being superseded by Jesus’s authority. In Matthew 11 Jesus identifies himself to
messengers sent by John the Baptizer by weaving together passages from Isaiah 35:5-6, 61:1-2,
and 8:14. Again in Luke 4:17-30 Jesus identified himself by quoting Isaiah 61:1-2, but this
account is more polemic against Jewish readers, because of the claim that his words would be
spread to the gentiles—just as Elijah helped a widow in the land of Sidon,157 and how Elisha did
not heal the Israelite lepers, but rather Naaman the Syrian.158 There are other passages, but these
kinds of polemics are intended by Christians to show a legitimizing continuity between the
contents of the Tanakh and their own scriptures. These polemics allow for Christians to utilize all
156

Matthew 5:21-22, 5:27-28, 5:31-32, 5:33-34, 5:38-39, 5:43-44.
Luke 4:26 is referencing the contents of 1 Kings 17:1-24.
158
Luke 4:27 is referencing the contents of 2 Kings 5:1-14.
157
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of the theological passages of the Tanakh, but also allow for their peculiar spin on them. This list
is illustrative of how Christians use older passages to claim the divinity of Jesus, but it is far
from exhaustive.
The epistolary literature is more explicit and helpful when dealing with direct doctrinal
matters, and accordingly I will focus mainly on the epistles. The Pauline epistles make up the
bulk of the New Testament, but they are not the only places we may seek explanations about
Divine nature. There are two explicit claims for divine immutability in the text of the New
Testament. The first is found in Hebrews 6:13-20,159
For when God made a promise to Abraham, since he had no one greater by whom to swear,
he swore by himself, saying, “Surely I will bless and multiply you.” And thus Abraham,
having patiently waited, obtained the promise. For people swear by something greater than
themselves, and in all their disputes an oath is final for confirmation. So when God desired to
show more convincingly to the heirs of the promise the unchangeable character of his
purpose, he guaranteed it with an oath, so that by two unchangeable things, in which it is
impossible for God to lie, we who have fled for refuge might have strong encouragement to
hold fast to the hope set before us. We have this as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a
hope that enters into the inner place behind the curtain, where Jesus has gone as a forerunner
on our behalf, having become a high priest forever after the order of Melchizedek.160
It is significant to note that the oath God takes here is an oath sworn by himself, because he
could swear by nothing greater. This concept of God swearing by himself is hardly new. It
occurs in Genesis 22:16, Isaiah 45:23, Jeremiah 22:5, 49:13 & 51:14, and Amos 6:8.161 The idea
that the only surety by which God could swear would be himself, as oaths must be taken by
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All Greek from the New Testament will come from Cambridge Greek Testament: Greek Text. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
160
τῷ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐπαγγειλάμενος ὁ θεός, ἐπεὶ κατʼ οὐδενὸς εἶχεν μείζονος ὀμόσαι, ὤμοσεν καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ, 14 λέγων,
Εἰ μὴν εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω σε καὶ πληθύνων πληθυνῶ σε· 15 καὶ οὕτως μακροθυμήσας ἐπέτυχεν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας.
16
ἄνθρωποι γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ μείζονος ὀμνύουσιν, καὶ πάσης αὐτοῖς ἀντιλογίας πέρας εἰς βεβαίωσιν ὁ ὅρκος· 17 ἐν ᾧ
περισσότερον βουλόμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς κληρονόμοις τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ
ἐμεσίτευσεν ὅρκῳ, 18 ἵνα διὰ δύο πραγμάτων ἀμεταθέτων, ἐν οἷς ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι θεόν, ἰσχυρὰν παράκλησιν
ἔχωμεν οἱ καταφυγόντες κρατῆσαι τῆς προκειμένης ἐλπίδος, 19 ἣν ὡς ἄγκυραν ἔχομεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ
βεβαίαν καὶ εἰσερχομένην εἰς τὸ ἐσώτερον τοῦ καταπετάσματος, 20 ὅπου πρόδρομος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰσῆλθεν Ἰησοῦς,
κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδὲκ ἀρχιερεὺς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.
161
There are, of course, other incidents of God swearing oaths, but these are the explicit instances in which God
swears by himself. Some other passages in which God takes oaths are Deuteronomy 19:8, 28:9; 2 Samuel 3:9, Amos
4:2 (in which God swears by his holiness, not himself).
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something more sure than the one who swears them, is a clear acknowledgement of the argument
that there can be nothing greater than God. This standard of a supreme Deity with whom nothing
whatsoever is coequal, shows that Xenophanes’s old claim about one god greatest among gods
and men has clearly found solid footing in the centuries since it was first sung. In addition, in
Deuteronomy 6, the Israelites during instruction for how they are to live in the promised land of
Canaan they are expressly told “It is the LORD your God you shall fear. Him you shall serve and
by his name you shall swear. You shall not go after other gods, the gods of the peoples who are
around you—for the LORD your God in your midst is a jealous God—lest the anger of the LORD
your God be kindled against you, and he destroy you from off the face of the earth.”162 Swearing
by YHWH is clearly an injunction that calls for the highest level of seriousness in the Tanakh,
and this level of seriousness only increases when it is God who takes the oath.
This passage in Hebrews references the oath God took in Genesis 22:16, which occurs
during the sacrifice of Isaac.163 Specifically the significant term used here is ἀμετάθετος, which
is the privation of μετατίθημι —a term that Philo also uses to discuss God’s lack of change.164
We must be careful, however, not to move too quickly here. This passage does not directly
address the ontology of the divine, but rather the character of the divine. The things that are said
to be unchangeable here are the character of God’s purpose, and the oath that God makes, rather
than God’s substance. At this point it is still necessary to at least allow for the possibility that the
author of Hebrews does not necessarily espouse a robust divine simplicity, especially because of
the puzzles that the doctrine of incarnation raises. A doctrine of simplicity would make either of
these things (God’s character or promises) identical with God’s existence, but such a move may

162

Deuteronomy 6:13-14. ESV.
Both God’s and Abraham’s actions in this passage have already been discussed in Chapter 1.
164
See Deus. 26 and footnote [22].
163
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be too quick here.165 Regardless of this lack of focus on ontology, we do see a clear focus on
divine character and intention. God’s character and promises remain as robustly immutable here
as they did in the sacrifice of Isaac that this passage is invoking. The argument from the author
of Hebrews is nearly identical to that found in Genesis. There is a seeming absurdity—the
Tanakh gave a particular set of promises (most particularly to Abraham and David) and despite
all appearances to the contrary (specifically the exile, the lack of the articles to fill the temple,
and the fact that Jesus of Nazareth did not come as a military monarch) the author claims that the
promises are fulfilled.
Just as we have seen in previous literature, the author of this epistle’s motivation for
claiming God’s lack of μετατίθημι is not caused by ontological speculation, but is the result of
attempting to understand God in the context of covenant. Unlike the people of Israel, unlike the
very creation itself, God undergoes no alteration nor movement. Quite literally he cannot be
placed or displaced. Thus the word used has physical and spatial overtones,166 but is applied to
God by reason of motivational structure rather than physical contemplation. Just as in Philo we
see here a sort of unification of previous ideas that have become more common knowledge. It is
these ideas that allow for the divine covenant constancy to be combined with more physical
contemplation that lay the groundwork for a more robustly philosophical theology of Divine
immutability.
The second place that the New Testament letters make explicit claim to divine
changelessness is in James 1:17. Once again, we see clear parallels to Philo’s understanding of
the connection between the human and divine in this passage,
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While some thinkers may already be committed to a robust doctrine of divine simplicity at this point in history
the question of a robust doctrine of divine simplicity is outside of the scope of this work.
166
Perhaps there is some theoretical connection to Cornford’s reading of moira here?
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Blessed is the man who remains steadfast under trial, for when he has stood the test he will
receive the crown of life, which God has promised to those who love him. Let no one say
when he is tempted “I am tempted by God,” for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he
himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own
desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully grown
brings forth death.
Do not be deceived, my beloved brothers. Every good and perfect gift is from above,
coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to
change. Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of
firstfruits of his creatures.167
Here the operative phrase is “παρʼ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα.” Interestingly
the terms here are less physical and psychological—they have more to do with power. In
particular τροπή can have both meteorological and strategic connotations. While the
meteorological connotations have some physical bias, the strategic connotations seem to be far
more front and center in James’s account. This epistle exists less to show the continuity of sacred
documents, and more to call the individual hearer to account by reminding them how they should
live in the here and now. Accordingly it is less contextual and contiguous than the book of
Hebrews. Because of this different focus, the claims here are accordingly less aligned with
natural philosophy. Nevertheless, the epistle shares the Christological polemic that ties Jesus to
Abraham, though in a less Philonic fashion.
Though the passages just listed are the most explicit claims to the DDI in the text of the
New Testament, there are some important implicit acknowledgements of divine changelessness
in the Pauline literature. Paul makes implicit reference to immutability in the opening lines of the
Epistle to the Romans.

James 1:12-18. ESV. 12 Μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν, ὅτι δόκιμος γενόμενος λήμψεται τὸν στέφανον
τῆς ζωῆς, ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν.13 Μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος λεγέτω ὅτι ἀπὸ θεοῦ πειράζομαι. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς
ἀπείραστός ἐστιν κακῶν, πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα. 14 ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος
καὶ δελεαζόμενος· 15 εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν, ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκύει θάνατον.
16
Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί. 17 πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθέν ἐστιν καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ
τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρʼ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα. 18 βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ
ἀληθείας, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων.
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For what can be known about God is plain to [ungodly and unrighteous humans], because
God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely his eternal power and divine
nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in things that have
been made. So they are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not honor him
as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts
were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the
immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles.168
This passage contains obvious parallels to earlier thinkers, and indeed, even to Xenophanes’s
now ancient complaint about anthropomorphisms and theriomorphisms. In addition, Paul affirms
that the more transcendent attributes of God are knowable through examination of the cosmic
order—a technique used by both Greeks and Israelites in order to form analogies that inform
their philosophical theology. Another claim in this same vein comes in Romans 9 where Paul is
discussing the inclusion of the Gentiles and the exclusion of some Jews in the new covenant. He
writes,
But it is not as though the word of God has failed. For not all who are descended from Israel
belong to Israel, and not all are children of Abraham because they are his offspring, but
“Through Isaac shall your offspring be named.” This means that it is not the children of the
flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are counted as offspring.
For this is what the promise said: “About this time next year I will return and Sarah shall
have a son.” And not only so, but also when Rebecca had conceived children by one man,
our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or
bad—in order that God’s purpose of election might continue, not because of works but
because of his call—she was told, “The older will serve the younger.”169
Once again, here, the work being done is not of an ontological nature, but on the idea of God’s
constancy in covenant despite the appearance of drastic change in the nature of that covenant.
Romans 1:19-23, ESV. 19 διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν.
τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ
θειότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, 21 διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν, ἀλλὰ
ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία· 22 φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ
ἐμωράνθησαν, 23 καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν
καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἑρπετῶν.
169
Romans 9:6-12. ESV. 6 Οὐχ οἷον δὲ ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραὴλ, οὗτοι
Ἰσραήλ· 7 οὐδʼ ὅτι εἰσὶν σπέρμα Ἀβραὰμ, πάντες τέκνα, ἀλλʼ Ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεταί σοι σπέρμα. 8 τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, οὐ τὰ
τέκνα τῆς σαρκὸς ταῦτα τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας λογίζεται εἰς σπέρμα· 9 ἐπαγγελίας γὰρ ὁ
λόγος οὗτος Κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐλεύσομαι καὶ ἔσται τῇ Σάρρᾳ υἱός. 10 οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ῥεβέκκα ἐξ ἑνὸς
κοίτην ἔχουσα, Ἰσαὰκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν· 11 μήπω γὰρ γεννηθέντων μηδὲ πραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον, ἵνα ἡ κατʼ
ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ μένῃ, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος, 12 ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ ὅτι Ὁ μείζων δουλεύσει τῷ
ἐλάσσονι·
168
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This work may not be contiguous with physical contemplation, it does show continuity with the
concern for divine motivation, and seeks to show how despite appearances of change, the Divine
can be intrinsically immutable. Paul stresses this point again in Romans 11, and in a similar
passage in Philippians 3:4-11. Galatians chapter 3 attempts to show a similar continuity between
the Abrahamic covenant and the budding Followers of the Way, despite the difference in
doctrine, and he gives another parallel passage in Galatians 4:21-31.
These passages do not necessarily give a more philosophical account of the very nature of
deity, and the other texts of Pauline literature are more concerned with the sectarian doctrinal
standards of belief and conduct than they are with philosophical theology. This continuity of
divine intention is stressed in other locations, however. The stoning of Stephen170 is introduced
by a lengthy speech about how the new covenant is continuous with the new covenant mirrors
these Pauline claims. Likewise the claims made in Paul’s address to the Areopagus mirror the
anti-anthropomorphic stance given in the epistles, and seeks to forge a means of continuity
between philosophical speculation and covenant consistency based in the creation account.171
All in all, the New Testament writings, and the early epistolary literature in particular, are
not robust explorations of philosophical theology. They are source material upon which further
systematic theological and philosophical explorations dwell. Nevertheless, this material can be
seen as meaningful in the overall conversation between those individuals who engage in
speculation as regards the essence and activity of the Divine. The material is naturally polemic in
fashion and tone—but the ideas contained and communicated therein do not make the material
either unimportant or uninteresting. Aristotle’s work was also quite polemic, and his
contributions also stand unstained despite his sometimes radical interpolations. The primary texts
170

The entirety of Acts 7 deals with this account.
Acts 17:16-35. The creation claim is explicit in v. 24, and the continuity with the Greek tradition is found in v.
28.
171
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of the New Testament, much like Philo’s writings, serve to bring together two schools of thought
regarding the divine. The synthesis of these traditions—the Hellenic Roman and the Hellenized
Jewish—serve to forge a way to think in a monotheistic fashion that takes the DDI to be
something that also allows for divine action in a particularly direct form. The most difficult
problem raised for the ontological version of the DDI in the New Testament text comes from the
combination of the Trinitarian doctrine derived from the source material combined with the clear
and central doctrine of the Incarnation. If the DDI is primarily understood to be an ontological
category of existence that is identified with the nature of the Divine, then the mystery of how
these things could hang together becomes quite opaque. If, on the other hand, the DDI is
primarily understood to be about intrinsic divine causation that flows from the essence of divine
motivation and is most clearly expressed through Covenant Constancy, then the mysterious
nature of the DDI is far more understandable and salutary to the early Christians. This focus on
Divine motivation and faithfulness to God’s own purposes despite apparently absurd
circumstances makes the budding religion both sensible and attractive to the Middle Platonic and
Stoic audiences to which it is being spread in the first century Roman Empire. We shall have
more to say concerning the how the Pauline literature and passages are interpreted and used
when we come to the writings of Justin Martyr.
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CHAPTER SIX
JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE DDI IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2ND CENTURY
As the final step in our examination of the development of the DDI in the ancient and
period we will consider the extant writings of Justin Martyr. Justin is an apologist for second
century Christians and the doctrines and practices of those Christians in his time period. The
second century marks the twilight of Middle Platonism before the work of Plotinus in the third
century. The extant works of Justin are not treatises about philosophical topics, but are rather
specific apologies aimed at peculiar audiences. Accordingly, we will not see a great deal of
development of philosophical topics, much less a robust philosophical treatise on any particular
idea. Rather, what we see is the use of fairly established doctrines in the service of these kinds of
apologies. Accordingly, we will examine sections of his first and second apologies and the
Dialogue with Trypho to see what place the DDI takes in his work, and how it is useful for
accomplishing his goals—the establishment of the legitimacy and truth of Christianity. To
understand him and his ideas, we will briefly examine his context, and then set those texts within
it.

Second Century Philosophy and Bibliophilia
The second century is still a time period in which inquiry and philosophy is not a
specialized enterprise, rather it maintains its pluralistic focus. In this way it is more contiguous
with the attitudes of Cicero and Philo than it is with even the attitudes of Medieval period, much
less any Modern or Post-modern attitudes. Hellenic philosophy in general, including Middle
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Platonism, as well as the Judaism and Christianity of the period share in an attitude that is a
direct product of the Axial Age: bibliophilia. The bibliophilic state of philosophy in the second
century CE period is not, perhaps, a very philosophically interesting subject in and of itself. It
does, however, help one to understand Justin’s interaction with Philosophy, and why he
conceives of Christianity as the complete philosophy. Betegh sets out an account of the great
authority and even reverence accorded to texts by the philosophers of the late centuries BCE and
early centuries CE. This period saw the demise of the centralized schools in Athens, and
philosophy underwent a sort of diaspora throughout the Roman Empire. This diaspora led to an
increased reliance on texts for accurate information concerning the “orthodoxy” of the school
one studied with. Betegh maintains that “the attitude toward authoritative texts, especially in the
Platonic tradition, gradually gained a spiritual dimension: centrally important texts were
considered sacred, and their study a religious act.”172 The dedication to texts as a legitimating
factor in philosophical investigation—indeed as containing the truth that must be puzzled out—
was also a potent concept in the Judaism of late antiquity. It is beyond doubt that the early
Christians quickly developed bibliophilic tendencies of their own.173 The letters of Paul were in
circulation in the 1st century CE, and the process of ratification of the Cannon was already
occurring in the second century. This shared bibliophilic orientation across intellectual, cultural,
and religious boundaries shows how deeply the people of the second century respected—even
venerated—the written word. Christianity was a religion of the book, and spread through the
dissemination of letters and written works. It is easy to see how Justin could have latched onto a
bibliophilic tradition which claimed to correct Judaism—a religion which was thought to have
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Gábor Betegh. "The Transmission of Ancient Wisdom." In The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late
Antiquity, Lloyd P. Gerson, 25-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 26.
173
Codices are the earliest Christian artifacts. Letters and collections of letters, as well as scriptural texts are
centrally important in Christianity’s self-definition.
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texts from much more ancient sources (i.e. Moses)—from which Plato was thought to have
borrowed.
Bibliophily contributes towards what I term philosophical syncretism. In the ancient
world religious syncretism was the norm among both the educated and the simple,174 so it comes
as little surprise that philosophers also attempt to reconcile differences of opinion through
syncretistic practice. Though the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, the Platonists and the Peripatetics
saw themselves as distinct schools with an exclusive purview on the true philosophy (or at least
the true interpretation of the writings of the masters), there was a good deal of inter-school
influence occurring during this period. The decentralized and bibliophilic state of philosophical
investigation led to more discussion between philosophical sects than would have happened
when each sect had its own base of operations. Justin recognizes this state of affairs in the
Dialogue when he informs us that Trypho recognized his dress as that of a philosopher—though
not necessarily as a philosopher of a certain school. The dress of a philosopher covers the
individuals of any given school—it does not seem that one could have looked at a given
individual and said “Hail O Platonic!” with anywhere near the certainty that one could have with
said “Hail O Philosopher!” The Stoics, for example, started to adopt Plato and Aristotle as
philosophical authorities as early as the second century BCE with the writings of Panaetius, and
Galen seems to have had access to Panaetius in the second century CE.175 We have already seen
the inter-penetration of the schools when we considered the work of Cicero and Philo Judaeus,
but that syncretism has continued into the second century seemingly without pause.

174

We have many examples of religious syncretism—Greeks and Romans adopt Egyptian gods for example.
Perhaps one of the more apparent examples of this phenomenon is Socrates’s tendency to swear “by the dog,” that is
by the theriomorphic Egyptian god Anubis, in Plato’s dialogs.
175
Betegh, 27.
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Complicating the matter even more than simple philosophical syncretism is the lack of a
central figure who shaped the discussion in this period. Early Platonism in the Academy had
headmasters who were able to shape the discussion of Plato’s works in a more monolithic
fashion than was possible after the fall of the old Academy. There is in Middle Platonism simply
no analog to Plato or to Plotinus. The lack of a central controlling figure in Middle Platonism
results in a lack of cohesion among those who would consider themselves Platonists. The result
is that scholars are able to see in certain thinkers of the period a general orientation toward texts
and philosophy that is termed “Middle Platonism.” The combination of philosophical syncretism
and the lack of cohesion in Middle Platonism makes it difficult to classify any thinker of the
period as being a “pure Platonist.” The dialectic of the period simply does not allow for
perfectly clear lines to be drawn in the sand, and so the thinkers of this period can be thought of
as existing on a spectrum from more to less Platonic. What we cannot do is to ask them for their
school ID badge so as to clearly identify them as purely Platonic, Stoic, Pythagorean, or
Peripatetic.176 If a Stoic can love some Platonic doctrines, and a Platonist can be enraptured
some Pythagorean doctrines and no one sees this as a problem, then the waters become
increasingly muddied.177 For this reason it is easier to see that Justin has some reason to believe
that his Christianity is actually the most pure and true form of Platonism, particularly because of
his dedication to the myth that all Greek philosophy has its source in the writings of Moses.
Justin’s claims and appeals to philosophy and philosophical schools are found primarily
in his Dialogue with Trypho in which he claims to have sought admittance to schools of the
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This should cause little worry in us, however, because this state of affairs is probably more the historical rule than
the exception. It is often not the case that individual thinkers are of “purely” one school or another.
177
This is not to say that there is no concept of differentiation between the schools merely that it tends to be a more
parochial matter of avowing a particular strain of the school in question. We saw this same attitude in evidenced in
Cicero’s characterizations of the schools in the first century BCE. While the Stoics and the Peripatetics did not see
their doctrines as conceptually contiguous, Cicero did.
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Stoics, the Pythagoreans, the Peripatetic, and finally the Platonists. The first three he found
mostly useless (or wasn’t accepted into their school at all in the case of the Pythagoreans), but
Platonism deeply appealed to him. Justin tells us why he is compelled towards philosophical
investigation in general. In the opening exchange he has with Trypho he explains quite clearly
what philosophy is for,
“How,” I asked, “can you gain as much from philosophy as from your own lawgiver and
prophets?”
“Why not,” he replied, “for do not the philosophers speak always about God? Do they not
constantly propose questions about his unity and providence? Is this not the task of
philosophy, to inquire about the Divine?”
“Yes, indeed,” I said, “we, too, are of the same opinion. But the majority of the
philosophers have simply neglected to inquire whether there is one or even several gods,
and whether or not a divine providence takes care of us, as if this knowledge were
unnecessary to our happiness.”178
Justin is unambiguous here in his claim that Philosophy aims at theological knowledge, and that
is why he is so enamored of it. As clear as this is, he is even more forceful a few chapters later
when he recounts his meeting with the old man that lead him to Christianity.
“Tell me,” he asked, “what is philosophy and what is the happiness it engenders, if there
is nothing which prevents your speaking.”
“Philosophy,” I answered, “is the knowledge of that which exists, and a clear
understanding of the truth; and happiness is the reward of such knowledge and
understanding.”179
He also claims that he followed Platonism because,
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The First Apology, The Second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho, Exhortation to the Greeks, Discourse to the
Greeks, The Monarchy or The Rule of God. Translated by Thomas B. Falls. Vol. 6. Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, Inc., 1948. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/21466. p.148. Chapter 1.
Καὶ τί ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοσοῦτον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας σύ τ’ ἂν ὠφεληθείης, ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ σοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν
προφητῶν; Τί γάρ; οὐχ οἱ φιλόσοφοι περὶ θεοῦ τὸν ἅπαντα ποιοῦνται λόγον, ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε, καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας
αὐτοῖς καὶ προνοίας αἱ ζητήσεις γίνονται ἑκάστοτε; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἐξετάζειν περὶ τοῦ θείου;
Ναί, ἔφην, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς δεδοξάκαμεν. ἀλλ’ οἱ πλεῖστοι οὐδὲ τούτου πεφροντίκασιν, εἴτε εἷς εἴτε καὶ πλείους εἰσὶ
θεοί, καὶ εἴτε προνοοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἑκάστου εἴτε καὶ οὔ, ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς γνώσεως ταύτης συντελούσης·
Greek text for the Dialogue is from E.J. Goodspeed, Die ältesten Apologeten, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1915: 90-265.
179
Justin, 152. Dialogue with Trypho Chapter 3. Τί γάρ ἐστι φιλοσοφία, φησί, καὶ τίς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὐτῆς, εἰ μή τι
κωλύει φράζειν, φράσον. Φιλοσοφία μέν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπίγνωσις,
εὐδαιμονία δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς σοφίας γέρας
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“Plato truly states,” I retorted, “that the eye of the mind has this special power, which has
been given to us in order that we may see with it, when it is pure, the very Being who is the
cause of everything the mind perceives, who has neither color, nor form, nor size, nor
anything the eye can see, but who is beyond all essence, who is ineffable and indescribable,
who alone is beautiful and good, and who comes at once into the souls which are well
disposed because of their affinity to and desire of seeing Him.”180
This is the primary goal of philosophy for Justin. He wishes to experience God through the
intellective capacity of his soul. As far as he is concerned, the goals of philosophical
contemplation and religious devotion are the same.
He does draw a very specific distinction between religious devotion and the activities of
the philosophical schools, however, and that is the content that drives their activity. When
addressing Trypho as their dialogue opens, he asks, “‘How,’ I asked, ‘can you gain as much from
philosophy as from your own lawgiver and prophets?’”181 He believes that Moses is the font of
all philosophy,182 and therefore there should be no need for Trypho or any other Jew to seek
some sort of wisdom beyond the font from which it flows. This tendency, however, reinforces
the bibliophilic nature of Justin’s conception of Philosophy. He also prizes the antiquity of the
thought, and the specific words used in the texts to an extreme degree. In this regard he is very
similar to Philo Judaeus (whose passages on the use of numbers in the creation account is rather
similar in its exacting nature). The distinction in source material but not between method may
seem odd to a 21st century thinker, but as we have seen in previous chapters the ancient
perspective does not insert the dissonance or distance between epistemology and ontology with
which we are so comfortable. Without this distance, the idea that there is a single method or

Justin, 154. Dialogue with Trypho Chapter 4. Φησὶ γὰρ Πλάτων, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὄμμα
καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἡμῖν δεδόσθαι, ὡς δύνασθαι καθορᾶν αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὂν εἰλικρινεῖ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ τῶν νοητῶν
ἁπάντων ἐστὶν αἴτιον, οὐ χρῶμα ἔχον, οὐ σχῆμα, οὐ μέγεθος, οὐδὲ οὐδὲν ὧν ὀφθαλμὸς βλέπει· ἀλλά τι ὂν τοῦτ’
αὐτό, φησί, ὂν ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας, οὔτε ῥητὸν οὔτε ἀγορευτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐξαίφνης ταῖς εὖ
πεφυκυίαις ψυχαῖς ἐγγινόμενον διὰ τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ ἔρωτα τοῦ ἰδέσθαι.
181
Justin, 148. Dialogue with Trypho Chapter 1
182
This claim is found in Chapter 60 of the Apology I. He claims that the evidence is found in the use of the x in the
Timaeus and correlates that with the idea that Moses lifted up the bronze serpent on a cross in Numbers 21.
180
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route for thinking makes a great deal of sense, and Parmenides’s principles still hold sway over
the minds of second century thinkers.
He makes even more of this distinction and of the significance of texts when he offers an
explanation for the existence of the various philosophical schools. Justin is concerned to
articulate why Christianity is pure and true philosophy, and thus to exert its excellence over all
other philosophical schools, and then afterwards to assert it as the true interpretation of Hebrew
Scripture. In order to accomplish this goal he claims that,
Philosophy is indeed one's greatest possession, and is most precious in the sight of God, to
whom it alone leads us and to whom it unites us, and they in truth are holy men who have
applied themselves to philosophy. But, many have failed to discover the nature of
philosophy, and the reason why it was sent down to men; otherwise, there would not be
Platonists, or Stoics, or Peripatetics, or Theoretics, or Pythagoreans, since this science of
philosophy is always one and the same. Now, let me tell you why it has at length become so
diversified. They who first turned to philosophy, and, as a result, were deemed illustrious
men, were succeeded by men who gave no time to the investigation of the truth, but, amazed
at the courage and self-control of their teachers as well as with the novelty of their
teachings, held that to be the truth which each had learned from his own teacher. And they
in turn transmitted to their successors such opinions, and others like them, and so they
became known of the name of him who was considered the father of the doctrine.183
It is clear that Justin believes that the teachings, or the actual words of the teachers, are more
important than the persons of the teachers themselves. This is a fascinating development because
of the emphasis placed upon virtue and character in ancient forms of ethical theory, but it makes
sense in light of Justin’s focus on a Christian form of Logos doctrine. This doctrine is key to
understanding how the DDI functions in his thinking, given the peculiarity and specific problems
raised by the Incarnation. We shall return to that topic later.
Justin, 149. Dialogue with Trypho ch. 2. ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτῆμα καὶ τιμιώτατον θεῷ, ᾧ τε
προσάγει καὶ συνίστησιν ἡμᾶς μόνη, καὶ ὅσιοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκότες. τί ποτε
δέ ἐστι φιλοσοφία καὶ οὗ χάριν κατεπέμφθη εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς πολλοὺς λέληθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν Πλατωνικοὶ
ἦσαν οὐδὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐδὲ Θεωρητικοὶ οὐδὲ Πυθαγορικοί, μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης ἐπιστήμης. οὗ δὲ
χάριν πολύκρανος ἐγενήθη, θέλω εἰπεῖν. συνέβη τοῖς πρώτοις ἁψαμένοις αὐτῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδόξοις γενομένοις
ἀκολουθῆσαι τοὺς ἔπειτα μηδὲν ἐξετάσαντας ἀληθείας πέρι, καταπλαγέντας δὲ μόνον τὴν καρτερίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν
ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὸ ξένον τῶν λόγων ταῦτα ἀληθῆ νομίσαι ἃ παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ἕκαστος ἔμαθεν, εἶτα καὶ αὐτούς,
τοῖς ἔπειτα παραδόντας τοιαῦτα ἄττα καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις προσεοικότα, τοῦτο κληθῆναι τοὔνομα, ὅπερ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ
πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου.
183
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The last evidence for Justin’s absolute bibliphilia is the entirety of Dialogue, as well as
the two Apologies. Justin almost compulsively quotes from other authors, particularly scripture.
He quotes lengthy passages of text from the Septuagint in the Dialogue, particularly from Isaiah,
and even in the Apologies we see appeals to scriptural traditions added to claims about the nature
of non-Christian philosophers.184

Justin’s Version of the DDI
In the Apology I, Justin makes a few claims about God’s changelessness. They are found
in Apology I, chapter 10 where Justin asserts God’s aseity.
But we have learned from tradition that God has no need of the material gifts of men, since
we see that He is the Giver of all things. [Acts 17:25] We have been taught, are convinced,
and do believe that He approves of only those who imitate his inherent virtues, namely,
temperance, justice, love of man, and any other virtue proper to God who is called by no
given name. We have also been instructed that God, in the beginning, created in His
goodness everything out of shapeless matter [compare to 2 Apol. 5] for the sake of men.
And if men by their actions prove themselves worthy of His plan, they shall, we are told, be
found worthy to make their abode with Him and to reign with Him, free from all corruption
and pain. Just as, in the beginning He created us when we were not, so also, we believe, He
will consider all those who choose to please Him, because of their choice, to be worthy of
eternal life in His presence. Our creation was not in our own power. But this--to engage in
those things that please Him and which we choose by means of the intellectual faculties He
has bestowed on us--this makes our conviction and leads us to faith. Indeed, we think it is
for the good of all men that they are not prevented from learning these things, but are even
urged to consider them. For, what human laws were unable to effect, the Divine Word
would have accomplished, had not the evil demons enlisted the aid of the various utterly evil
inclinations, which are in every man by nature, and scattered many false and ungodly
accusations--none of which, however, applies to us.185
For competing takes on Justin’s philosophical training see M.J. Edwards. "On the Platonic Schooling of Justin
Martyr." The Journal of Theological Studies 42, no. 1 (April 1991): 17-34. www.jstor.org.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23965141. and R M. Price ""Hellenization" and Logos Doctrine in Justin Martyr."
Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 1 (March 1988): 18-23. www.jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1584467. Each
articulates a different conception of Justin’s familiarity and use of Hellenic thought and the interaction of Middle
Platonism with Christianity.
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Justin, 42-43 Apology I. chapter 10. Greek text is from D. Minns and P. Parvis, Justin, Philosopher and Martyr,
Apologies [Oxford Early Christian Texts Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009]
Ἀλλ’ οὐ δέεσθαι τῆς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ὑλικῆς προσφορᾶς προσειλήφαμεν τὸν θεόν, αὐτὸν παρέχοντα πάντα
ὁρῶντες· ἐκείνους δὲ προσδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν μόνον δεδιδάγμεθα καὶ πεπείσμεθα καὶ πιστεύομεν, τοὺς τὰ προσόντα
αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ μιμουμένους, σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ ὅσα οἰκεῖα θεῷ ἐστι, τῷ μηδενὶ
184
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This passage will put Justin at odds with later thinkers on some specific theological points, but it
does particularly engage with the idea of Divine motivation. Once again here we see the idea that
God has no need of supply or support. God's nature is such that there is in God no need, desire,
want, or lack that would make gifts either necessary or even interesting to God. It is interesting
that the translator identifies Acts 17:25 as the source of this idea, as it is clearly found in the
traditions of the philosophers as well. Indeed, this very quotation comes from Paul's address to
the Areopagus in which he quotes Epimenides of Crete and Arastus’s Phainomena.
After this passage, we see the issue of the DDI return in chapter 13 where he explicitly
describes God as unchanging and eternal,
What sensible person will not admit that we are not atheists, since we worship the Creator of
this world and assert, as we have been taught, that He has no need of bloody sacrifices,
libations, and incense. But we praise Him to the best of our power by prayer and
thanksgiving for all our nourishment. We have been instructed that the only worship worthy
of Him is not to consume by fire those things that He created for our sustenance, but to
employ them for the good of ourselves and the needy, and, with thankful voices, to offer
Him solemn prayers and hymns for our own creation, for the preservation of our health, for
the variety of things, and for the changes of the seasons, and to beseech Him in prayer that
we may rise to life everlasting because of our faith in Him. Our Teacher of these things is
Jesus Christ, who was born for this end, and who was crucified under Pontius Pilate,
prosecutor of Judea, in the reign of Tiberius Caesar. We shall prove that we worship Him
with reason, since we have learned that He is the Son of the living God Himself, and believe
Him to be in the second place, and the Prophetic Spirit in the third. For this they accuse us
of madness, saying that we attribute to a crucified man a place second to the unchanging and
eternal God, the Creator of all things, but they are ignorant of the mystery which lies herein.
To this mystery we entreat you to give your attention, while we explain it to you. 186
ὀνόματι θετῷ καλουμένῳ. καὶ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι’ ἀνθρώπους
δεδιδάγμεθα, οἳ ἐὰν ἀξίους τῷ ἐκείνου βουλεύματι ἑαυτοὺς δι’ ἔργων δείξωσι, τῆς μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἀναστροφῆς
καταξιωθῆναι προσειλήφαμεν συμβασιλεύοντας, ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς γενομένους. ὃν τρόπον γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ
ὄντας ἐποίησε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἡγούμεθα τρόπον διὰ τὸ ἑλέσθαι τοὺς αἱρουμένους τὰ αὐτῷ ἀρεστὰ καὶ ἀφθαρσίας καὶ
συνουσίας καταξιωθῆναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι οὐχ ἡμέτερον ἦν, τὸ δ’ ἐξακολουθῆσαι οἷς φίλον αὐτῷ
αἱρούμεθα, οὓς δι’ ὧν αὐτὸς ἐδωρήσατο λογικῶν δυνάμεων πείθει τε καὶ εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων
ἀνθρώπων ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἴργεσθαι ταῦτα μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προτρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῦτα. ὅπερ γὰρ
οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι πρᾶξαι, ταῦτα ὁ λόγος θεῖος ὢν εἰργάσατο, εἰ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι δαίμονες
κατεσκέδασαν πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἄθεα κατηγορήματα, σύμμαχον λαβόντες τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ κακὴν πρὸς πάντα καὶ
ποικίλην φύσει ἐπιθυμίαν, ὧν οὐδὲν πρόσεστιν ἡμῖν.
186
Justin, 45-46. Apology I, chapter 13. Ἄθεοι μὲν οὖν ὡς οὔκ ἐσμεν, τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς

σεβόμενοι, ἀνενδεῆ αἱμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν καὶ θυμιαμάτων, ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λέγοντες, λόγῳ
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Clearly we have here a claim that insists that God is immutable because of God’s own
perfections. At this point in our study, the aseity and impassibility of the Divine are well
documented as being the reason for God’s different mode of existence and action, and come as
no surprise. What is difficult to understand is the last two sentences. The place of the Son and the
Prophetic Spirit seem to share in some sort of Divine Nature, but the exact parameters of that
sharing are not spelled out here. Justin actively uses the Trinitarian formula for baptism, but
whether his theology is robustly Trinitarian or Subordinationist is underdetermined. Regardless
of his position on these theological standards, he does affirm that God, the Creator of all things,
is both eternal and unchanging.
In Chapter 14 he makes the claim that God is “unbegotten,” indicating that God’s mode
of existence is fundamentally different than every other created thing.
Indeed, we warn you to be careful lest the demons, previously accused by us, should
mislead you and turn you from reading and understanding thoroughly what we have said.
They strive to make you their slaves and servants. They ensnare, now by apparitions in
dreams, now by tricks of magic, all those who do not labor with all their strength for their
own salvation--even we, also, after our conversion by the Word have separated ourselves
from those demons and have attached ourselves to the only unbegotten God, through His
Son. We who once reveled in impurities now cling to purity; we who devoted ourselves to
the arts of magic now consecrate ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who loved
above all else the ways of acquiring riches and possessions now hand over to a community
εὐχῆς καὶ εὐχαριστίας ἐφ’ οἷς προσφερόμεθα πᾶσιν, ὅση δύναμις, αἰνοῦντες, μόνην ἀξίαν αὐτοῦ
τιμὴν ταύτην παραλαβόντες—τὸ τὰ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου εἰς διατροφὴν γενόμενα οὐ πυρὶ δαπανᾶν, ἀλλ’
ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις προσφέρειν ἐκείνῳ δὲ εὐχαρίστους ὄντας διὰ λόγου πομπὰς καὶ
ὕμνους πέμπειν ὑπέρ τε τοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν εἰς εὐρωστίαν πόρων πάντων, ποιοτήτων μὲν
γενῶν καὶ μεταβολῶν ὡρῶν, καὶ τοῦ πάλιν ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ γενέσθαι διὰ πίστιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ
αἰτήσεις πέμποντες—τίς σωφρονῶν οὐχ ὁμολογήσει; τὸν διδάσκαλόν τε τούτων γενόμενον ἡμῖν
καὶ εἰς τοῦτο γεννηθέντα, Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν σταυρωθέντα ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, τοῦ
γενομένου ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ ἐπὶ χρόνοις Τιβερίου Καίσαρος ἐπιτρόπου, υἱὸν αὐτὸν τοῦ ὄντως θεοῦ
μαθόντες καὶ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, πνεῦμά τε προφητικὸν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει ὅτι μετὰ λόγου
τιμῶμεν ἀποδείξομεν. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ μανίαν ἡμῶν καταφανὴν ἀποφαίνονται, δευτέραν χώραν
μετὰ τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα θεὸν καὶ γεννήτορα τῶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπῳ σταυρωθέντι διδόναι
ἡμᾶς λέγοντες, ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ἐν τούτῳ μυστήριον, ᾧ προσέχειν ὑμᾶς, ἐξηγουμένων ἡμῶν,
προτρεπόμεθα.
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fund what we possess, and share it with every needy person; we who hated and killed one
another and would not share our hearth with those of another tribe because of their
[different] customs, now, after the coming of Christ, live together with them, and pray for
our enemies, and try to convince those who hate us unjustly, so that they who live according
to the good commands of Christ may have a firm hope of receiving the same reward as
ourselves from God who governs all. But, lest we seem to quibble, we think it fitting to
recall a few of the teachings of Christ, before giving our proofs; it is up to you, as mighty
emperors, to consider whether we have been taught and do teach the truth. His sayings were
brief and concise, for He was not a sophist, but His word was the power of God.187
He directly contrasts this unbegotten nature to that of the demons who mislead men and
emperors. In this regard he clearly follows the Pauline tradition of admitting that there are
powerful “divine” entities that are not fully Divine in their mode of existence. The difference is
that the unbegotten God, and the Begotten Son and Prophetic Spirit are special in their mode of
existence because none of these things are created. This distinction in perfection and nature
renders them perfect and worthy of worship, whereas the demons ought to be shunned and hated.
The distinction between demonic beings and the Divine mirrors the distinction made before
starting with Xenophanes and echoed by many others, including Philo. He does not innovate
here, but rather collates and makes use of argumentation that others have developed to make a
point about the nature of God that is within the realm of acceptable philosophical contemplation.
This use of the DDI is well within the purpose of the Apology, and serves the purpose of

Justin, 46-47. Apology I chapter 14. Προλέγομεν γὰρ ὑμῖν φυλάξασθαι μὴ οἱ προδιαβεβλημένοι ὑφ’
ἡμῶν δαίμονες ἐξαπατήσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀποτρέψωσι τοῦ ὅλως ἐντυχεῖν καὶ συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα· ἀγωνίζονται γὰρ
ἔχειν ὑμᾶς δούλους καὶ ὑπηρέτας καὶ ποτὲ μὲν δι’ ὀνείρων ἐπιφανείας ποτὲ δ’ αὖ διὰ μαγικῶν στροφῶν χειροῦνται
πάντας τοὺς οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας ἀγωνιζομένους· ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς μετὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ
πεισθῆναι ἐκείνων μὲν ἀπέστημεν θεῷ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἑπόμεθα· οἱ πάλαι μὲν πορνείαις
χαίροντες, νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνην μόνην ἀσπαζόμενοι· οἱ δὲ καὶ μαγικαῖς τέχναις χρώμενοι, νῦν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ
ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ ἑαυτοὺς ἀνατεθεικότες· χρημάτων δὲ καὶ κτημάτων οἱ πόρους παντὸς μᾶλλον στέργοντες, νῦν καὶ ἃ
ἔχομεν εἰς κοινὸν φέροντες καὶ παντὶ δεομένῳ κοινωνοῦντες· οἱ μισάλληλοι δὲ καὶ ἀλληλοφόνοι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
οὐχ ὁμοφύλους διὰ τὰ ἔθη καὶ ἑστίας κοινὰς μὴ ποιούμενοι, νῦν μετὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁμοδίαιτοι
γινόμενοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐχόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἀδίκως μισοῦντας πείθειν πειρώμενοι ὅπως οἱ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ
Χριστοῦ καλὰς ὑποθημοσύνας βιώσαντες εὐέλπιδες ὦσι σὺν ἡμῖν τῶν αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ πάντων δεσπόζοντος θεοῦ
τυχεῖν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ σοφίζεσθαι ὑμᾶς δόξωμεν, ὀλίγων τινῶν τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδαγμάτων ἐπιμνησθῆναι
καλῶς ἔχειν πρὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἡγησάμεθα, καὶ ὑμέτερον ἔστω ὡς δυνατῶν βασιλέων ἐξετάσαι εἰ ἀληθῶς ταῦτα
δεδιδάγμεθα καὶ διδάσκομεν. βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ’ αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν, οὐ γὰρ σοφιστὴς ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ
δύναμις θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν.
187
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attempting to make Christianity acceptable to the emperor. Making one’s school similar enough
to existing and accepted schools is exactly the purpose to which Justin wrote this letter.
The next passage in which Justin mentions the DDI comes in chapter 20 of Apology I.
Here he uses the fact that philosophy grows out of the soil of μῦθος to show how Christianity is a
growth of truth that has analogies with pagan myths.
Indeed, Sibyl and Hystaspes foretold that all corruptible things are to be destroyed by fire.
And the so-called Stoic philosophers teach that even God is to be transformed into fire, and
they claim that after this evolution the world is to be made over again. We, on the contrary,
believe that God, the Maker of all things, is superior to changeable things. If, therefore, we
agree on some points with your honored poets and philosophers, and on other points offer a
more complete and supernatural teaching, and if we alone produce proof of our statements,
shy are we unjustly hated beyond all others? When we say that God created and arranged all
things in this world, we seem to repeat the teachings of Plato; when we announce a final
conflagration [of the world], we utter the doctrine of the Stoics; and when we assert that the
souls of the wicked, living after death, will be sensibly punished, and that the souls of the
good, freed from punishment, will live happily, we believe the same things as your poets
and philosophers. In claiming that we should not worship the work of men's hands, we agree
with the comic poet Menander and other writers like him, for they have declared that the
creator is greater than the work.188
Once again, the content is not innovative, but it is cleverly using the language of the day in order
to argue for the legitimacy of his sect. In addition, we also see here that God is said to be
superior to changeable things. The perfection and dignity of the Divine nature is what sets it
above all created and mutable things, and requires that the Divine be immutable.

Justin, 55-56. Apology I, chapter 20. Καὶ Σίβυλλα δὲ καὶ Ὑστάσπης γενήσεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ἀνάλωσιν διὰ
πυρὸς ἔφασαν. οἱ λεγόμενοι δὲ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύεσθαι δογματίζουσι καὶ αὖ
πάλιν κατὰ μεταβολὴν τὸν κόσμον γενέσθαι λέγουσιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ κρεῖττόν τι τῶν μεταβαλλομένων νοοῦμεν τὸν
πάντων ποιητὴν θεόν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁμοίως τινὰ τοῖς παρ’ ὑμῖν τιμωμένοις ποιηταῖς καὶ φιλοσόφοις λέγομεν ἔνια δὲ καὶ
μειζόνως καὶ θείως καὶ μόνοι μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, τί παρὰ πάντας ἀδίκως μισούμεθα; τῷ γὰρ λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ
πάντα κεκοσμῆσθαι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι Πλάτωνος δόξομεν λέγειν δόγμα· τῷ δὲ ἐκπύρωσιν γενέσθαι Στωϊκῶν· τῷδὲ
κολάζεσθαι ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ μετὰ θάνατον οὔσας τὰς τῶν ἀδίκων ψυχάς, τὰς δὲ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀπηλλαγμένας τῶν
τιμωριῶν εὖ διάγειν, ποιηταῖς καὶ φιλοσόφοις τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν δόξομεν· τῷ δὲ καὶ μὴ δεῖν χείρω ἀνθρώπους
προσκυνεῖν Μενάνδρῳ τῷ κωμικῷ καὶ τοῖς ταῦτα φήσασι ταὐτὰ φράζομεν, μείζονα γὰρ τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ
σκευαζομένου ἀπεφήναντο.
188
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Justin clarifies the nature of Divine immutability is not simple stasis or inability to act. It
is a perfection of action that does not allow it to be passive or affected by other entities or forces.
In chapter 28 of Apology I he claims,
As you may learn by examining our writings, the chief of the wicked demons we call the
serpent, Satan, the devil, and Christ foretold that he with his army of demons, and the men
who follow him will be cast into the fire [of Hell] to be punished for endless ages. The cause
of God's delay in doing this is his regard for mankind, for in His foreknowledge He sees that
some will yet be saved by repentance, some who are, perhaps, not yet in existence. Indeed,
in the beginning when He created man, He endowed him with the power of understanding,
of choosing the truth, and of doing right; consequently, before God ho man has an excuse if
he does evil, for all men have been created with the power to reason and to reflect. If anyone
does not believe that God takes an interest in these things, he will by some artifice imply
either that God does not exist, or that though He does exist, He takes delight in evil, or that
He is as [as unmoved] as a stone, and that neither virtue nor vice is a reality, but that things
are considered good or bad only in the opinion of men: this indeed would be the height of
blasphemy and injustice.189
Here we see two objections raised. The first is clearly an objection to Epicurean ideas about the
nature of the Divine as uninterested in the workings of the world, but also a distancing himself
from a divine separateness that might be seen in Aristotle. This defense of the nature of God’s
judgment attempts to insulate God from Epicurean criticisms about the nature of God. Justin, of
course, has no interest in the Epicureans, and does not even include them in the list of
philosophical schools worthy of mention. The Epicureans’ ideas about Divinity being
disinterested in the affairs of the world is anathema to Justin’s theology which includes the
Incarnation. It is perfectly reasonable, therefore, that he would both reject such ideas as vile, and
mock them as silly by comparing the Divine to a rock. While there might be a glimmer of humor

Justin, Apology I. 64-65. Παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν κακῶν δαιμόνων ὄφις καλεῖται καὶ σατανᾶς καὶ
διάβολος ὡς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων συγγραμμάτων ἐρευνήσαντες μαθεῖν δύνασθε· ὃν εἰς τὸ πῦρ πεμφθήσεσθαι μετὰ
τῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων ἀνθρώπων κολασθησομένους τὸν ἀπέραντον αἰῶνα προεμήνυσεν ὁ
Χριστός. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιμονὴ τοῦ μηδέπω τοῦτο πρᾶξαι τὸν θεὸν διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος γεγένηται, προγινώσκει
γάρ τινας ἐκ μετανοίας σωθήσεσθαι μέλλοντας καί τινας μηδέπω ἴσως γεννηθέντας. καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὸν καὶ
δυνάμενον αἱρεῖσθαι τἀληθῆ καὶ εὖ πράττειν τὸ γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πεποίηκεν, ὥστ’ ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τοῖς
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, λογικοὶ γὰρ καὶ θεωρητικοὶ γεγένηνται. (4) εἰ δέ τις ἀπιστεῖ μέλειν τούτων τῷ θεῷ, ἢ
μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν διὰ τέχνης ὁμολογήσει ἢ ὄντα χαίρειν κακίᾳ φήσει ἢ λίθῳ ἐοικότα μένειν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν
μηδὲ κακίαν δόξῃ δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ταῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι, ἥπερ μεγίστη ἀσέβεια καὶ ἀδικία ἐστί.
189
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in this passage, it is also a criticism that Justin takes seriously. Second, we see that there is a
fundamental difference between God's form of immutability and impassability and that of a rock.
God's immutability is something totally different from mere stasis. This passage is more than a
simple throwaway phrase used to denigrate the Epicurean doctrines. It is a positive statement
about the nature of immutability. Despite being more Platonic than Peripatetic, Justin is explicit
in his doctrine that God is perfectly perfect, and therefore has no privations or needs that would
allow for God to change. Thus the immutability and impassability that he argues for is
fundamentally different from impassible things like rocks. Justin thinks about immutability and
impassability from a perspective that emphasizes something different than modal distinctions the
way we would today.
In Apology II Justin does not have nearly as much detail, but in chapter 6 he returns to the
idea that God is unbegotten.
No proper name has been bestowed upon God, the Father of all, since He is unbegotten. For,
whoever has a proper name received it from a person older than himself. The words Father,
and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master are not real names, but rather terms of address
derived from His beneficent deeds. But His Son, who alone is properly called Son, the
Word, who was with Him [God, the Father] and was begotten before all things, when in the
beginning He [God, the Father] created and arranged all things through Him [the Son], is
called Christ, because He was anointed and because God the Father arranged all the things
of creation through Him. This name also has an unknown meaning, just as the term 'God,'
which is not a real name, but the expression of man's innate opinion of a thing that can
scarcely be defined. But 'Jesus,' which is His name both as Man and Savior, has a meaning.
For He also became a man, as we stated, [Apol. 23 & 33] and was born in accordance with
the will of God the Father for the benefit of believers, and for the defeat of the demons.
Even now, your own eyes will teach you the truth of this last statement. For many
demoniacs throughout the entire world, and even in your own city, were exorcised by many
of our Christians in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate; and
our men cured them, and they still cure others by rendering helpless and dispelling the
demons who had taken possession of these men, even when they could not be cured by all
the other exorcists, and exploiters of incantations and drugs.190
190

Justin, Apology II. 125-126. Greek text is from D. Minns and P. Parvis, Justin, Philosopher and Martyr,
Apologies [Oxford Early Christian Texts Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009]. Note: The Greek text lists this
chapter as chapter 5 rather than chapter 6. Ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πάντων πατρὶ θετόν, ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν. ὃς γὰρ ἂν
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Once again he very clearly insists that there is no generation of the Divine, and that the lack of
generation is what sets makes the Divine to be above proper names and above change. The
dignity of being ungenerated is a concept about the Divine that stretches back to at least
Parmenides’s eight fragment. This chapter also introduces the difficulty of the incarnation,
particularly in light of the Trinitarian baptism formula, but again, we must return to that topic
below.
Finally, in the Dialog with Trypho he has some small mentions of the DDI. He defines
the Divine as follows, “God is the being who always has the same nature in the same manner,
and is the cause of existence to all else.”191 Though brief, this is a clear statement that the Divine
must be immutable, but the nature of that immutability is considered later at the end of chapter
five,
"On the other hand," he continued, "I do not claim that any soul ever perishes, for this
would certainly be a benefit to sinners. What happens to them? The souls of the devout
dwell in a better place, whereas the souls of the unjust and the evil abide in a worse place,
and there they await the judgment day. Those, therefore, who are deemed worthy to see God
will never perish, but the others will be subjected to punishment as long as God allows them
to exist as long as He wants them to be punished."
"Does not your assertion agree with what Plato taught in his Timaeus [41 AB] concerning
the world, namely, that it can be destroyed since it is a created thing, but that it will not be
destroyed or be destined for destruction since such is the will of God? Don't you think that
the same thing could be said of the soul, and, in short, of all other creatures? For whatever
κατ’ ὄνομά τι προσαγορεύηται πρεσβύτερον ἔχει τὸν θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα. τὸ δὲ πατὴρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ κτίστης καὶ κύριος
καὶ δεσπότης οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις. ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκείνου—ὁ μόνος
λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱός, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνὼν καὶ γεννώμενος—Χριστὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρῖσαι καὶ
κοσμῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸν θεὸν λέγεται, ὄνομα καὶ αὐτὸ περιέχον ἄγνωστον σημασίαν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ τὸ
θεὸς προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πράγματος δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα. Ἰησοῦς
δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ σωτῆρος ὄνομα καὶ σημασίαν ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς προέφημεν, γέγονε, κατὰ τὴν
τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς βουλήν, ἀποκυηθεὶς ὑπὲρ τῶν πιστευόντων ἀνθρώπων· καὶ καταλύσει τοὺς δαίμονας, ὡς καὶ
νῦν ἐκ τῶν ὑπ’ ὄψιν γινομένων μαθεῖν δύνασθε. δαιμονιολήπτους γὰρ πολλοὺς κατὰ πάντα τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐν τῇ
ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀνθρώπων, τῶν Χριστιανῶν, ἐπορκίζοντες κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,
τοῦ σταυρωθέντος ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἐπορκιστῶν καὶ ἐπᾳστῶν καὶ φαρμακευτῶν μὴ
ἰαθέντας, ἰάσαντο· καὶ ἔτι νῦν ἰῶνται, καταργοῦντες καὶ ἐκδιώκοντες τοὺς κατέχοντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δαίμονας.
191
Justin, 152. Dialogue with Trypho Chapter 3. Τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχον καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς
ἄλλοις αἴτιον, τοῦτο δή ἐστιν ὁ θεός. οὕτως ἐγὼ ἀπεκρινάμην αὐτῷ· καὶ ἐτέρπετο ἐκεῖνος ἀκούων μου, οὕτως
τέ με ἤρετο πάλιν.
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exists or shall exist after God has a nature subject to corruption, and therefore capable of
complete annihilation, for only God is unbegotten and incorruptible. For this reason He is
God, and all other things after Him are created and corruptible. This is also the reason why
souls die and are punished, for, if they were unbegotten, they would not have sinned, nor
have become so foolish; they would not have been so timid at one time, and so daring at
another; nor would they, of their own account, ever have entered into swine, serpents, and
dogs. Furthermore, if they were unbegotten, it would not be right to coerce them, for one
who is unbegotten is similar and equal to another unbegotten, for, if there were some
difference between them, you could not, no matter how you searched, find the cause of such
difference; but, after sending your thought always to infinity, you would finally become
tired and have to stop before the one Unbegotten and declare that He is the cause of all
things. Do you think that these things escaped the notice of Plato and Pythagoras, those wise
men who became, so to say, a wall and bulwark of our philosophy?"192
These last two paragraphs are particularly important to our study. We see here a direct doctrinal
statement that allows us to give some content to Justin's Theology and concept about the nature
of ontology and divinity. Aseity is the core Divine characteristic that justifies the DDI.
Justin’s version of the DDI is, thus far, not particularly novel, nor complex. It is a fairly
standard articulation of the standard reasoning for the dignity and uniqueness of Divine
motivation and existence. It is not particularly traceable to one tradition, but rather shows an
amount of familiarity with the bibliophilic and syncretic way that philosophy worked for the
common populace in the second century, and some exposure to Philo’s sort of Hellenized
thought. The innovations of Justin come from an attempt to reconcile the two fundamental
192

Justin, 157-158. Dialogue with Trypyho Chapter 5.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ· ἕρμαιον γὰρ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖς κακοῖς. ἀλλὰ τί; τὰς μὲν
τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐν κρείττονί ποι χώρῳ μένειν, τὰς δὲ ἀδίκους καὶ πονηρὰς ἐν χείρονι, τὸν τῆς κρίσεως ἐκδεχομένας
χρόνον τότε. οὕτως αἱ μέν, ἄξιαι τοῦ θεοῦ φανεῖσαι, οὐκ ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἔτι· αἱ δὲ κολάζονται, ἔστ’ ἂν αὐτὰς καὶ
εἶναι καὶ κολάζεσθαι ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ.
Ἆρα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, οἷον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ αἰνίσσεται περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, λέγων ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ
φθαρτός ἐστιν ᾗ γέγονεν, οὐ λυθήσεται δὲ οὐδὲ τεύξεται θανάτου μοίρας διὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ; τοῦτ’ αὐτό σοι
δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντων πέρι λέγεσθαι; ὅσα γάρ ἐστι μετὰ τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἔσται ποτέ, ταῦτα φύσιν
φθαρτὴν ἔχειν, καὶ οἷά τε ἐξαφανισθῆναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἔτι· μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ὁ θεὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
θεός ἐστι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα μετὰ τοῦτον γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτά. τούτου χάριν καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ
κολάζονται· ἐπεὶ εἰ ἀγέννητοι ἦσαν, οὔτ’ ἂν ἐξημάρτανον οὔτε ἀφροσύνης ἀνάπλεῳ ἦσαν, οὐδὲ δειλαὶ καὶ θρασεῖαι
πάλιν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἑκοῦσαί ποτε εἰς σύας ἐχώρουν καὶ ὄφεις καὶ κύνας, οὐδὲ μὴν ἀναγκάζεσθαι αὐτὰς θέμις, εἴπερ
εἰσὶν ἀγέννητοι. τὸ γὰρ ἀγέννητον τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστι καὶ ἴσον καὶ ταὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε δυνάμει οὔτε τιμῇ
προκριθείη ἂν θατέρου τὸ ἕτερον. (6) ὅθεν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ἀγέννητα· εἰ γὰρ διαφορά τις ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ἂν
εὕροις ἀναζητῶν τὸ αἴτιον τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλ’, ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἀεὶ τὴν διάνοιαν πέμπων, ἐπὶ ἑνός ποτε στήσῃ
ἀγεννήτου καμὼν καὶ τοῦτο φήσεις ἁπάντων αἴτιον. ἢ ταῦτα ἔλαθε, φημὶ ἐγώ, Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν, σοφοὺς
ἄνδρας, οἳ ὥσπερ τεῖχος ἡμῖν καὶ ἔρεισμα φιλοσοφίας ἐξεγένοντο;
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reasons for positing the DDI in the first place, and using the doctrine to argue for the uniqueness
and importance of Christianity, but most importantly, as a means by which to understand the
mystery of the incarnation.

Divine Perfection and Covenant Constancy as a Means to Articulate the Philosophical
Acceptability of the Incarnation and the Godhead
Justin has to explain a particularly thorny problem that no other thinker, including Paul,
had to make sense of: the incarnation.193 The Pauline letters focus mainly on the conception of
God’s immutability as being connected to the mystery of the Covenant including the Gentile
population. The articulation of God as immutable is simply stated in the biblical literature rather
than argued for. Especially in the Pauline letters, the argumentation that is present is about how
Christianity is the legitimate sect of Israelite religiosity. Justin has a similar project in the
Dialogue with Trypho, he is trying to show that Christian interpretation of the Tanakh is more
correct, and he is using the tools of Greek philosophy to manage it. Some of this text turns
around how the practice of the so-called Ceremonial Law (usually spoken of as “the
circumcision” by early Christians) is unnecessary, and how they worship the same God as that of
the Tanakh, but a great deal of Justin’s argumentation is actually for the legitimacy of
considering Jesus to be Divine. The trouble with this idea, of course, is that Christians also
profess that Jesus was human and humans are quite mutable. The question that obviously rises is
“How can a man who was born, moved about, grew, ate, and died share the Divine Nature if the
Divine is immutable?” Justin will appeal to the DDI in both of the senses I have already
193

Paul and the other scriptural authors, of course, articulate the primary source information of the Incarnation. They
argue for its necessity for salvation, and for its place in their sectarian readings of the Tanakh, but they do not need
to attempt a metaphysical articulation of how it is philosophically salutary. That is not their business. Justin,
however, does attempt something like this articulation. The explanation that we have is not as subtle as those
proffered by the Cappadocians or Augustine, but his extant writings are not built to address the metaphysical
problems directly, as I explained above.
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articulated, but places more emphasis on the DDI in the Hebrew context (i.e. Covenant
Constancy)—as would be appropriate in a dialogue with a Jewish person. He emphasizes God’s
Covenant Constancy in the face of a seemingly absurd mystery as a means of making
philosophical and soteriological sense of the Incarnation.
Justin has to overcome the idea that the body is a limitation to, and is problematic for, the
incarnation. He references both the idea that the body is a hindrance to pure intellection, and the
transmigration of souls into lower forms of animal life. The first overture to this idea is found in
the Dialogue when Justin is speaking to the Old Man. They have a dispute about whether or not
souls are ungenrated and immortal, and whether souls transmigrate. The Old Man insists that
neither of these things can be true, and Justin even sneaks in what appears to be a subtle
reference to Balaam’s Ass194 as a means to argue against the Pythagorean defamation of animal
and bodily life is a hindrance to apprehending God. The significant goodness of the body is, of
course, particularly important for Christians, as it is necessary for a doctrine of bodily
resurrection. In Justin’s relation of the Old Man’s words, we see that the simple intellective
nature of human beings is insufficient to understand the Divine Nature. Where before the F3P
was enough to bring the human mind and the Divine Mind into contact (or even confuse the

194

The passage in question is found in chapter 4 of the Dialogue. The conversation covers the dignity of even
animal bodies. The theme of the necessity of the body is found both in Justin’s Christology and his Soteriology, but
this funny little quirk is quite quick. The passage concerning Balaam’s Ass is found in Numbers 22, and in it the Ass
is far better equipped to understand the presence of God’s angel and of holy things than the human prophet.
“Then,” he continued, “shall horses and asses see God, or have they ever seen God at any time?”
“No,” I replied, “for not even most men see Him [God]; only those who are honest in their life, and who have been
purified through their justice and every other virtue.”
“Then you would say,” he persisted, “that man does not see God because of his affinity with Him, nor because he
possesses an intellect, but because he is temperate and just?”
“Certainly,” I answered, “and also because he has the faculty of thinking of God.”
“Would you say,” he asked, “that goats or sheep do an injustice to anyone?”
“They do not in any way do an injustice to anyone,” I replied.
“So, according to your reasoning,” he said, “these animals will see God?”
“No, they won’t,” I answered, “because they are hindered by their bodies.”
“If these animals had the power of speech,” he retorted, “you can be sure that they would have more right to revile
our bodies.”
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two), Justin does not think that this ontological standard is sufficient. He demands not just that
virtue perfect us into our most divine nature, but rather that only perfect virtue could bring us
into contact with the Divine. This move is aimed at what Justin considers to be a particular
inadequacy of both Platonism and Pythagoreanism, and sets the groundwork for his use of the
doctrine of the Spermatic Logos.
The provenance of Justin’s exposure to the doctrine of the λόγος σπερματικός and its
place in Justin’s philosophy has been hotly debated, but there is one aspect that is unexamined,
and that is how his rather vague use of this doctrine allows for Justin to postulate an immutable
divine entity that can have an incarnational immanence. This move is not made explicitly, but
undergirds his theology and forms a bridge to a uniquely Christian form of immanence. In
Justin’s estimation the spermatic logos allows for human beings to begin to philosophize,195 but
it cannot accomplish all goals. Just as the Old Man communicates it is only one of the necessary
conditions for a complete philosophy. One must also have the correct material upon which to
contemplate—namely the logos given though the prophets. While this concept clearly does allow
for a particular theory of epistemology that includes limits which will become powerful in the
Medieval period, it also does the unexpected work of explaining how logos can become
incarnate without corrupting the immutable status of God.
The spermatic logos is particularly useful at this point in Justin’s argumentation. The idea
that the Logos can at some level indwell the intellect of mortal beings provides an analogy for
how the Logos itself could be both divinely constant to the mystery of the Divine plan and
present in mortal form. The function of this doctrine is not to provide a precisely articulated
metaphysical mechanism by which the Divine can indwell the mortal. What it does is provide the
link between the Divine and the mortal that Justin was so fond of in his understanding of
195

See Edwards, Ibid.
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Platonism.196 Justin needs his doctrine of the Divine-mortal relationship to avoid two pitfalls.
First, he must avoid the pantheism of Stoicism, and second he must avoid the Peripatetic
identification of the Divine intellect with human intellect. The spermatic logos is particularly
well suited to this task. Edwards argues persuasively for a Middle Platonist use of the spermatic
logos that is similar to the doctrines of Numenius.197 Most significant to our considerations here
is his claim about Justin’s idea of how the spermatic logos functioned in pagan thinkers. He
identifies how the spermatic logos and the Logos of God are related, and identifies 3 principles
that are related to the classical model of thinking we have found consistently since Parmenides.
Justin’s theory of insight may be concisely expressed as follows. Christians have the
unimpeded vision of Christ, the logos of God, and thus perceive the real entities (τὰ ὄντα).
Because of the affinity (συγγενές) between the spermatic logos within them and the true
logos, pagans also have a dim perception of these realities, yet the content of their
perception is nothing more than a shadow, a seed of veridical knowledge, but one that has
yet to ripen into truth. This theology rests upon a number of principles which are not selfevident to modern commonsense. It is possible to identify at least three presuppositions
which are distinctive and germane to the present study:
1. A double propagation, first producing the spermatic logos and then
engendering the seed
2. A relation of the seed to its original source which co-exists with that of a part
to whole and of copy to original.
3. An important and ineradicable distinction between the σπέρμα and the Christ
from whom it indirectly proceeds.198
Edwards goes on to claim that both Justin and Numenius would have accepted the first two
principles, but denied the third. This claim should by no means surprise us, as the mindset of the
Middle Platonists still hold more closely to the F3P than any Modern or later thinker would find
palatable. These three principles easily show exactly the kind of relationship Justin needs to
make the mystery of the incarnation acceptable to his audience, and they also show how the DDI
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See again the conversation between the Old Man and Justin in the Dialogue.
Edwards, 24-29.
198
Edwards, 25-26.
197
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functions to secure the link between the un-incarnate Divine and the incarnate Logos.
Essentially, we have here a Johannine and Pauline use of the creative power of the Divine as it
applies to the human being.
Both principles 1 and 2 are directly tied to the creation narrative as interpreted by the
Johannine tradition. The language here clearly mirrors the opening lines of John’s Gospel,
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He
was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not
any thing made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The light
shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it.
There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came as a witness to the
light, that all might believe through him. He was not the light, cut came to bear witness
about the light.
The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world. He was in the
world, and the world was made through him, yet the world did not know him. He came to
his own, and his own people did not receive him. But to all who did receive him, who
believed in his name, he gave the right to become children of God, who were born, not of
the blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God.
And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of
the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth. (John bore witness about him, and
cried out, “This was he of whom I said, ‘He who comes after me ranks before me, because
he was before me.’”) And from his fullness we have all received grace upon grace. For the
law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever
seen God; the only God, who is at the Father’s side, he has made him known.199

John 1:1-18., ESV. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 2 Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ
πρὸς τὸν θεόν. 3 πάντα διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν. 4 ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ
ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 5 καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν.
6
Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος, ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης· 7 οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ
περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν διʼ αὐτοῦ. 8 οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός.
9
ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον. 10 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος διʼ
αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω. 11 εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον. 12 ὅσοι δὲ
ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, 13 οἳ οὐκ ἐξ
αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.
14
Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ
πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας. 15 Ἰωάννης μαρτυρεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκραγεν λέγων· Οὗτος ἦν ὃν εἶπον, Ὁ
ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν, ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν. 16 ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες
199
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It is in this Logos, by which and through which creation is accomplished. The nature of the
capacity of the Logos to both be the creative power behind the entirety of the cosmos as well as
be the generative force behind human life, as well as the light of their existence, fits exactly with
the way Justin uses the spermatic logos. All human beings have some level of access to the
spermatic logos because they were created through and for the Logos itself. It leaves its imprint
on them in ways that cannot be fully corrupted or destroyed. This use of the spermatic logos
allows for the maintenance of humans beings capacity to bear the image of God. It also serves to
explain how the Logos could take on human form and not be irrational: the human form was
created to bear just such an image through Divine providence and the mystery of the Covenant.
The mystery in question is also referenced in the book of Acts, predictably, when Paul
addresses the Greeks in the Areopagus. We have already seen Justin reference this passage in the
chapter 10 of the First Apology, but some notes about the oddity of the mystery he attempts to
solve are significant here. The nature of the mystery that Paul is interested in is found in a few
different places, but to understand how Justin could use the spermatic logos to explain the
incarnation we must follow the thread of the mystery of divine motivation. It is in understanding
divine motivation that we see Justin’s use of the idea of Covenant Constancy despite apparent
absurdities, both to the eyes of the Jews and the Gentiles of his day. The passage is as follows,
So Paul, standing in the midst of the Areopagus, said: "Men of Athens, I perceive that in
every way you are very religious. For as I passed along and observed the objects of your
worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: 'To the unknown god.' What therefore
you worship as unknown I proclaim to you. The God who made the world and everything in
it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he served
by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life
and breath and everything. And he made from one man every nation of mankind to live on
all the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their
ἐλάβομεν, καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος· 17 ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωυσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
ἐγένετο. 18 θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.
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dwelling place, that they should seek God and perhaps feel their way toward him and find
him. Yet he is actually not far from each one of us, for
"In him we live and move and have our being",
as even some of your own poets have said,
"For we are indeed his offspring."
Being then God's offspring, we ought not to think that the divine being is like gold or silver
or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man. The times of ignorance God
overlooked, but now he commands all peoples everywhere to repent, because he has fixed a
day on which he will judge the world in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed;
and of this he has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead.200
The reference by Justin is clearly intended to tie together the two parts of what he sees as his
conceptual heritage. He exists within a Hellenized tradition of interpretation that would find it
most salutary to tie together the works of the philosophers and the prophets wherever they are in
accord. This address itself is interesting, because it seems to hold the contradictory claims that
God is invincible, possesses aseity, and asserts that God has no lacks while also claiming that
God acted one way at one point in history, and now acts in another. This way of thinking might
be thought to be an explicit acknowledgement of change in the Divine Nature, but we should be
careful here. Justin’s use of scripture holds a quarry at bay, though it is subtle and hides itself in
the underbrush. We can follow the trail, however, if we only keep the scent through the various
Pauline passages that concern the mysterious nature of God’s will and plan of salvation.

Acts 17:22-31. ESV. 22 Σταθεὶς δὲ Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ Ἀρείου πάγου ἔφη, Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ πάντα ὡς
δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ. 23 διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ
ἐπεγέγραπτο, ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν. 24 ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν
κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς ὑπάρχων κύριος οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ, 25 οὐδὲ
ὑπὸ χειρῶν ἀνθρωπίνων θεραπεύεται προσδεόμενός τινος, αὐτὸς διδοὺς πᾶσιν ζωὴν καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα·
26
ἐποίησέν τε ἐξ ἑνὸς πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων κατοικεῖν ἐπὶ παντὸς προσώπου τῆς γῆς, ὁρίσας προστεταγμένους
καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν, 27 ζητεῖν τὸν θεόν, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν, καί
γε οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα. 28 ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, ὡς καί τινες τῶν
καθʼ ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασιν, Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν. 29 γένος οὖν ὑπάρχοντες τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ὀφείλομεν νομίζειν,
χρυσῷ ἢ ἀργύρῳ ἢ λίθῳ, χαράγματι τέχνης καὶ ἐνθυμήσεως ἀνθρώπου, τὸ θεῖον εἶναι ὅμοιον. 30 τοὺς μὲν οὖν
χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεριδὼν ὁ θεὸς τὰ νῦν παραγγέλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντας πανταχοῦ μετανοεῖν, 31 καθότι
ἔστησεν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾧ ὥρισεν, πίστιν παρασχὼν πᾶσιν
ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν.200
200
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Paul often acknowledges that our temporal experience of God's actions is different from the
Knowledge that God has of Godself. We see this clearly in one of his benedictions to the
Romans,
Now to him who is able to strengthen you according to my gospel and the preaching of
Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery that was kept secret for long ages
but has now been disclosed and through the prophetic writings has been made known to all
nations, according to the command of the eternal God, to bring bout the obedience of faith-to the only wise God be glory forevermore through Jesus Christ! Amen.201
Paul’s use of mystery here clearly indicates that Gods way of establishing the standards of the
time can be temporally located without causing a change in God or God's plans. We see the same
theme of God’s mysterious will in Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. Chapter 3 is particularly
salient here.
For this reason I, Paul, a prisoner for Christ Jesus on behalf of you Gentiles--assuming
that you have heard of the stewardship of God's grace that was given to me for you, how the
mystery was made known to me by revelation, as I have written briefly. When you read this,
you can perceive my insight in to the mystery of Christ, which was not made known to the
sons of men in other generations as it has now been revealed to his holy apostles and
prophets by the Spirit. This mystery is that the Gentiles are fellow heirs, members of the
same body, and partakers of the promise in Christ Jesus through the Gospel.
Of this Gospel I was made a minister according to the gift of God's grade, which was
given me by the working of his power. To me, though I am the very least of all the saints,
this grace was given, to preach to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to bring
to light for everyone what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all
things, so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known
to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places. This was according to the eternal
purpose that he has realized in Christ Jesus our Lord, in whom we have boldness and access
with confidence in our faith in him.202
Romans 16:25-27. ESV. 25 Τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ ὑμᾶς στηρίξαι κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ
Χριστοῦ, κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου 26 φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν διά τε γραφῶν
προφητικῶν κατʼ ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ αἰωνίου θεοῦ εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη γνωρισθέντος, 27 μόνῳ σοφῷ
θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [ᾧ] ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν.
202
Ephesians 3:1-13, ESV. 1 Τούτου χάριν ἐγὼ Παῦλος ὁ δέσμιος τοῦ χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τῶν ἐθνῶν,—2 εἴ γε
ἠκούσατε τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δοθείσης μοι εἰς ὑμᾶς, 3 [ὅτι] κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν ἐγνωρίσθη μοι
τὸ μυστήριον, καθὼς προέγραψα ἐν ὀλίγῳ, 4 πρὸς ὃ δύνασθε ἀναγινώσκοντες νοῆσαι τὴν σύνεσίν μου ἐν τῷ
μυστηρίῳ τοῦ χριστοῦ, 5 ὃ ἑτέραις γενεαῖς οὐκ ἐγνωρίσθη τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς νῦν ἀπεκαλύφθη τοῖς ἁγίοις
ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις ἐν πνεύματι, 6 εἶναι τὰ ἔθνη συνκληρονόμα καὶ σύνσωμα καὶ συνμέτοχα τῆς
ἐπαγγελίας ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 7 οὗ ἐγενήθην διάκονος κατὰ τὴν δωρεὰν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς
δοθείσης μοι κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ—8 ἐμοὶ τῷ ἐλαχιστοτέρῳ πάντων ἁγίων ἐδόθη ἡ χάρις αὕτη—
τοῖς ἔθνεσιν εὐαγγελίσασθαι τὸ ἀνεξιχνίαστον πλοῦτος τοῦ χριστοῦ, 9 καὶ φωτίσαι τίς ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ μυστηρίου
201
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Here the epistolary literature very plainly explains that God’s plan for the salvation of sinful
human beings always included the Gentiles, but that the divine will and plan remained hidden
from human beings. It is not that the plan ever underwent some sort of Dispensationalist
alteration, but rather that human beings simply were not privy to the details until God revealed
them through Prophecy. The theme continues even more strongly as we follow it into Colossians,
where Paul identifies the nature of God the Father as well as the nature of Christ as both coequally Divine by explaining that the mystery of the incarnation has been revealed.
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation. For by him all things
were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or
rulers or authorities--all things were created through him and for him. And he is before all
things, and in him all things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the church. He is
the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent. For in
him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all
things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross.
And you, who were once alienated and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now
reconciled in his body of flesh by his death, in order to present you holy and blameless and
above reproach before him, if indeed you continue in the faith, stable and steadfast, not
shifting from the hope of the gospel that you heard, which has been proclaimed in all
creation under heaven, and of which I, Paul, became a minister.
Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I am filling up what is
lacking in Christ's afflictions for the sake of his body, that is, the church, of which I became
a minister according to the stewardship from God that was given to me for you, to make the
word of God fully known, the mystery hidden for ages and generations but no revealed to
his saints. To them God chose to make known how great among the Gentiles are the riches
of the glory of this mystery, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory. Him we proclaim,
warning everyone and teaching everyone with all wisdom, that we may present everyone
mature in Christ. For this I toil, struggling with all his energy that he powerfully works
within me.203
τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τῷ θεῷ τῷ τὰ πάντα κτίσαντι, 10 ἵνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς
ἐξουσίαις ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ, 11 κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων ἣν
ἐποίησεν ἐν τῷ χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, 12 ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ προσαγωγὴν ἐν πεποιθήσει διὰ τῆς
πίστεως αὐτοῦ. 13 Διὸ αἰτοῦμαι μὴ ἐνκακεῖν ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσίν μου ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ἥτις ἐστὶν δόξα ὑμῶν.
203
Colossians 1:15-29. ESV. ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, 16 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ
ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, εἴτε θρόνοι εἴτε κυριότητες εἴτε ἀρχαὶ
εἴτε ἐξουσίαι· τὰ πάντα διʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται· 17 καὶ αὐτὸς ἔστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ
συνέστηκεν, 18 καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος, τῆς ἐκκλησίας· ὅς ἐστιν [ἡ] ἀρχή, πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν
νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων, 19 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι 20 καὶ διʼ
αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτόν, εἰρηνοποιήσας διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, [διʼ αὐτοῦ] εἴτε τὰ
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· 21 καὶ ὑμᾶς ποτὲ ὄντας ἀπηλλοτριωμένους καὶ ἐχθροὺς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις

147

Once again the mystery is the same. Despite the appearance of contradiction and absurdity, God
can both incarnate and remain perfectly constant and immutable even through the incarnation
process. It is through this mystery that Christ is held to be the Lamb slain from before the
foundation of the world.204 Justin lacks any sort of interaction with a theory of time and eternity
because he feels no particular need to explain the mechanisms behind the incarnation. For him it
is not a matter of explaining the nuts and bolts of metaphysics, rather it is a matter of watering
the germinating seed of the spermatic logos that was quickened by exposure to the Logos. Such
mysteries are dissolved not by logical permutation but by exposure to the Divine itself—exactly
what he claims is the business of philosophy.205
It must, of course, be noted at this point that some may claim that Justin’s version of the
DDI depends not on the above argument, but on Subordinationism. While it is simpler and easier
to claim that Justin was a Subordinationist and therefore only bothers to attribute immutability
only to the Father and not the Logos, this attribution is too quick. It is not obvious to what extent
that Justin’s theology is robustly Trinitarian by post-Nicaean or even post-Cappadocian
standards. There is not an explicit discussion of the nature of hypostasis in the extant works of
Justin. Arguments about the sophistication of his Trinitarianism proceed from a rather
considerable silence, and therefore claims to his Subordinationism are significantly
τοῖς πονηροῖς,—νυνὶ δὲ ἀποκατήλλαξεν* 22 ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου,—παραστῆσαι ὑμᾶς
ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ, 23 εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἑδραῖοι καὶ
μὴ μετακινούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε, τοῦ κηρυχθέντος ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν
οὐρανόν, οὗ ἐγενόμην ἐγὼ Παῦλος διάκονος.
24
Νῦν χαίρω ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, καὶ ἀνταναπληρῶ τὰ ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ χριστοῦ ἐν τῇ σαρκί
μου ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν ἡ ἐκκλησία, 25 ἧς ἐγενόμην ἐγὼ διάκονος κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν
δοθεῖσάν μοι εἰς ὑμᾶς πληρῶσαι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, 26 τὸ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἀπὸ
τῶν γενεῶν,—νῦν δὲ ἐφανερώθη τοῖς ἁγίοις αὐτοῦ, 27 οἷς ἠθέλησεν ὁ θεὸς γνωρίσαι τί τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τοῦ
μυστηρίου τούτου ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅ ἐστιν Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης· 28 ὃν ἡμεῖς καταγγέλλομεν
νουθετοῦντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον καὶ διδάσκοντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ, ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα
ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ· 29 εἰς ὃ καὶ κοπιῶ ἀγωνιζόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνεργουμένην ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἐν δυνάμει.
204
Revelation 13:8. ESV.
205
Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, ch. 3.
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underdetermined. What is clear is that he appeals to the Trinitarian formula in baptism and that
he clearly believes in both the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth and the Spirit of Prophecy. Without
simple recourse to the precise nature of concept of the Trinity we must consider the method
Justin uses in his argumentation. As I have set out above, the use of spermatic logos as a
mechanism to explicate the Divine mystery disclosed in scripture is perfectly in accordance with
Justin’s technique. Those who would claim Justin’s Subordinationism must recall that he appeals
to the mystery of the incarnation not in the Dialogue with Trypho but in the First Apology, and
the doctrine of the spermatic logos in the Second Apology. In these two works Justin is trying to
argue for the rational and salutary nature of the incarnation to a pagan audience, and so he must
defend the idea that not only could a God be born, but also that that God could suffer and die a
painful and shameful death, all while maintaining the power and dignity worthy of the Divine.
He is not making a particular claim against the idea of the one-ness of God as he would be doing
in the Dialogue, so asserting that he is insisting on finding Subordinationism in his letters to the
emperors is unnecessary as these pagan rulers would have no horse in the race.
Thus we see that Justin’s use of the concept of spermatic logos and Johannine Logos serve to
affirm both premises 1 and 2 in a manner consistent with what he deems the proper work of
philosophy. More than that, however, it also gives us the reason why he would not find premise 3
to be significant or correct. Though Justin lacks a formal emanation doctrine like that found in
Neo-Platonism, nevertheless he has significant reasons both from his philosophical training and
from his scriptures to deny that there can be existence outside of the person and activity of the
Divine. Moreover, his constant reference to the Spirit of Prophecy serves as the means by which
the Logos can be related to the individual seeds of the spermatic logos in human beings. In this
regard his lack of the sort of tight articulation of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation
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actually serve to make his account more palatable to his own mind, and he believes to his
audience. Both Justin’s technique of writing and arguing and his devotional and contemplative
standards drive him to the conclusion that it is the very immutability of God that allows for
Creation to exist and to change. It is God’s immutability that makes the intellect of human beings
rational and capable of moral action. It is also God’s mysterious Immutability that causes the
Incarnation and death of the Logos to be sensible and necessary to keep the Covenant in a
perfectly self-consistent manner.
We can easily see, then, how Justin’s use of the spermatic logos gives him the tools he
needs to argue for his Theological convictions to the Roman rulers, but also to the Hellenic Jews
of his day. Justin’s techniques are steeped in just the sort of Middle Platonism that would find
itself at home in the agora, the synagogue, the church, and the seashore. Thus we have an
argument in favor of his use of DDI as tied to the spermatic logos and the Incarnation. Justin’s
articulation of the DDI may not satisfy the more exacting logical desires of the 21st century
thinker, but it functions perfectly well to do the work he believes it needs to do. It ties together
his doctrines and keeps the dignity and invincibility of the Divine intact. He is perfectly within
the traditions begun by Xenophanes and Parmenides and even innovates how the DDI can be
used to illuminate a particularly opaque Divine mystery. Additionally, he believes that it makes
his doctrine both sensible and desirable both to the Jew and to the Greek. Justin has done the
apologetic work of a second century Christian philosopher, and he has done it with distinction.
His arguments are conversant with his times. Later thinkers will, of course, find fault with his
lack of precision but we must remember that Justin lives and writes in a time where
philosophical and theological doctrines are actively being ratified and codified. We must also do
him the decency to recall that we have only a very limited amount of his thought preserved for us
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and not judge his philosophical subtlety too harshly based upon a small and extremely directed
sample of his thought. Justin has thus shown himself to be a master philosophical apologist and
advanced the uses of the DDI dramatically.
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
The Doctrine of Divine Immutability is a philosophical and theological postulate that is
well entrenched in the world of monotheisms and has been since the Medieval period. While it
has undergone some specific challenges in recent decades by Whitehead and other process
theorists, it remains a widely held dogma for many religious believers as well as holding
significance for various philosophical and theological postulates—such as a standard theodicy in
the face of the problem of evil. Another way that the problem is engaged is as a matter of modal
logic, and an attempt to understand how language can be applied to divine entities in “God-talk”
language games. While the analytic usefulness of these techniques is unquestionably useful in
articulating the minutia of various distinct attributes of the divine, these distinctions are not hard
and fast in the world in which the DDI is generated. The uses to which the DDI is put by
Medieval and later philosophers and theologians is as varied as these scholars themselves. It is
foundationally important, however, that we not read the DDI of later periods anachronistically
into the periods in which it is generated and first formed.
The DDI in later periods functions as a fully formed doctrine that does very specific
explanatory work qua the systematic understandings of the Divine and its place in specific
religious systems. This particular attribute of the Divine is then an explanatory factor of other
things that are understood as either desirable or true about divine existence. The fullness of these
theological doctrines and systems, as well as their individual doctrinal elements, are not mere
curiosities or speculations about the nature of reality. Rather they are holistic metanarratives that
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ground doxastic praxis. Rather than an attempt to understand the metaphysical underpinnings of
reality, or to relate the Divine and the profane through contemplation or system building, the
fully formed religious systems are cultic. Such cultic systems do not attempt to bring knowledge
through intellection, but rather prize knowledge via association with the Divine entity.
Accordingly comprehension is not the goal of such systems, but conditioning the individual soul
for the condescension of the Divine. In systems like these the doctrines are explanatory of the
personal experience and the data set that is taken as correct. It is exactly at this point that
revelatory systems like Judaism and early Christianity have some direct overlap with the
philosophy of Middle Platonism and Stoicism. As previously argued this time period is
particularly bibliophilic. While our two religious systems known to care deeply about revelatory
texts, the philosophic traditions have no less of a tradition of received wisdom that functions as a
given data set from which they work. The greatest distinction between these two types of
tradition is the level of speculation that those who practice them are comfortable with. For each
of these received systems, however, we see the same sort of desire to properly and fully
articulate the truth of the Divine.
When we consider its genesis and early development, however, we find that it does
something rather different. It is not a doctrine that is articulated or assumed as a means of
making the system function. It is, rather, the culmination of a series of speculative moves at the
beginnings of systematic philosophical theology. The doctrine is not one that originates as a
means of explaining other attributes or doctrines, nor is it an anchor for a series of systematic
propositions that exist in a logical web with one another. It is only later that such robust systems
are fully formed enough to require such metaphysical hangers and anchors. As I have shown here
the DDI is an answer to a fundamental question of the distinct nature of Divine Ontology.
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Parmenides’s F3P provides the necessary explanatory factor for how this fact should be
understood. The DDI is generated as a means of properly articulating the way in which human
beings can understand the mysterious nature of the Divine and how it can be reconciled with the
profane order. This is a very different means of attacking the problems of ontology and truth. It
also functions to help solve the mysterious relationship between the One and the Many by giving
a lever from which the distinction by which such mysteries can be understood.
While understanding how the DDI functioned in its nascent period does not give a
mechanism to evaluate its internal logical consistency it does give us a more accurate idea of the
philosophical work that this doctrine does for the thinkers who first articulate it. A correct
understanding of how it was used, and the way in which it developed will deliver a fuller
understanding of the historical relationship between ancient Philosophy and religions
contemporary with it. Accordingly we will be able to use this account in order to provide a better
model for how such religions understood themselves. Understanding the way that this doctrine
answers particular mysteries will enable us to more accurately interpret the internal consistency
and philosophical work that such systems do in contributing to the development of the world’s
major religions. Of particular interest in regards to further work in this area would be to see how
such an overall view on the development of doctrines like this one can help more accurately
identify the nature of local parochial terms. We can also use this account to evaluate how these
doctrines should be understood so as to avoid mistaking the doctrines of the religion and
philosophical schools. In addition to all of these topics, we are also in a better position to
understand the way in which various philosophical schools and religious organizations in the
Middle Platonic period interact with and influence one another across geography (Cicero and
Philo for example, or the relationship between the Pauline literature and contemporary Stoicism).
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Furthermore we are in a better position to understand the development of both philosophy and
religious dogma in the Medieval period.
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